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Problem of universals
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== Indian philosophy == === Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika (Realist position) === Indian philosophers raise the problem of universals in relation to [[semantics]].<ref>{{Cite book |last=Perrett |first=Roy W. |url=https://www.cambridge.org/highereducation/books/an-introduction-to-indian-philosophy/B9CD240194015F1D13BCDE7CA376CB86#contents |title=An Introduction to Indian Philosophy |date=2016-01-25 |publisher=Cambridge University Press |isbn=978-0-521-85356-9 |edition=1 |pages=132 |doi=10.1017/cbo9781139033589}}</ref> Universals are postulated as referents for the meanings of general terms. The [[Nyaya|Nyāya]]-[[Vaisheshika|Vaiśeṣika]] school conceives of universals as perceptible eternal entities, existing independently of our minds. Nyāya postulates the existence of universals based on our experience of a common characteristic among particulars. Thus, the meaning of a word is understood as a particular further characterized by a universal.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Perrett |first=Roy W. |url=https://www.cambridge.org/highereducation/books/an-introduction-to-indian-philosophy/B9CD240194015F1D13BCDE7CA376CB86#contents |title=An Introduction to Indian Philosophy |date=2016-01-25 |publisher=Cambridge University Press |isbn=978-0-521-85356-9 |edition=1 |pages=132–133 |doi=10.1017/cbo9781139033589}}</ref> For example, the meaning of the term 'cow' refers to a particular cow characterized by the universal of 'cowness'. Nyāya holds that although universals are apprehended differently from particulars, they are not separate, given their inherence in the particulars.<ref name="Perrett 135">{{Cite book |last=Perrett |first=Roy W. |url=https://www.cambridge.org/highereducation/books/an-introduction-to-indian-philosophy/B9CD240194015F1D13BCDE7CA376CB86#contents |title=An Introduction to Indian Philosophy |date=2016-01-25 |publisher=Cambridge University Press |isbn=978-0-521-85356-9 |edition=1 |pages=135 |doi=10.1017/cbo9781139033589}}</ref> Not every term, however, corresponds to a universal. [[Udayana|Udāyana]] puts forward six conditions for identifying genuine universals.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Perrett |first=Roy W. |url=https://www.cambridge.org/highereducation/books/an-introduction-to-indian-philosophy/B9CD240194015F1D13BCDE7CA376CB86#contents |title=An Introduction to Indian Philosophy |date=2016-01-25 |publisher=Cambridge University Press |isbn=978-0-521-85356-9 |edition=1 |pages=133–134 |doi=10.1017/cbo9781139033589}}</ref> === Mīmaṃsã (Realist position) === Like the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school, [[Mīmāṃsā|Mīmaṃsã]] characterizes universals as referents for words. The fundamental difference between Bhāṭṭa Mīmaṃsā's and Nyāya is that Bhāṭṭa Mīmaṃsa rejects the Nyāya understanding of the universals' relation of inherence to the particulars.<ref name="Perrett 135"/> The Hindu philosopher [[Kumārila Bhaṭṭa]] argues that if inherence is different from the terms of the relation, it would continuously require another common relation, and if the inherence is non-different, it would be superfluous.<ref name="Perrett 135"/> === Buddhist Nominalism === Buddhist ontology regards the world as consisting of momentary particulars and mentally constructed universals.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Perrett |first=Roy W. |url=https://www.cambridge.org/highereducation/books/an-introduction-to-indian-philosophy/B9CD240194015F1D13BCDE7CA376CB86#contents |title=An Introduction to Indian Philosophy |date=2016-01-25 |publisher=Cambridge University Press |isbn=978-0-521-85356-9 |edition=1 |pages=136 |doi=10.1017/cbo9781139033589}}</ref> In contrast to the realist schools of Indian philosophy, Buddhist logicians put forward a positive theory of nominalism, known as the [[apoha]] theory, which denies the existence of universals. The apoha theory identifies particulars through double negation, not requiring for a general shared essence between terms. For instance, the term 'cow' can be understood as referring to every entity of its exclusion class 'non-cow'.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Perrett |first=Roy W. |url=https://www.cambridge.org/highereducation/books/an-introduction-to-indian-philosophy/B9CD240194015F1D13BCDE7CA376CB86#contents |title=An Introduction to Indian Philosophy |date=2016-01-25 |publisher=Cambridge University Press |isbn=978-0-521-85356-9 |edition=1 |pages=137 |doi=10.1017/cbo9781139033589}}</ref>
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