Editing Vote counting (section)

===Secure storage to enable counts in future===
[[File:AEC-Senate-ballots-sealed-1.jpg|thumb|Australia-Senate-ballots-sealed]]
[[File:AEC-HoR-ballots-sealed-2.jpg|thumb|Australia-ballots-sealed]]
[[File:AEC-HoR-ballots-sealed-3.jpg|thumb|Australia-ballots-sealed]]

If ballots or other paper or electronic records of an election may be needed for counting or court review after a period of time, they need to be stored securely.

Election storage often uses [[Tamper-evident technology#Seals and signatures|tamper-evident seals]],<ref name="eac-phys">{{Cite web |url=https://www.eac.gov/assets/1/6/260.pdf |archive-url=https://wayback.archive-it.org/all/20170327214637/https://www.eac.gov/assets/1/6/260.pdf |url-status=dead |archive-date=March 27, 2017 |title=Chapter 3. PHYSICAL SECURITY |website=US Election Assistance Commission |access-date=April 24, 2018 }}</ref><ref name="wp">{{Cite web |url=https://www.stat.berkeley.edu/~stark/Preprints/RLAwhitepaper12.pdf |title=Risk-Limiting Post-Election Audits: Why and How |last1=Lindeman |first1=Mark|first2=Jennie|last2= Bretschneider|first3= Sean|last3= Flaherty|first4= Susannah|last4=Goodman|first5=Mark|last5=Halvorson|first6= Roger |last6=Johnston|first7= Ronald L.|last7=Rivest|first8=Pam|last8=Smith|first9=Philip B.|last9=Stark |date=October 1, 2012 |website=University of California at Berkeley |pages=3, 16 |access-date=April 9, 2018}}</ref> 
although seals can typically be removed and reapplied without damage, especially in the first 48 hours.<ref name="seals"/> Photos taken when the seal is applied can be compared to photos taken when the seal is opened.<ref name="hoover">{{Cite web |url=https://www.stat.berkeley.edu/~stark/Preprints/lhc18.pdf |title=An Introduction to Risk-Limiting Audits and Evidence-Based Elections Prepared for the Little Hoover Commission |last=Stark |first=Philip |date=July 26, 2018 |website=University of California, Berkeley |access-date=August 16, 2019}}</ref>
Detecting subtle tampering requires substantial training.<ref name="seals">{{Cite news |url=http://www.alu.army.mil/alog/issues/JulAug12/Choose_Use_Seals.html |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130224233221/http://www.alu.army.mil/alog/issues/JulAug12/Choose_Use_Seals.html |url-status=dead |archive-date=February 24, 2013 |title=How to Choose and Use Seals |last=Johnston |first=Roger G. |author2=Jon S. Warner |date=July 31, 2012 |work=Army Sustainment |access-date=May 4, 2018}}</ref><ref name="freeman2017">{{Cite web |last=Coherent Cyber |publisher=Freeman, Craft McGregor Group |date=August 28, 2017 |title=Security Test Report ES&S Electionware 5.2.1.0 |url=http://votingsystems.cdn.sos.ca.gov/vendors/ess/evs5210/ess5210-sec.pdf |pages=9 |via=California Secretary of State}}</ref><ref name="stauffer">{{Cite web |last=Stauffer |first=Jacob |date=November 4, 2016 |title=Vulnerability & Security Assessment Report Election Systems &Software's Unity 3.4.1.0 |url=https://www.verifiedvoting.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/ESS-red-team-CA-2016.pdf |via=Freeman, Craft, MacGregor Group for California Secretary of State}}</ref> Election officials usually take too little time to examine seals, and observers are too far away to check seal numbers, though they could compare old and new photos projected on a screen. If seal numbers and photos are kept for later comparison, these numbers and photos need their own secure storage. Seals can also be forged. Seals and locks can be cut so observers cannot trust the storage. If the storage is breached, election results cannot be checked and corrected.

