Editing Anchoring effect (section)

===Motivation/rewards===

The motivation to be accurate in one's judgements seem to have mixed effects on the strength of anchoring. On one hand, According to Wegener's attitude change theory, it was widely accepted that the prevalent effects of anchoring was due to the pathway of low-elaboration, non-thoughtful processes.<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Wegener |first1=Duane T. |last2=Petty |first2=Richard E. |last3=Blankenship |first3=Kevin L. |last4=Detweiler-Bedell |first4=Brian |date=January 2010 |title=Elaboration and numerical anchoring: Implications of attitude theories for consumer judgment and decision making |url=https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcps.2009.12.003 |journal=Journal of Consumer Psychology |volume=20 |issue=1 |pages=5–16 |doi=10.1016/j.jcps.2009.12.003 |issn=1057-7408|url-access=subscription }}</ref> The lack of reward or consequences results in the assumption that anchors are a reasonable hint to the correct answer without considering contextual differences, categorical differences, or even the relevance of the anchor. There is also evidence that the effects of anchoring is diminished when there is prior warning about the phenomenon of insufficient adjustment <ref>{{Cite journal |last1=LeBoeuf |first1=Robyn A. |last2=Shafir |first2=Eldar |date=2009 |title=Anchoring on the "here" and "now" in time and distance judgments. |url=https://doi.org/10.1037/a0013665 |journal=Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition |volume=35 |issue=1 |pages=81–93 |doi=10.1037/a0013665 |pmid=19210082 |issn=1939-1285|url-access=subscription }}</ref> and self-generated anchors.<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Epley |first1=Nicholas |last2=Gilovich |first2=Thomas |date=2005 |title=When effortful thinking influences judgmental anchoring: differential effects of forewarning and incentives on self-generated and externally provided anchors |url=https://doi.org/10.1002/bdm.495 |journal=Journal of Behavioral Decision Making |volume=18 |issue=3 |pages=199–212 |doi=10.1002/bdm.495 |issn=0894-3257|url-access=subscription }}</ref><ref name=":02">{{Cite journal |last1=Furnham |first1=Adrian |last2=Boo |first2=Hua Chu |date=2011-02-01 |title=A literature review of the anchoring effect |url=https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S1053535710001411 |journal=The Journal of Socio-Economics |volume=40 |issue=1 |pages=35–42 |doi=10.1016/j.socec.2010.10.008 |issn=1053-5357|url-access=subscription }}</ref>

However, there is also conflicting evidence where increases in motivation does not correlate to a lowered rate of anchoring. There were no differences in the effects of anchoring when comparing participants who were offered monetary rewards for accurate answers to those who weren't.<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Tversky |first1=Amos |last2=Kahneman |first2=Daniel |date=1974-09-27 |title=Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases |url=https://doi.org/10.1126/science.185.4157.1124 |journal=Science |volume=185 |issue=4157 |pages=1124–1131 |doi=10.1126/science.185.4157.1124 |pmid=17835457 |bibcode=1974Sci...185.1124T |issn=0036-8075|url-access=subscription }}</ref> Moreover, findings by Wilson et al. (1996) concluded that incentives and forewarnings did not eliminate anchoring effects.<ref name="WilsonHouston1996"/>

This could be explained by high elaborative anchoring - When motivated to be accurate, participants engage in more cognitively demanding thought processes, searching for existing information, including prior experiences and established anchors.<ref name=":02" /> The high need for accuracy lead to more effortful thought processes, and putting a heavier emphasis on anchors since they are representations of prior knowledge in what we perceive as similar categories. Findings have demonstrated that both a high and low need to be accurate result in susceptibility to the influence of anchoring effects, even when one is motivated to explicitly avoid them.<ref name=":02" />