Editing Hard problem of consciousness (section)

===Type-B Materialism===
{{further|Phenomenal concept strategy|A posteriori physicalism}}
Type-B Materialism, also known as ''Weak Reductionism'' or ''[[A priori and a posteriori|A Posteriori]] Physicalism'', is the view that the hard problem stems from human psychology, and is therefore not indicative of a genuine [[ontology|ontological]] gap between consciousness and the physical world.<ref name="jw-iep"/> Like Type-A Materialists, Type-B Materialists are committed to [[physicalism]]. Unlike Type-A Materialists, however, Type-B Materialists ''do'' accept inconceivability arguments often cited in support of the hard problem, but with a key caveat: that inconceivability arguments give us insight only into how the human mind ''tends to conceptualize'' the relationship between mind and matter, but not into what the true nature of this relationship actually is.<ref name="jw-iep"/><ref name="Chalmers-caipin"/> According to this view, there is a gap between two ways of knowing (introspection and neuroscience) that will not be resolved by understanding all the underlying neurobiology, but still believe that consciousness and neurobiology are one and the same in reality.<ref name="jw-iep"/>

While Type-B Materialists all agree that intuitions about the hard problem are psychological rather than ontological in origin, they differ as to whether our intuitions about the hard problem are innate or culturally conditioned. This has been dubbed the "hard-wired/soft-wired distinction."<ref>{{cite journal
| last = Balmer
| first = A.
| year = 2020
| title = Soft-Wired Illusionism vs. the Meta-Problem of Consciousness
| journal = Journal of Consciousness Studies
| volume = 27
| issue = 5–6
| pages = 26–37
| url = https://philpapers.org/rec/BALSIV
}}</ref><ref name="DCuniversal">{{cite journal
| last = Chalmers
| first = David
| year = 2020
| title = Is the Hard Problem of Consciousness Universal?
| journal = Journal of Consciousness Studies
| volume = 27
| issue = 5–6
| pages = 227–257
}}</ref> In relation to Type-B Materialism, those who believe that our intuitions about the hard problem are innate (and therefore common to all humans) subscribe to the "hard-wired view".<ref name="DCuniversal" /> Those that believe our intuitions are culturally conditioned subscribe to the "soft-wired view". Unless otherwise specified, the term ''Type-B Materialism'' refers to the hard-wired view.<ref name="DCuniversal" />

Notable philosophers who subscribe to Type-B Materialism include [[David Papineau]],<ref>{{cite journal
| last = Papineau
| first = D.
| year = 2019
| title = Response to Chalmers' 'The Meta-Problem of Consciousness'
| journal = Journal of Consciousness Studies
| volume = 26
| issue = 9–10
| pages = 173–181
| url = https://philpapers.org/rec/PAPRTC-6
}}</ref> [[Joseph Levine (philosopher)|Joseph Levine]],<ref name="J. Levine 1999, pp 3">J. Levine, "Conceivability, Identity, and the Explanatory Gap" in Stuart R. Hameroff, Alfred W. Kaszniak and David Chalmers (eds.), ''Towards a Science of Consciousness III: The Third Tucson Discussions and Debates'', The MIT Press, 1999,. pp 3–12.</ref> and Janet Levine.<ref name="Levin 2008 402–425"/>

====The "hard-wired view"====
Joseph Levine (who formulated the notion of the [[explanatory gap]]) states: "The explanatory gap argument doesn't demonstrate a gap in nature, but a gap in our understanding of nature."<ref name="J. Levine 1999, pp 3"/> He nevertheless contends that full scientific understanding will not close the gap,<ref name="jw-iep"/> and that analogous gaps do not exist for other [[Identity (philosophy)|identities]] in nature, such as that between water and H<sub>2</sub>O.<ref name="rjg-iep">{{cite web|last1=Gennaro|first1=Rocco J.|title=Consciousness|url=https://www.iep.utm.edu/consciou|website=Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy}}</ref> The philosophers [[Ned Block]] and [[Robert Stalnaker]] agree that facts about what a conscious experience is like to the one experiencing it cannot be deduced from knowing all the facts about the underlying physiology, but by contrast argue that such gaps of knowledge ''are'' also present in many other cases in nature, such as the distinction between water and H<sub>2</sub>O.<ref name="block-stalnaker">{{cite journal|last1=Block|first1=Ned|last2=Stalnaker|first2=Robert|title=Conceptual Analysis, Dualism, and the Explanatory Gap|journal=The Philosophical Review|date=1999|volume=108|issue=1|pages=1–46|jstor=2998259|doi=10.2307/2998259|citeseerx=10.1.1.693.2421|url=http://www.nyu.edu/gsas/dept/philo/faculty/block/papers/ExplanatoryGap.pdf}}</ref><ref name="harder-problem"/>

To explain why these two ways of knowing (i.e. third-person scientific observation and first-person introspection) yield such different understandings of consciousness, weak reductionists often invoke the ''phenomenal concepts strategy'', which argues the difference stems from our inaccurate [[Phenomenal consciousness|phenomenal]] concepts (i.e., how we think about consciousness), not from the nature of consciousness itself.<ref name="stoljar-2005">{{cite journal|last1=Stoljar|first1=Daniel|title=Physicalism and Phenomenal Concepts|journal=Mind & Language|date=2005|volume=20|issue=5|pages=469–494|doi=10.1111/j.0268-1064.2005.00296.x}}</ref><ref name="chalmers-pceg">{{cite book|last1=Chalmers|first1=David|editor1-last=Alter|editor1-first=Torin|editor2-last=Walter|editor2-first=Sven|title=Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism|date=2006|publisher=Oxford University Press|isbn=9780195171655|chapter-url=http://consc.net/papers/pceg.pdf|access-date=27 March 2019|chapter=Phenomenal Concepts and the Explanatory Gap}}</ref> By this view, the hard problem of consciousness stems from a dualism of concepts, not from a dualism of properties or substances.<ref name="jw-iep"/>

====The "soft-wired view"====
Some consciousness researchers have argued that the hard problem is a cultural artifact, unique to contemporary Western Culture. This is similar to Type-B Materialism, but it makes the further claim that the psychological facts that cause us to intuit the hard problem are not innate, but culturally conditioned. Notable researchers who hold this view include [[Anna Wierzbicka]],<ref name="AW2019">{{cite journal
| last = Wierzbicka
| first = A.
| year = 2019
| title = From 'Consciousness' to 'I Think, I Feel, I Know': A Commentary on David Chalmers
| journal = Journal of Consciousness Studies
| volume = 26
| issue = 9–10
| pages = 257–269
}}</ref> Hakwan Lau and Matthias Michel.<ref>{{cite journal
| last1 = Lau
| first1 = Hakwan
| last2 = Michel
| first2 = Matthias
| year = 2019
| title = A Socio-Historical Take on the Meta-Problem of Consciousness
| journal = Journal of Consciousness Studies
| volume = 26
| issue = 9–10
| pages = 136–147
}}</ref>

Wierzbicka (who is a linguist) argues that the vocabulary used by consciousness researchers (including words like ''experience'' and ''consciousness'') are not universally translatable, and are "[[Parochialism|parochially]] English."<ref name="AW2019"/> Weirzbicka calls David Chalmers out by name for using these words, arguing that if philosophers "were to use panhuman concepts expressed in crosstranslatable words" (such as ''know'', ''think'', or ''feel'') then the hard problem would dissolve.<ref name="AW2019"/> David Chalmers has responded to these criticisms by saying that he will not "apologise for using technical terms in an academic article . . . they play a key role in efficient communication in every discipline, including Wierzbicka’s".<ref name="DCuniversal" />