Editing Hard problem of consciousness (section)

===== Criticisms =====
The main criticisms of eliminative materialism and illusionism hinge on the counterintuitive nature of the view. Arguments of this form are called ''Moorean Arguments''. A Moorean argument seeks to undermine the conclusion of an argument by asserting that the [[negation]] of that conclusion is more certain than the [[premise]]s of the argument.<ref>{{cite journal
| last = Scarfone
| first = Matthew
| year = 2022
| title = Using and Abusing Moorean Arguments
| journal = Journal of the American Philosophical Association
| volume = 8
| issue = 1
| pages = 52–71
| doi = 10.1017/apa.2020.47
| s2cid = 239672728
| url = https://philpapers.org/rec/SCAUAA-2
}}</ref>

The roots of the Moorean Argument against illusionism extend back to [[Augustine of Hippo]] who stated that he could not be deceived regarding his own existence, since the very act of being deceived secures the existence of a being there to be the recipient of that deception.<ref group="note">"But, without any delusive representations of images or phantasms, I am most certain that I am, and that I know and delight in this. In respect to these truths I am not at all afraid of the arguments of the Academians, who say, What if you are deceived? For if I am deceived, I am. For he who is not, cannot be deceived..."</ref><ref>{{cite book
| last = Augustine of Hippo
| title = City of God
| chapter = Book 11, Chapter 26
}}</ref>

{{Wikisource|Discourse on the Method/Part 4|Descartes' Discourse on the Method/Part 4}}
In the Early-Modern era, these arguments were repopularized by [[René Descartes]], who coined the now famous phrase ''"Je pense, donc je suis"'' ("I think, therefore I am").<ref>{{cite book
| last = Descartes
| first = René
| year = 1637
| title = Discourse on the Method
| chapter = 4
}}</ref> Descartes argued that even if he was maximally deceived (because, for example, an evil demon was manipulating all his senses) he would still know with certainty that his mind exists, because the state of being deceived requires a mind as a prerequisite.<ref>{{cite book
| last = Descartes
| first = René
| year = 1641
| title = Meditations on First Philosophy
| chapter = Second Meditation
}}</ref>

This same general argumentative structure is still in use today. For example, in 2002 David Chalmers published an explicitly Moorean argument against illusionism. The argument goes like this: The reality of consciousness is more certain than any theoretical commitments (to, for example, physicalism) that may be motivating the illusionist to deny the existence of consciousness. The reason for this is because we have direct "acquaintance" with consciousness, but we do not have direct acquaintance with anything else (including anything that could inform our beliefs in consciousness being an illusion). In other words: consciousness can be known directly, so the reality of consciousness is more certain than any philosophical or scientific theory that says otherwise.<ref name="chalmers202-illusionism">{{cite journal
| last = Chalmers
| first = David
| year = 2020
| title = Debunking Arguments for Illusionism
| journal = Journal of Consciousness Studies
| volume = 27
| issue = 5–6
| pages = 258–281
| url = https://philpapers.org/rec/CHADAF-2
}}</ref> Chalmers concludes that "there is little doubt that something like the Moorean argument is the reason that most people reject illusionism and many find it crazy."<ref name="chalmers2020-illusionism">{{cite journal| last = Chalmers| first = David| year = 2002| title = Debunking Arguments for Illusionism| journal = Journal of Consciousness Studies| volume = 27| issue = 5–6| pages = 258–281| url = https://philpapers.org/rec/CHADAF-2}}</ref>

Eliminative materialism and illusionism have been the subject of criticism within the popular press. One highly cited example comes from the philosopher [[Galen Strawson]] who wrote an article in the [[New York Review of Books]] titled "The Consciousness Deniers". In it, Strawson describes illusionism as the "silliest claim ever made", next to which "every known religious belief is only a little less sensible than the belief that the grass is green."<ref>
{{cite web
|last=Strawson
|first=G.
|year=2018
|title=The Consciousness Deniers
|url=https://www.nybooks.com/daily/2018/03/13/the-consciousness-deniers/
|website=The New York Review of Books
}}</ref> Another notable example comes from [[Christof Koch]] (a neuroscientist and one of the leading proponents of [[Integrated Information Theory]]) in his popular science book ''The Feeling of Life Itself''. In the early pages of the book, Koch describes eliminativism as the "metaphysical counterpart to Cotard's syndrome, a psychiatric condition in which patients deny being alive."<ref>
{{cite book
|last=Koch
|first=Christof
|year=2019
|title=The Feeling of Life Itself: Why Consciousness is Everywhere But Can't be Computed
|publisher=MIT Press
|pages=2
}}</ref> Koch takes the prevalence of eliminativism as evidence that "much of twentieth-century analytic philosophy has gone to the dogs".<ref>
{{cite book
|last=Koch
|first=Christof
|year=2019
|title=The Feeling of Life Itself: Why Consciousness is Everywhere But Can't be Computed
|publisher=MIT Press
|pages=3
}}</ref>

Frankish has responded to such criticisms by asserting that "qualia realists" have to conceive of qualia as being either observational or theoretical in nature. If conceived of as observational, then realists cannot claim that illusionists are leaving anything out of their theories of consciousness, as such a claim would presuppose qualia as having certain theoretical components. If conceived of as theoretical, then illusionists are simply denying the theoretical components of qualia but not the mere fact that they exist, which is what they're attempting to explain in the first place.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Frankish |first=Keith |date=2022-12-02 |title=A dilemma for illusionists — and another for realists! |url=https://www.keithfrankish.com/blog/a-dilemma-for-illusionists-and-another-for-realists/ |access-date=2025-02-01 |website=Keith Frankish |language=en-GB}}</ref>