Editing Mechanism design (section)

== References ==
* {{cite journal | last = Clarke | first = Edward H. | title = Multipart Pricing of Public Goods | journal = [[Public Choice]] | volume = 11 | issue = 1 | pages = 17–33 | doi = 10.1007/BF01726210 | jstor = 30022651 | date = 1971 | s2cid = 154860771 | url = http://darp.lse.ac.uk/papersdb/Clarke_(PublicChoice71).pdf | access-date = 2016-08-12 | archive-date = 2017-05-10 | archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20170510074532/http://darp.lse.ac.uk/papersdb/Clarke_(PublicChoice71).pdf | url-status = dead }} 
* {{cite journal |last= Gibbard |first= Allan |title= Manipulation of voting schemes: A general result |journal= [[Econometrica]] |volume= 41 |issue= 4 |year= 1973 |pages= 587–601 |url= http://courses.math.tufts.edu/math19/duchin/gibbard.pdf |jstor= 1914083 |doi= 10.2307/1914083 |access-date= 2016-08-12 |archive-date= 2016-08-23 |archive-url= https://web.archive.org/web/20160823015117/http://courses.math.tufts.edu/math19/duchin/gibbard.pdf |url-status= dead }}
* {{cite journal | last = Groves | first = Theodore | title = Incentives in Teams | journal = Econometrica | volume = 41 | issue = 4 | pages = 617–631 | doi= 10.2307/1914085 | jstor = 1914085 | date = 1973 | url = http://www.eecs.harvard.edu/cs286r/courses/spring02/papers/groves73.pdf }} 
* {{cite journal | last = Harsanyi | first = John C. | title = Games with incomplete information played by "Bayesian" players, I-III. part I. The Basic Model | journal = Management Science | volume = 14 | issue = 3 | pages = 159–182 | doi= 10.1287/mnsc.14.3.159 | jstor = 2628393 | date = 1967 }} 
* {{cite journal |last= Mirrlees |first= J. A. |year= 1971 |title= An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation |journal= [[Review of Economic Studies]] |volume= 38 |issue= 2 |pages= 175–208 |url= http://aida.econ.yale.edu/~dirkb/teach/pdf/mirrlees/1971%20optimal%20taxation.pdf |doi= 10.2307/2296779 |jstor= 2296779 |access-date= 2016-08-12 |archive-url= https://web.archive.org/web/20170510212956/http://aida.econ.yale.edu/~dirkb/teach/pdf/mirrlees/1971%20optimal%20taxation.pdf |archive-date= 2017-05-10 |url-status= dead }}
* {{cite journal |last1= Myerson |first1= Roger B. |last2= Satterthwaite |first2= Mark A. |year= 1983 |title= Efficient Mechanisms for Bilateral Trading |journal= [[Journal of Economic Theory]] |volume= 29 |issue= 2 |pages= 265–281 |url= http://www.econ.yale.edu/~dirkb/teach/521b-08-09/reading/1983-bilateral-trade.pdf |doi= 10.1016/0022-0531(83)90048-0 |hdl= 10419/220829 |hdl-access= free |access-date= 2016-08-12 |archive-date= 2017-05-10 |archive-url= https://web.archive.org/web/20170510212959/http://www.econ.yale.edu/~dirkb/teach/521b-08-09/reading/1983-bilateral-trade.pdf |url-status= dead }}
* {{cite journal |first= Mark Allen |last= Satterthwaite |title= Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions |journal=Journal of Economic Theory |volume= 10 |issue= 2 |date= 1975 |pages= 187–217 |doi= 10.1016/0022-0531(75)90050-2 |citeseerx= 10.1.1.471.9842 }}
* {{cite journal |last = Vickrey |first = William | title= Counterspeculation, Auctions, and Competitive Sealed Tenders | journal= [[The Journal of Finance]] | year= 1961 | volume= 16 | issue= 1 | pages= 8–37 |url=http://robotics.eecs.berkeley.edu/~wlr/228aF04/Vickrey61.pdf | doi= 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1961.tb02789.x }}