Editing False flag (section)

==Pseudo-operations==
Pseudo-operations are those in which forces of one power disguise themselves as enemy forces. For example, a state power may disguise teams of operatives as insurgents and, with the aid of defectors, infiltrate insurgent areas.<ref name="Cline">Cline, Lawrence E. (2005) [http://www.blackwaterusa.com/btw2005/articles/080105counter.pdf ''Pseudo Operations and Counterinsurgency: Lessons from other countries''], {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20161116130502/http://www.blackwaterusa.com/btw2005/articles/080105counter.pdf |date=16 November 2016}}, [[Strategic Studies Institute]].</ref> The aim of such pseudo-operations may be to gather short- or long-term [[intelligence]] or to engage in active operations, in particular [[assassination]]s of important enemies. However, they usually involve both, as the risks of exposure rapidly increase with time and intelligence gathering eventually leads to violent confrontation. Pseudo-operations may be directed by military or police forces, or both. Police forces are usually best suited to intelligence tasks; however, military provide the structure needed to back up such pseudo-ops with military response forces. According to US military expert Lawrence Cline (2005), "the teams typically have been controlled by police services, but this largely was due to the weaknesses in the respective military intelligence systems."<ref>{{cite web |title=Excerpt – Pseudo Operations and Counterinsurgency: Lessons from Other Countries |website=ssi.armywarcollege.edu |url=https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/summary.cfm?q=607 |access-date=2019-10-16 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170502082323/http://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/summary.cfm?q=607 |archive-date=2 May 2017}}</ref>

[[File:Charlemagne Péralte.jpg|thumb|upright|[[Charlemagne Péralte]] of Haiti was assassinated in 1919 after checkpoints were passed by military disguised as guerrilla fighters.]]
The [[State Political Directorate]] (OGPU) of the [[Soviet Union]] set up such an operation from 1921 to 1926. During [[Operation Trust]], they used loose networks of [[White Army]] supporters and extended them, creating the pseudo-"Monarchist Union of Central Russia" (MUCR) in order to help the OGPU identify real monarchists and anti-Bolsheviks.<ref name=":11">{{cite book |last1=Andrew |first1=Christopher |title=The Sword and the Shield: The Mitrokhin Archive and the Secret History of the KGB |date=2001 |publisher=Basic Books |isbn=0-465-00312-5 |pages=33–35, 42 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=l0g8Q14NPisC}}</ref>

An example of a successful assassination was [[United States Marine]] [[Sergeant]] [[Herman H. Hanneken]] leading a patrol of his [[Haiti]]an [[Gendarmerie]] disguised as enemy [[guerrilla]]s in 1919. The patrol successfully passed several enemy checkpoints in order to assassinate the guerilla leader [[Charlemagne Péralte]] near [[Grande-Rivière-du-Nord]]. Hanneken was awarded the [[Medal of Honor]]<ref>{{cite news |title=Ex-Marine Corps Gen. Hanneken Dies |date=1986-08-27 |work=Los Angeles Times |language=en-US |issn=0458-3035 |url=https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1986-08-27-me-14249-story.html |access-date=2017-11-07}}</ref> and was commissioned a Second Lieutenant for his deed.{{citation needed|date=December 2015}}

During the [[Mau Mau Uprising|Mau Mau uprising]] in the 1950s, captured Mau Mau members who switched sides and specially trained British troops initiated the pseudo-gang concept to successfully counter Mau Mau. In 1960, [[Frank Kitson]], who was later involved in the [[The Troubles|Northern Irish conflict]], published ''Gangs and Counter-gangs'', an account of his experiences with the technique in [[Kenya]]. Information included how to counter gangs and measures of deception, including the use of defectors, which brought the issue a wider audience.{{citation needed|date=December 2015}}

Another example of combined police and military oversight of pseudo-operations include the [[Selous Scouts]] in the former country [[Rhodesia]] (now [[Zimbabwe]]), governed by [[white minority rule]] until 1980. The Selous Scouts were formed at the beginning of [[Operation Hurricane]], in November 1973, by Major (later Lieutenant Colonel) [[Ronald Reid-Daly]]. As with all Special Forces in Rhodesia, by 1977, they were controlled by COMOPS (Commander, Combined Operations) Commander Lieutenant General [[Peter Walls]]. The Selous Scouts were originally composed of 120 members, with all officers being white and the highest rank initially available for black soldiers being [[colour sergeant]]. They succeeded in turning approximately 800 insurgents who were then paid by Special Branch, ultimately reaching the number of 1,500 members. Engaging mainly in long-range reconnaissance and surveillance missions, they increasingly turned to offensive actions, including the attempted assassination of [[Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army]] leader [[Joshua Nkomo]] in [[Zambia]]. This mission was finally aborted by the Selous Scouts, and attempted again, unsuccessfully, by the [[Rhodesian Special Air Service]].<ref>Cline (2005), p. 11.</ref>

