Editing Color term (section)

== Philosophy ==

Color objectivism holds that colors are objective, mind-independent properties of material objects or light sources and that color terms refer to objective reality. Two main forms are color primitivism, which sees colors as simple, irreducible qualities either realist or eliminativist, and color physicalism, which views colors as objective properties that require empirical investigation to understand. Color irrealism, eliminativism or fictionalism denies that material objects and light sources actually possess colors, though eliminativists may describe colors as dispositions or attributes of sensations, as seen in the work of [[Descartes]], [[Isaac Newton|Newton]], and others. Color dispositionalism sees colors as dispositional properties, existing as powers to cause color experiences in perceivers using the right conditions.<ref>{{Citation |last1=Maund |first1=Barry |contribution=Color |title=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |edition=Fall 2024 |editor-last1=Zalta |editor-first1=Edward N. |editor-last2=Nodelman |editor-first2=Uri |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2024/entries/color/ }}</ref> Averill's radical relationism argues that colors are relational properties. He suggests that the color term "yellow", for example, is a relational term tied to both populations of normal observers and optimal viewing conditions in specific environments.<ref>{{Citation |last1=Averill |first1=Edward Wilson |title=The Relational Nature of Color |journal=Philosophical Review |volume=101 |issue=3 |pages=551–588 |year=1992 |doi=10.2307/2186057 }}</ref>

For [[Wittgenstein]], in his work [[Remarks on Colour]], any puzzles about color and color terms can only be resolved through attention to the [[language games]] involved. He stated that our description of colors are neither fully [[empirism|empirical]] nor [[a priori]]. Statements such as "there cannot be a reddish green" are taken as a part of a [[logic]]al structure akin to geometry, institing that color-related terms and propositions are rooted in our language practices.

[[Frank Cameron Jackson|Frank Jackson]]'s [[knowledge argument]] against [[physicalism]] involves a famous thought experiment about Mary, a scientist knowing everything about the physical aspects of color, including physics and terms, but has lived her whole life in a black-and-white room. When Mary leaves the room and experiences color for the first time, she learns what it feels like to see color, i.e., acquires certain [[qualia]] while using the color term "red", suggesting subjective aspects of color experience.

The [[inverted spectrum]] argument states that two people could experience different subjective experiences while seeing the same color even when using the same color term "red". For example, one person might see red as what the other experiences as green, even though they both use the color term "red".

Hardin addresses the everyday color terms like "red", "yellow", "green", and "blue", as essential reference points in the study of color. He explores what elements of color are fundamental versus accidental, emphasizing his focus on a core set of colors, including white, black, and gray, while acknowledging a special place for brown in color perception.<ref>{{Citation |last1=Hardin |first1=Clyde L. |title=Color for Philosophers: Unweaving the Rainbow|publisher=Hackett  |year=1993 }}</ref> Peacock explores the relationship between how we conceptualize colors and how we experience them, examining whether color concepts, shaped by language and cognition, align with our subjective experience of color perception.<ref>{{Citation |last1=Peacocke |first1=Christopher |title=Colour Concepts and Colour Experience |journal=Synthese |volume=58 |issue=3 |pages=365–381 |year=1984 |publisher=Springer Nature}}</ref> 

For Foster, color constancy refers to the phenomenon where the perceived color of a surface remains stable despite changes in lighting conditions, such as intensity or spectral composition. <ref>{{Citation |last1=Foster |first1=David H. |title=Does Colour Constancy Exist? |journal=Trends in Cognitive Sciences |volume=7 |issue=10 |pages=439–443 |year=2003 |doi=10.1016/j.tics.2003.08.002}}</ref> Txapartegi analyzed how the ancient Greeks understood and categorized color through the concepts of hue, brightness, and saturation, using color terms from classical Greek texts.<ref>{{Citation |last1=Txapartegi |first1=E. |contribution=Hue, Brightness & Saturation in Classical Greek Chroma Terms |title=How Colours Matter to Philosophy |volume=388 |series=Synthese Library |editor-last=Silva |editor-first=Marcos |publisher=Springer |location=Cham |year=2017 |doi=10.1007/978-3-319-67398-1_2 }}</ref> 

Šekrst and Karlić introduced cognitive convenience, referring to naming of objects of a certain color, for which their hue is not as important as their brightness. For example, in various languages, grapes are described using color terms "white" and "black" even though their real hue is usually a  certain shade of green or purple.<ref>{{Citation |last1=Šekrst |first1=Kristina |last2=Karlić |first2=Virna |title=Red Onions are Clearly Purple: Cognitive Convenience in Color Naming |journal=Communication and Culture Online |volume=15 |issue=15 |year=2024|url=https://philpapers.org/rec/SEKROA-2}}</ref> Hansen and Chemla explore whether color adjectives, like "red" or "green", function as relative or absolute adjectives, using experimental methods instead of informal judgments. Their findings reveal interpersonal variation in how people apply color adjectives, challenging existing theories and highlighting the complexity of scalar adjectives and context sensitivity.<ref>{{Citation |last1=Hansen |first1=Nat |last2=Chemla |first2=Emmanuel |title=Color Adjectives, Standards, and Thresholds: An Experimental Investigation |journal=Linguistics and Philosophy |volume=40 |issue=3 |pages=1–40 |year=2017|url=https://philpapers.org/rec/HANCAS-2}}</ref>

Decock analzyes conceptual change and engineering in the context of color concepts, arguing that in the case of conceptual change of colour concepts varying degrees of optimization, design and control are possible.<ref>{{Citation |last1=Decock |first1=Lieven |title=Conceptual Change and Conceptual Engineering: The Case of Colour Concepts |journal=Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy |volume=64 |issue=1-2 |pages=168–185 |year=2021|url=https://philpapers.org/rec/DECCCA-2}}</ref> Krempel investigates whether differences in color terminology across languages lead to differences in color experience, questioning whether language can penetrate and affect perception. She argues that empirical studies do not conclusively support the idea of linguistic penetrability in color experience, even if differences exist between speakers of different languages.<ref>{{Citation |last1=Krempel |first1=Raquel |title=Is Color Experience Linguistically Penetrable? |journal=Synthese |volume=199 |issue=1-2 |pages=4261–4285 |year=2021}}</ref>