Editing Electronic voting (section)

===Audit trails===
{{Further|Voter Verified Paper Audit Trail|End-to-end auditable voting systems}}

A fundamental challenge with any [[voting machine]] is to produce evidence that the votes were recorded as cast and tabulated as recorded. Election results produced by voting systems that rely on voter-marked paper ballots can be verified with manual hand counts (either valid sampling or full recounts). [[Voting machine#Direct-recording electronic (DRE)|Paperless]] ballot voting systems must support auditability in different ways. An independently auditable system, sometimes called an Independent Verification, can be used in recounts or audits. These systems can include the ability for voters to verify how their votes were cast or enable officials to verify that votes were tabulated correctly.

A discussion draft argued by researchers at the [[National Institute of Standards and Technology]] (NIST) states, "Simply put, the DRE architecture’s inability to provide for independent audits of its electronic records makes it a poor choice for an environment in which detecting errors and fraud is important."<ref>{{cite web|url=http://vote.nist.gov/DraftWhitePaperOnSIinVVSG2007-20061120.pdf |title=Draft white paper on VVPR |access-date=24 May 2010 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20091128025506/http://vote.nist.gov/DraftWhitePaperOnSIinVVSG2007-20061120.pdf |archive-date=28 November 2009 }}</ref> The report does not represent the official position of NIST, and misinterpretations of the report has led NIST to explain that "Some statements in the report have been misinterpreted. The draft report includes statements from election officials, voting system vendors, computer scientists and other experts in the field about what is potentially possible in terms of attacks on DREs. However, these statements are not report conclusions."<ref>[https://www.nist.gov/public_affairs/factsheet/draftvotingreport.htm] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070202222414/https://www.nist.gov/public_affairs/factsheet/draftvotingreport.htm|date=2 February 2007}}</ref>

[[Image:Desi accuvote-tsx vvpat.jpg|thumb|A Diebold Election Systems, Inc. model AccuVote-TSx DRE voting machine with VVPAT attachment]]

Various technologies can be used to assure DRE voters that their votes were cast correctly, and allow officials to detect possible fraud or malfunction, and to provide a means to audit the tabulated results. Some systems include technologies such as cryptography (visual or mathematical), paper (kept by the voter or verified and left with election officials), audio verification, and dual recording or witness systems (other than with paper).

Dr. [[Rebecca Mercuri]], the creator of the [[Voter Verified Paper Audit Trail]] (VVPAT) concept (as described in her Ph.D. dissertation in October 2000 on the basic voter verifiable ballot system), proposes to answer the auditability question by having the voting machine print a paper ballot or other paper facsimile that can be visually verified by the voter before being entered into a secure location. Subsequently, this is sometimes referred to as the "[[Mercuri method]]." To be truly ''voter''-verified, the record itself must be verified by the voter and able to be done without assistance, such as visually or audibly.  If the voter must use a bar-code scanner or other electronic device to verify, then the record is not truly voter-verifiable, since it is actually the electronic device that is verifying the record for the voter. VVPAT is the form of Independent Verification most commonly found in [[elections in the United States]] and other countries such as Venezuela.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.ndi.org/e-voting-guide/examples/e-voting-audits-venezuela|title=E-voting Audits in Venezuela|last=apleasant|date=25 November 2013|website=www.ndi.org|language=en|access-date=13 February 2017|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170214003900/https://www.ndi.org/e-voting-guide/examples/e-voting-audits-venezuela|archive-date=14 February 2017}}</ref>

[[End-to-end auditable voting systems]] can provide the voter with a receipt that can be taken home. This receipt does not allow voters to prove to others how they voted, but it does allow them to verify that the system detected their vote correctly. End-to-end (E2E) systems include [[Punchscan]], [[ThreeBallot]] and [[Prêt à Voter]]. [[Scantegrity]] is an add-on that extends current optical scan voting systems with an E2E layer. The city of [[Takoma Park, Maryland]] used [[Scantegrity II]] for its November 2009 election.<ref>{{cite web|title=Pilot Study of the Scantegrity II Voting System Planned for the 2009 Takoma Park City Election |url=http://www.takomaparkmd.gov/committees/boe/documents/flyer_workshop_I_(02-19-09).pdf |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110719064407/http://www.takomaparkmd.gov/committees/boe/documents/flyer_workshop_I_%2802-19-09%29.pdf |archive-date=19 July 2011 }}</ref><ref>{{cite web
 |last        = Hardesty
 |first       = Larry
 |title       = Cryptographic voting debuts
 |work        = MIT news
 |date = 13 November 2009
 |access-date  = 30 November 2009
 |url         = http://web.mit.edu/newsoffice/2009/rivest-voting.html
 |url-status     = live
 |archive-url  = https://web.archive.org/web/20110719064407/http://www.takomaparkmd.gov/committees/boe/documents/flyer_workshop_I_(02-19-09).pdf
 |archive-date = 19 July 2011
}}</ref>

Systems that allow the voter to prove how they voted are never used in U.S. public elections, and are outlawed by most state constitutions. The primary concerns with this solution are [[voter intimidation]] and [[vote selling]].

An audit system can be used in measured random recounts to detect possible malfunction or fraud. With the VVPAT method, the paper ballot is often treated as the official ballot of record. In this scenario, the ballot is primary and the electronic records are used only for an initial count. In any subsequent recounts or challenges, the paper, not the electronic ballot, would be used for tabulation. Whenever a paper record serves as the legal ballot, that system will be subject to the same benefits and concerns as any paper ballot system.

To successfully audit any voting machine, a strict [[chain of custody]] is required.

The solution was first demonstrated (New York City, March 2001) and used (Sacramento, California 2002) by AVANTE International Technology, Inc.. In 2004 Nevada was the first state to successfully implement a DRE voting system that printed an electronic record. The $9.3 million voting system provided by [[Sequoia Voting Systems]] included more than 2,600 [[AVC EDGE]] touchscreen DREs equipped with the [[VeriVote VVPAT]] component.
<ref>[https://www.nbcnews.com/id/5937115 ‘Paper trail’ voting system used in Nevada] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201022031805/http://www.nbcnews.com/id/5937115 |date=22 October 2020 }}, [[Associated Press]] 7 September 2004</ref> The new systems, implemented under the direction of then Secretary of State [[Dean Heller]] replaced largely punched card voting systems and were chosen after feedback was solicited from the community through town hall meetings and input solicited from the [[Nevada Gaming Control Board]].<ref>[http://www.cnn.com/2004/TECH/10/28/nevada.evote/index.html Nevada improves odds with e-vote] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160303172108/http://www.cnn.com/2004/TECH/10/28/nevada.evote/index.html |date=3 March 2016 }}, [[CNN]] 29 October 2004</ref>