Some offensive operations attracted international condemnation, in particular the Selous Scouts' raid on a [[Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army]] (ZANLA) camp at Nyadzonya Pungwe, [[Mozambique]] in August 1976. ZANLA was then led by [[Josiah Tongogara]]. Using Rhodesian trucks and armored cars disguised as Mozambique military vehicles, 84 scouts killed 1,284 people in the camp, registered as a [[refugee camp]] by the [[United Nations]] (UN). Even according to Reid-Daly, most of those killed were unarmed guerrillas standing in formation for a parade. The camp hospital was also set ablaze by the rounds fired by the Scouts, killing all patients.<ref>Cline (2005), quoting Reid-Daly, ''Pamwe Chete: The Legend of the Selous Scouts'', Weltevreden Park, South Africa: [[Covos-Day]] Books, 1999, p. 10 (republished by Covos Day, 2001, {{ISBN|978-1-919874-33-3}}).</ref> According to David Martin and Phyllis Johnson, who visited the camp shortly before the raid, it was only a refugee camp that did not host any guerrillas. It was staged for UN approval.<ref>Cline (2005), who quotes David Martin and Phyllis Johnson, ''The Struggle for Zimbabwe: the Chimurenga War'', New York: Monthly Review Press, 1981, pp. 241–242.</ref>

According to a 1978 study by the Directorate of Military Intelligence, 68% of all insurgent deaths inside Rhodesia could be attributed to the Selous Scouts, who were disbanded in 1980.<ref>Cline (2005), pp. 8–13. For 1978 study, quotes J. K. Cilliers, ''Counter-insurgency in Rhodesia'', London: [[Croom Helm]], 1985, pp. 60–77. Cline also quotes Ian F. W. Beckett, ''The Rhodesian Army: Counter-Insurgency 1972–1979'' at [http://members.tripod.com/selousscouts/ selousscouts].</ref>

If the action is a police action, then these tactics would fall within the laws of the state initiating the pseudo, but if such actions are taken in a [[civil war]] or during a [[belligerent military occupation]] then those who participate in such actions would not be [[privileged belligerent]]s. The principle of [[plausible deniability]] is usually applied for pseudo-teams. (See the above section [[#Laws of war|Laws of war]]){{clarify |date=December 2024 |reason=This links to a non-existing section.}}. Some false flag operations have been described by Lawrence E. Cline, a retired [[US Army intelligence]] officer, as pseudo-operations, or "the use of organized teams which are disguised as guerrilla groups for long- or short-term penetration of [[insurgency|insurgent]]-controlled areas".<ref name="Cline"/>

"Pseudo-operations should be distinguished," notes Cline, "from the more common police or intelligence [[espionage|infiltration]] of guerrilla or criminal organizations. In the latter case, infiltration is normally done by individuals. Pseudo teams, on the other hand, are formed as needed from organized units, usually military or [[paramilitary]]. The use of pseudo teams has been a hallmark of a number of foreign [[counterinsurgency]] campaigns."<ref name="Cline"/>

Similar false flag tactics were also employed during the [[Algerian Civil War]], starting in the middle of 1994. [[Death squad]]s composed of [[Département du Renseignement et de la Sécurité]] (DRS) security forces disguised themselves as Islamist terrorists and committed false flag terror attacks. Such groups included the [[Organisation of Young Free Algerians]] (OJAL) or the Secret Organisation for the Safeguard of the Algerian Republic (OSSRA).<ref>Lounis Aggoun and Jean-Baptiste Rivoire (2004). ''Françalgérie, crimes et mensonges d'Etats'', (Franco-Algeria, Crimes and Lies of the States). {{ill|Editions La Découverte|fr|La Découverte}}. {{ISBN|2-7071-4747-8}}. Extract in English with mention of the OJAL [http://www.algeria-watch.org/en/analyses/ojal.htm available here].</ref> According to [[Roger Faligot]] and Pascal Kropp (1999), the OJAL was reminiscent of "the Organization of the French Algerian Resistance (ORAF), a group of counter-terrorists created in December 1956 by the [[Direction de la surveillance du territoire]] (Territorial Surveillance Directorate, or DST) whose mission was to carry out terrorist attacks with the aim of quashing any hopes of political compromise".<ref>Luonis Aggoun and Jean-Baptiste Rivoire, ''ibid.'', quoting [[Roger Faligot]] and Pascal KROP, ''DST, Police Secrète'', [[Groupe Flammarion|Flammarion]], 1999, p. 174.</ref>