Editing First day on the Somme (section)

===German preparations===
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|+'''Weather'''<br /><small>(23 June – 1 July)</small>{{sfn|Gliddon|1987|p=415}}
|-
!Date
!Rain<br />mm
![[°F]]/[[°C]]
!
|-
| 23||2.0||79°–55°<br />26°–12°||wind
|-
| 24||1.0||72°–52°<br />22°–11°||dull
|-
| 25||1.0||71°–54°<br />22°–12°||wind
|-
| 26||6.0||72°–52°<br />22°–11°||cloud
|-
| 27||8.0||68°–54°<br />20°–12°||cloud
|-
| 28||2.0||68°–50°<br />20°–10°||dull
|-
| 29||0.1||66°–52°<br />19°–11°||cloud<br />wind
|-
| 30||0.0||72°–48°<br />22°–9°||dull<br />gale
|-
|1 Jul||0.0||79°–52°<br />26°–11°||clear
|}
Many of the German units on the Somme had arrived in 1914 and made great efforts to fortify the defensive line, particularly with barbed-wire entanglements beyond the front trench, with fewer troops. Railways, roads and waterways connected the battlefront to the Ruhr, the source of material for {{lang|de|minierte Stollen}}, dug-outs {{cvt|20|–|30|ft}} underground, big enough for {{nowrap|25 men}} each, excavated every {{cvt|50|yd}}.{{sfn|Rogers|2010|pp=57–58}} In February 1916, following the {{lang|de|Herbstschlacht}} (Autumn Battle, [[Second Battle of Champagne]]) in 1915, a third defensive position another {{cvt|3000|yd|mi+km}} back from the {{lang|de|Stützpunktlinie}} was begun and was nearly complete on the Somme front when the battle began. The German artillery was organised in {{lang|de|Sperrfeuerstreifen}} (barrage sectors); each infantry officer was expected to know the batteries covering his section of the front line and the batteries had to be ready to engage fleeting targets. A telephone system with lines {{cvt|6|ft}} deep {{cvt|5|mi}} back from the front line linked the artillery.{{sfn|Wynne|1976|pp=100–103}}

The Somme defences had two inherent weaknesses that the rebuilding had not remedied. The front trenches were on a forward slope, lined by white chalk from the [[subsoil]] and easily seen by observers on the British side of no man's land. The defences were crowded towards the front trench, with a regiment having two battalions near the front-trench system and the reserve battalion divided between the {{lang|de|Stützpunktlinie}} and the second position, all within {{cvt|2000|yd}} of the front line; most troops were within {{cvt|1000|yd}} of the front line, in the new deep dugouts. The concentration of troops forward guaranteed that they would face the bulk of an artillery bombardment, directed by ground observers on clearly marked lines.{{sfn|Wynne|1976|pp=100–103}} Digging and wiring of a new third position had begun in May; civilians were moved away and stocks of ammunition and hand-grenades were increased in the front-line.{{sfn|Philpott|2009|pp=157–165}}

By mid-June, General [[Fritz von Below]] (commander of the 2nd Army) and [[Crown Prince Rupprecht]] (commander of the 6th Army) expected an attack on the 2nd Army, which held the front from north of [[Gommecourt, Pas-de-Calais|Gommecourt]] to [[Noyon]] south of the Somme. Falkenhayn was more concerned about an offensive in [[Alsace-Lorraine]] and an attack on the 6th Army that held the front north of the 2nd Army, from Gommecourt to [[St Eloi]] near Ypres. In April, Falkenhayn had suggested a spoiling attack by the 6th Army but the demands of the offensive at Verdun made it impossible. In May, Below proposed a preventive attack (a suggestion latter reduced, in June, to an operation from [[Ovillers]] to St Pierre Divion) but was only assigned one more artillery regiment, some labour battalions and captured Russian heavy artillery. On 6 June, Below reported that air reconnaissance showed that attacks at [[Fricourt]] and Gommecourt were possible and that the French troops south of the Somme had been reinforced. [[XVII Corps (German Empire)|XVII Corps]] held the ground opposite the French but it was overstretched, with twelve regiments holding {{cvt|36|km|order=flip}} of front line with no reserves.{{sfn|Edmonds|1993|pp=316–319}}

In mid-June, Falkenhayn remained sceptical of an offensive on the Somme, as a great success would lead to operations in Belgium; an offensive in Alsace-Lorraine would take the war and its devastation into Germany. More railway activity, fresh digging and camp extensions around Albert opposite the 2nd Army was seen by German air observers on {{nowrap|9 and 11 June;}} spies reported an imminent offensive. On 24 June, a British prisoner spoke of a five-day bombardment to begin on 26 June and local units expected an attack within days. On 27 June, 14 [[observation balloon]]s were visible, one for each British division. No German reinforcements were sent to the area until 1 July and only then to the 6th Army, that had also been given control of the three divisions in ''OHL'' reserve behind it. At Verdun, on 24 June, [[Crown Prince Wilhelm]] was ordered to conserve troops, ammunition and equipment and further restrictions were imposed on 1 July when two divisions were taken under ''OHL'' command.{{sfn|Edmonds|1993|pp=316–319}} By 30 June, the German air strength on the 2nd Army front was six {{lang|de|Feldflieger-Abteilungen}} (reconnaissance flights) with {{nowrap|42 aircraft,}} four {{lang|de|Artillerieflieger-Abteilungen}} (artillery flights) with {{nowrap|17 aeroplanes,}} {{lang|de|Kampfgeschwader 1}} (Bomber-Fighter Squadron 1) with {{nowrap|43 aircraft,}} {{lang|de|Kampfstaffel 32}} (Bomber-Fighter Flight 32) with {{nowrap|8 aeroplanes}} and a {{lang|de|Kampfeinsitzer-Kommando}} (single-seat fighter detachment) with {{nowrap|19 aeroplanes}}, a total of {{nowrap|129 aircraft}}.{{sfn|Jones|2002|p=201}}