Editing Great Leap Forward (section)

==== Causes of the famine and responsibility for it ====
The policies of the Great Leap Forward, the failure of the government to respond quickly and effectively to famine conditions, as well as Mao's insistence on maintaining high grain export quotas in the face of clear evidence of poor crop output were responsible for the famine. There is disagreement over how much, if at all, weather conditions contributed to the famine.

Significant amounts of agricultural labor had been transferred for steel production, resulting in a shortage of agricultural workers.<ref name="Marquis2022">{{Cite book |last1=Marquis |first1=Christopher |author-link1=Christopher Marquis |title=Mao and Markets: The Communist Roots of Chinese Enterprise |last2=Qiao |first2=Kunyuan |date=15 November 2022 |publisher=Yale University Press |isbn=978-0-300-26883-6 |page=147 |jstor=j.ctv3006z6k }}</ref> Approximately 10% of crops could not be harvested as a result.<ref name="Marquis2022" />

[[Yang Jisheng (journalist)|Yang Jisheng]], a former CCP member and former reporter for the official Chinese news agency ''[[Xinhua]]'', puts the blame squarely on [[Maoist]] policies and the political system of [[totalitarianism]],<ref name="Branigan2013" /> such as diverting agricultural workers to steel production instead of growing crops, and exporting grain at the same time.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Yu |first=Verna |date=18 November 2008 |title=Chinese author of book on famine braves risks to inform new generations |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/18/world/asia/18iht-famine.1.18785257.html?pagewanted=all |url-access=subscription |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190226022150/https://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/18/world/asia/18iht-famine.1.18785257.html?pagewanted=all |archive-date=26 February 2019 |work=[[The New York Times]]}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news |last=Applebaum |first=Anne |author-link=Anne Applebaum |date=12 August 2008 |title=When China Starved |url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/08/11/AR2008081102015.html |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20121107055147/http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/08/11/AR2008081102015.html |archive-date=7 November 2012 |newspaper=[[The Washington Post]]}}</ref> During the course of his research, Yang uncovered that some 22 million tons of grain was held in public granaries at the height of the famine, reports of starvation went up the bureaucracy only to be ignored by top officials, and the authorities ordered that statistics be destroyed in regions where population decline became evident.<ref>{{Cite magazine |last=Link |first=Perry |date=13 January 2011 |title=China: From Famine to Oslo |url=http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2011/jan/13/china-famine-oslo/ |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20151126192536/http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2011/jan/13/china-famine-oslo/ |archive-date=26 November 2015 |magazine=[[The New York Review of Books]]}}</ref> Using Henan as an example, Yang documents that inflated reports claimed production of 1200 jin per mu, while the actual production was closer to 600 jin per mu, resulting in excessive grain requisitions and local starvation, nearly 6% of the population passed away.{{sfnp|Yang|2012|p=38}} In the later book, Yang states, "36 million Chinese starved to death in the years between 1958 and 1962, while 40 million others failed to be born, which means that "China's total population loss during the Great Famine then comes to 76 million."<ref>{{Cite news |last=Mirsky |first=Jonathan |date=7 December 2012 |title=Unnatural Disaster |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/09/books/review/tombstone-the-great-chinese-famine-1958-1962-by-yang-jisheng.html |url-access=subscription |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220319191607/https://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/09/books/review/tombstone-the-great-chinese-famine-1958-1962-by-yang-jisheng.html |archive-date=19 March 2022 |access-date=12 May 2022 |work=The New York Times}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |title=Tombstone: The Great Chinese Famine 1958–1962, by Yang Jisheng, New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 2012, 629 pp. |url=https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1010&=&context=gsp&=&sei-redir=1&referer=https%253A%252F%252Fwww.bing.com%252Fsearch%253Fq%253Dtombstone%252Bby%252BYang%252BJisheng%2526FORM%253DAWRE#search=%22tombstone%20by%20Yang%20Jisheng%22 |access-date=12 May 2022 |archive-date=12 May 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220512192344/https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1010&=&context=gsp&=&sei-redir=1&referer=https%253A%252F%252Fwww.bing.com%252Fsearch%253Fq%253Dtombstone%252Bby%252BYang%252BJisheng%2526FORM%253DAWRE#search=%22tombstone%20by%20Yang%20Jisheng%22 |url-status=live }}</ref>

