Editing Condorcet method (section)

==Evaluation by criteria==

Scholars of electoral systems often compare them using mathematically defined [[Comparison of electoral systems|voting system criteria]]. The criteria which Condorcet methods satisfy vary from one Condorcet method to another. However, the Condorcet criterion implies the [[Majority favorite criterion|majority criterion]], and thus is incompatible with [[independence of irrelevant alternatives]] (though it implies a weaker analogous form of the criterion: when there is a Condorcet winner, losing candidates can drop out of the election without changing the result),<ref>{{cite arXiv |eprint=1804.02973 |page=351 |quote=The Condorcet criterion for single-winner elections (section 4.7) is important because, when there is a Condorcet winner b ∈ A, then it is still a Condorcet winner when alternatives a1,...,an ∈ A \ {b} are removed. So an alternative b ∈ A doesn’t owe his property of being a Condorcet winner to the presence of some other alternatives. Therefore, when we declare a Condorcet winner b ∈ A elected whenever a Condorcet winner exists, we know that no other alternatives a1,...,an ∈ A \ {b} have changed the result of the election without being elected.|last1=Schulze |first1=Markus |title=The Schulze Method of Voting |year=2018 |class=cs.GT }}</ref> [[later-no-harm]], the [[participation criterion]], and the [[consistency criterion]].

{| class="wikitable" style="text-align:center"
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! {{diagonal split header|<br />Condorcet<br />method|Voting system<br />criterion}} !! [[Monotonicity criterion|Monotonic]] !! [[Condorcet loser criterion|Condorcet<br />loser]] !! [[Independence of clones criterion|Clone<br />independence]] !! [[Reversal symmetry|Reversal<br />symmetry]] !! [[Polynomial time|Polynomial<br />time]] !! [[Resolvability criterion|Resolvable]] !! [[Independence of irrelevant alternatives#Local independence|Local<br />independence<br />of irrelevant<br />alternatives]]
|-
! [[Schulze method|Schulze]]
| {{yes}} || {{yes}} || {{yes}} || {{yes}} || {{yes}} || {{yes}} || {{no}}
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! [[Ranked Pairs]]
| {{yes}} || {{yes}} || {{yes}} || {{yes}} || {{yes}} || {{yes}} || {{yes}}
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! [[Minimax Condorcet|Minimax]]
| {{yes}} || {{no}} || {{no}} || {{no}} || {{yes}} || {{yes}} || {{no}}
|-
! [[Nanson's method|Nanson]]
| {{no}} || {{yes}} || {{no}} || {{yes}} || {{yes}} || {{partial|Unknown}} || {{partial|Unknown}}
|-
! [[Kemeny–Young method|Kemeny–Young]]
| {{yes}} || {{yes}} || {{no}} || {{yes}} || {{no}} || {{yes}} || {{yes}}
|-
! [[Dodgson's method|Dodgson]]
| {{no}} || {{no}} || {{no}} || {{no}} || {{no}} || {{partial|Unknown}} || {{partial|Unknown}}
|-
! [[Copeland's method|Copeland]]
| {{yes}} || {{yes}} || {{no}} || {{yes}} || {{yes}} || {{no}} || {{no}}
|}