Experienced testers can usually bypass all physical security systems.<ref name="sevold"/> Locks<ref name="eff-delayed">There are several sources on lock vulnerabilities:
*Lockpicking is widely [[locksport|taught and practiced]]: {{Cite news |url=https://slate.com/human-interest/2013/03/locksport-the-strange-things-that-happen-at-a-lock-picking-convention.html |title=The Strange Things That Happen at a Lock-picking Convention |last=Vanderbilt |first=Tom |date=March 12, 2013|work=Slate |access-date=August 15, 2019 |language=en}} 
*Different techniques apply to electronic locks: {{Cite news |url=https://www.reuters.com/article/us-locks-cyber-exclusive-idUSKCN1UW26Z |title=Exclusive: High-security locks for government and banks hacked by researcher |last=Menn |first=Joseph |date=August 6, 2019 |work=Reuters |access-date=August 16, 2019 |language=en}} 
*More on electronic locks: {{Cite magazine |url=https://www.wired.com/2017/08/the-hotel-hacker/ |title=Inside an Epic Hotel Room Hacking Spree |last=Greenberg |first=Andy |date=August 29, 2017 |magazine=Wired |access-date=August 16, 2019 |language=en-US |issn=1059-1028}} 
*There are no statistics on how often criminals enter rooms undetected, but [[Sneak and peek warrant|law enforcement]] often does so, so ability to enter rooms undetected is widespread: {{Cite web |url=https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2014/10/peekaboo-i-see-you-government-uses-authority-meant-terrorism-other-uses |title=Peekaboo, I See You: Government Authority Intended for Terrorism is Used for Other Purposes |last=Tien |first=Lee |date=October 26, 2014 |website=Electronic Frontier Foundation |language=en |access-date=August 15, 2019}}</ref> 
and cameras<ref name="ifsec">Security camera flaws have been covered extensively: 
*{{Cite web |url=https://www.ifsecglobal.com/cyber-security/how-to-hack-a-security-camera/ |title=How to hack a security camera. It's alarmingly simple |last=Bannister |first=Adam |date=October 7, 2016 |website=IFSEC Global, Security and Fire News and Resources |access-date=August 16, 2019}} 
*{{Cite news |url=https://www.forbes.com/sites/zakdoffman/2019/08/02/u-s-military-spends-millions-on-dangerous-chinese-tech-with-known-cyber-risks/ |title=Official Cybersecurity Review Finds U.S. Military Buying High-Risk Chinese Tech (Updated) |last=Doffman |first=Zak |work=Forbes |access-date=August 14, 2019 |language=en}} 
*{{Cite web |url=https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2007/10/hacking_securit.html |title=Hacking Security Cameras - Schneier on Security |last=Schneier |first=Bruce |date=October 8, 2007 |website=www.schneier.com |access-date=August 16, 2019}} 
*{{Cite web |url=https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2019/06/11/critical-flaws-found-in-amcrest-security-cameras/ |title=Critical flaws found in Amcrest security cameras |last=Dunn |first=John |date=June 11, 2019 |website=Naked Security |language=en |access-date=August 16, 2019}}</ref>
are vulnerable before and after delivery.<ref name="sevold"/>
Guards can be bribed or blackmailed. Insider threats<ref name="cleveland">{{Cite news |url=https://www.cleveland.com/metro/2007/11/elections_board_workers_to_tak.html |title=Elections board workers take plea deal |last=Turner |first=Karl |date=November 5, 2007 |work=Cleveland Plain Dealer |access-date=August 17, 2019 |language=en-US}}</ref><ref name="recountnow">{{Cite web |url=http://votewell.homestead.com/clark_county_report.pdf |title=Report on the 2016 Presidential Recount in Clark County, Nevada. Page 20. |last=Recount Now |date=January 11, 2017|website=Internet Archive |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190812144903/http://votewell.homestead.com/clark_county_report.pdf |access-date=August 17, 2019|archive-date=2019-08-12 }}</ref>
and the difficulty of following all security procedures are usually under-appreciated, and most organizations do not want to learn their vulnerabilities.<ref name="sevold">{{Cite web |url=http://losspreventionmedia.com/insider/retail-security/physical-security-threats-and-vulnerabilities/ |title=Physical Security Threats and Vulnerabilities - LPM |last=Seivold |first=Garett |date=April 2, 2018 |website=losspreventionmedia.com |language=en-US |access-date=April 24, 2018}}</ref>