Economist [[Steven Rosefielde]] argues that Yang's account "shows that Mao's slaughter was caused in considerable part by terror-starvation; that is, voluntary manslaughter (and perhaps murder) rather than innocuous famine."<ref>[[Steven Rosefielde|Rosefielde, Steven]] (2009). ''Red Holocaust''. [[Routledge]]. p.&nbsp;114. {{ISBN|0-415-77757-7}}.</ref> Yang claims that local party officials were indifferent to the large number of people dying around them, as their primary concern was the delivery of grain, which Mao wanted to use to pay back debts to the USSR totaling 1.973&nbsp;billion [[Chinese yuan|yuan]]. In [[Xinyang]], people died of starvation at the doors of grain warehouses.<ref>O'Neill, Mark (2008). [http://en.chinaelections.org/newsinfo.asp?newsid=18328# A hunger for the truth: A new book, banned on the mainland, is becoming the definitive account of the Great Famine.] China Elections, 10 February 2012 {{webarchive |url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120210190821/http://en.chinaelections.org/newsinfo.asp?newsid=18328 |date=10 February 2012 }}</ref> Mao refused to open the state granaries as he dismissed reports of food shortages and accused the "[[rightists]]" and the ''[[kulak]]s'' of conspiring to hide grain.{{sfnp|Becker|1998|p=86}}

From his research into records and talks with experts at the meteorological bureau, Yang concludes that the weather during the Great Leap Forward was not unusual compared to other periods and was not a factor.<ref name="Johnson2010">Johnson, Ian (2010). [http://www.nybooks.com/blogs/nyrblog/2010/dec/20/finding-facts-about-maos-victims/ Finding the Facts About Mao's Victims] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20151029002955/http://www.nybooks.com/blogs/nyrblog/2010/dec/20/finding-facts-about-maos-victims/ |date=29 October 2015 }}. ''[[The New York Review of Books]]'' (Blog), 20 December 2010. Retrieved 4 September 2011. Johnson interviews Yang Jisheng. (Provincial and central archives).</ref> Yang also believes that the [[Sino-Soviet split]] was not a factor because it did not happen until 1960, when the famine was well under way.<ref name="Johnson2010" />

Mao's efforts to cool the Leap in late 1958 met resistance within the Party and when Mao proposed a scaling down of steel targets, "many people just wouldn't change and wouldn't accept it".<ref name="Joseph1986" /> Thus, according to historian Tao Kai, the Leap "wasn't the problem of a single person, but that many people had ideological problems". Tao also pointed out that "everyone was together" on the [[Anti-Rightist Campaign]] and only a minority didn't approve of the Great Leap's policies or put forth different opinions.<ref name="Joseph1986" /> The actions of the party under Mao in the face of widespread famine are reminiscent of Soviet policy nearly three decades earlier during the [[Soviet famine of 1932-33]]. At that time, the USSR exported grain for international propaganda purposes despite millions dying of starvation across southern areas of the Soviet Union.

Benjamin Valentino writes that like in the USSR during the [[Soviet famine of 1932–33|famine of 1932–33]], peasants were confined to their starving villages by a system of household registration,{{sfnp|Valentino|2004|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=LQfeXVU_EvgC&pg=PA127 127]}} and the worst effects of the famine were directed against enemies of the regime.{{sfnp|Valentino|2004|p=128}} Those labeled as "black elements" (religious leaders, rightists, rich peasants, etc.) in any previous campaign were given the lowest priority in the allocation of food, and therefore died in the greatest numbers.{{sfnp|Valentino|2004|p=128}} Drawing from Jasper Becker's book Hungry Ghosts, genocide scholar [[Adam Jones (Canadian scholar)|Adam Jones]] states that "no group suffered more than the Tibetans" from 1959 to 1962.<ref>[[Adam Jones (Canadian scholar)|Jones, Adam]] (2010). ''Genocide: A Comprehensive Introduction''. [[Routledge]], 2nd edition (2010). p.&nbsp;96. {{ISBN|0-415-48619-X}}.</ref>

Ashton, et al. write that policies leading to food shortages, natural disasters, and a slow response to initial indications of food shortages were to blame for the famine. Policies leading to food shortages included the implementation of the commune system and an emphasis on non-agricultural activities such as backyard steel production.{{sfnp|Ashton|Hill|Piazza|Zeitz|1984|pp=624–625}} Natural disasters included [[drought]], flood, typhoon, plant disease, and insect pest.{{sfnp|Ashton |Hill |Piazza |Zeitz|1984|p=629}} The slow response was in part due to a lack of objective reporting on the agricultural situation,{{sfnp|Ashton |Hill|Piazza|Zeitz|1984|p=634}} including a "nearly complete breakdown in the agricultural reporting system".{{sfnp|Ashton|Hill|Piazza|Zeitz|1984|p=630}}

This was partly caused by strong incentives for officials to over-report crop yields.{{sfnp|Ashton|Hill|Piazza|Zeitz|1984|pp=613, 616–619}} According to Frank Dikötter, local officials frequently reported production figures 30-40% higher than the actual output to meet the central government's ambitious targets.{{sfnp|Dikötter|2010|p={{page needed|date=June 2024}}}} The unwillingness of the Central Government to seek international aid was a major factor; China's net grain exports in 1959 and 1960 would have been enough to feed 16 million people 2000 calories per day.{{sfnp|Ashton|Hill|Piazza|Zeitz|1984|p=629}} Ashton, et al. conclude that "It would not be inaccurate to say that 30 million people died prematurely as a result of errors of internal policy and flawed international relations."{{sfnp|Ashton|Hill|Piazza|Zeitz|1984|p=634}}

Mobo Gao suggested that the Great Leap Forward's terrible effects came not from malignant intent on the part of the Chinese leadership at the time, but instead related to the structural nature of its rule, and the vastness of China as a country. Gao says "the terrible lesson learnt is that China is so huge and when it is uniformly ruled, follies or wrong policies will have grave implications of tremendous magnitude".{{sfnp|Gao|2007|p={{page needed|date=June 2024}}}}

In the official ''[[Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party since the Founding of the People's Republic of China]]'' passed in 1981, the Chinese Communist Party called the purge of the so-called anti-Party clique of Peng Dehuai and others as "entirely wrong" and cut short the process of the rectification of "Left" errors.<ref name=":1">{{Cite web |title=Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party since the Founding of the People's Republic of China |url=https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/resolution-certain-questions-history-our-party-founding-peoples-republic-china |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20241225024145/https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/resolution-certain-questions-history-our-party-founding-peoples-republic-china |archive-date=25 December 2024 |access-date=2024-12-28 |website=[[Wilson Center]] |language=en |url-status=live }}</ref><ref name=":18">{{Cite web |title=关于建国以来党的若干历史问题的决议 |url=http://www.gov.cn/test/2008-06/23/content_1024934_2.htm |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191022175245/http://www.gov.cn/test/2008-06/23/content_1024934_2.htm |archive-date=22 October 2019 |access-date=23 April 2020 |website=The Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China |language=zh}}</ref> The 1981 Resolution also states that, "it was mainly due to the errors of the Great Leap Forward and of the [[Anti-Right Deviation Struggle|struggle against 'Right opportunism']] together with a succession of natural calamities and the perfidious scrapping of contracts by the Soviet Government that our economy encountered serious difficulties between 1959 and 1961, which caused serious losses to our country and people."<ref name=":1" /><ref name=":18" />