Security recommendations include preventing access by anyone alone,<ref name="bp2018">{{Cite web |url=https://electionaudits.org/files/Audit%20Principles%20and%20Best%20Practices%202018.pdf |title=Principles and Best Practices for Post-Election Tabulation Audits |date=2018 |website=ElectionAudits.org |access-date=August 12, 2019}}</ref>
which would typically require two hard-to-pick locks, and having keys held by independent officials if such officials exist in the jurisdiction; having storage risks identified by people other than those who design or manage the system; and using background checks on staff.<ref name="eac-phys"/>

No US state has adequate laws on physical security of the ballots.<ref name="evote">{{Cite conference |book-title=Proceedings of the Second International Conference on Electronic Voting |last=Benaloh|display-authors=etal|title=Public Evidence from Secret Ballots |year=2017 |isbn=9783319686875 |location=Cham, Switzerland |pages=122 |oclc=1006721597 |arxiv=1707.08619}}</ref>

Starting the tally soon after voting ends makes it feasible for independent parties to guard storage sites.<ref name="sleep">Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) policy calls for independent foreign officials to sleep with ballots, and allows parties to do so:
*{{Cite web |url=https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6a6e84.html |title=Municipal Elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina |last=International Crisis Group (ICG) |date=September 10, 1997 |website=RefWorld |language=en |access-date=August 12, 2019 }}
*{{Cite web |url=http://www.ohr.int/ohr_archive/ohr-srt-news-summary-7-september-1998/ |title=OHR SRT News Summary, September 7, 1998 |date=September 7, 1998 |website=Office of the High Representative (Bosnia+Herzegovina) |language=en-US |access-date=August 12, 2019 }}
Turkish opposition sleeping with balllots:
*{{Cite news |url=https://ahvalnews.com/local-elections/turkeys-opposition-sleeping-beside-ballots-safeguard-democracy |title=Turkey's opposition sleeping beside ballots to safeguard democracy |date=April 4, 2019 |work=Ahval |access-date=August 12, 2019 |language=en |archive-date=August 12, 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190812170256/https://ahvalnews.com/local-elections/turkeys-opposition-sleeping-beside-ballots-safeguard-democracy |url-status=dead }}
*{{Cite news |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/01/world/europe/turkey-erdogan-election-loss.html |title=A Political Quake in Turkey as Erdogan's Party Loses in His Home Base of Support |last=Gall |first=Carlotta |date=April 1, 2019 |work=The New York Times |access-date=August 12, 2019 |language=en-US |issn=0362-4331 }}
Republicans guarded warehouse of voted ballots in 2000 in Florida and had state police lock up ballots in New Mexico:
*{{Cite web |url=https://adst.org/2016/10/2000-presidential-election-florida-recount/ |title=The 2000 Presidential Election – The Florida Recount |last=Cobb |first=Sue |date=2016-10-17 |website=Association for Diplomatic Studies & Training |language=en-US |access-date=2020-03-11 }}
*{{Cite news |last=Baker |first=Deborah |url=https://www.abqjournal.com/elex/apvotes10-31-04.htm |title=ABQjournal: Contentious 2000 Election Closest in N.M. History |date=2004-10-31 |work=Albuquerque Journal |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210607181458/https://www.abqjournal.com/elex/apvotes10-31-04.htm |access-date=2020-03-11 |archive-date=2021-06-07 }}</ref>