Editing Mutual assured destruction (section)

==Criticism==
{{more citations needed|section|date=March 2008}}
[[File:Redwing Apache.jpg|thumb|280px|Nuclear weapon test Apache (yield {{convert|1.85|Mt(TNT)|disp=or|abbr=on}})]]Deterrence theory has been criticized by numerous scholars for various reasons. A prominent strain of criticism argues that rational deterrence theory is contradicted by frequent deterrence failures, which may be attributed to misperceptions.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Jervis |first=Robert |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=3QlsDQAAQBAJ |title=Perception and Misperception in International Politics: New Edition |date=1976 |publisher=Princeton University Press |isbn=978-1-4008-8511-4 |language=en}}</ref> Critics have also argued that leaders do not behave in ways that are consistent with the predictions of nuclear deterrence theory.<ref name=":2">{{Cite book |last=Green |first=Brendan Rittenhouse |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=wFTMDwAAQBAJ |title=The Revolution that Failed: Nuclear Competition, Arms Control, and the Cold War |date=2020 |publisher=Cambridge University Press |isbn=978-1-108-48986-7 |language=en}}</ref><ref name=":3">{{Citation |last=Jervis |first=Robert |title=The Nuclear Age |date=2021 |url=https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/before-and-after-the-fall/nuclear-age/3F9C601E9D5B0283487BEFCE73913C60 |work=Before and After the Fall: World Politics and the End of the Cold War |pages=115–131 |editor-last=Bartel |editor-first=Fritz |publisher=Cambridge University Press |doi=10.1017/9781108910194.008 |isbn=978-1-108-90677-7 |editor2-last=Monteiro |editor2-first=Nuno P. |s2cid=244858515|url-access=subscription }}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal |last=Sagan |first=Scott D. |date=1994 |title=The Perils of Proliferation: Organization Theory, Deterrence Theory, and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/2539178 |journal=International Security |volume=18 |issue=4 |pages=66–107 |doi=10.2307/2539178 |issn=0162-2889 |jstor=2539178 |s2cid=153925234|url-access=subscription }}</ref> For example, it has been argued that it is inconsistent with the logic of rational deterrence theory that states continue to build nuclear arsenals once they have reached the second-strike threshold.<ref name=":2" /><ref name=":3" /> For a more inconsistent example, [[Mao Zedong]] urged the socialist camp not to fear [[nuclear war]] with the United States since, even if "half of mankind died, the other half would remain while imperialism would be razed to the ground and the whole world would become socialist."<ref>{{cite news |title= Instant Wisdom: Beyond the Little Red Book |url= http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,946612,00.html |date= 20 September 1976 |magazine= [[Time (magazine)|Time]] |access-date= 14 April 2013 |archive-date= 29 September 2013 |archive-url= https://web.archive.org/web/20130929083531/http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,946612,00.html |url-status= live }}</ref>

Additionally, many scholars have advanced philosophical objections against the principles of deterrence theory on purely [[ethical]] grounds. Included in this group is [[Robert L. Holmes]] who observes that mankind's reliance upon a system of preventing war which is based exclusively upon the threat of waging war is inherently irrational and must be considered immoral according to fundamental [[deontological]] principles. In addition, he questions whether it can be conclusively demonstrated that such a system has in fact served to prevent warfare in the past and may actually serve to increase the probability of waging war in the future due to its reliance upon the continuous development of new generations of technologically advanced nuclear weapons.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Meyers |first=Diana T. |date=1992 |title=Reviewed work: On War and Morality, Robert L. Holmes |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/2185583.pdf |journal=The Philosophical Review |volume=101 |issue=2 |pages=481–484 |doi=10.2307/2185583 |jstor=2185583}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal |last=Rock |first=Stephen R. |date=1989 |title=Reviewed work: On War and Morality, Robert L. Holmes; Paths to Peace: Exploring the Feasibility of Sustainable Peace, Richard Smoke, Willis Harman |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/1961738.pdf |journal=The American Political Science Review |volume=83 |issue=4 |pages=1447–1448 |doi=10.2307/1961738 |jstor=1961738}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal |last=Lee |first=Steven |date=1992 |title=Reviewed work: On War and Morality., Robert L. Holmes |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/2216042.pdf |journal=Noûs |volume=26 |issue=4 |pages=559–562 |doi=10.2307/2216042 |jstor=2216042}}</ref> 

===Challengeable assumptions===
==== Second-strike capability ====
{{main|Second strike}}
* A first strike must not be capable of preventing a retaliatory second strike or else mutual destruction is not assured. In this case, a state would have nothing to lose with a first strike or might try to preempt the development of an opponent's second-strike capability with a first strike. To avoid this, countries may design their nuclear forces to make decapitation strike almost impossible, by dispersing launchers over wide areas and using a combination of [[submarine-launched ballistic missile|sea-based]], [[strategic bombers|air-based]], underground, and [[Missile vehicle|mobile land-based launchers]].
*Another method of ensuring second strike capability is through the use of [[dead man's switch]] or "[[fail-deadly]]:" in the absence of ongoing action from a functional command structure—such as would occur after suffering a successful [[decapitation strike]]—an automatic system defaults to launching a nuclear strike upon some target. A particular example is the Soviet (now Russian) [[Dead Hand]] system, which has been described as a semi-automatic "version of [[Dr. Strangelove|Dr. Strangelove's Doomsday Machine]]" which, once activated, can launch a second strike without human intervention. The purpose of the Dead Hand system is to ensure a second strike even if Russia were to suffer a decapitation attack, thus maintaining MAD.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Ross|first=Douglas Alan|date=1998|title=Canada's Functional Isolationism: And the Future of Weapons of Mass Destruction|url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/40203359|journal=International Journal|volume=54|issue=1|pages=120–142|doi=10.2307/40203359|jstor=40203359|issn=0020-7020|url-access=subscription}}</ref>

==== Perfect detection ====
* No false positives (errors) in the equipment and/or procedures that must identify a launch by the other side. The implication of this is that an accident could lead to a full nuclear exchange. During the Cold War there were several instances of false positives, as in the case of [[Stanislav Petrov]].
* Perfect attribution. If there is a launch from the Sino-Russian border, it could be difficult to distinguish which nation is responsible—both Russia and China have the capability—and, hence, against which nation retaliation should occur. A launch from a nuclear-armed submarine could also be difficult to attribute.

==== Perfect rationality ====
* No rogue commanders will have the ability to corrupt the launch decision process. Such an incident very nearly occurred during the [[Cuban Missile Crisis]] when an argument broke out aboard a nuclear-armed submarine cut off from radio communication. The second-in-command, [[Vasily Arkhipov (vice admiral)|Vasili Arkhipov]], refused to launch despite an order from Captain Savitsky to do so.<ref name="Globe">{{Cite news|url= http://www.latinamericanstudies.org/cold-war/sovietsbomb.htm | date=13 October 2002 |first=Marion |last=Lloyd | journal=[[Boston Globe]] |title=Soviets Close to Using A-Bomb in 1962 Crisis, Forum is Told |access-date=7 August 2012 |pages=A20}}</ref>
* All leaders with launch capability seem to care about the survival of their citizens. [[Winston Churchill]] is quoted as saying that any strategy will not "cover the case of lunatics or dictators in the mood of [[Adolf Hitler|Hitler]] when he found himself in his final dugout."<ref>Cited in Wolfgang Panofsky, "The Mutual-Hostage Relations between America and Russia," ''Foreign Affairs'', 52/1, (October 1973): p 118.</ref>

==== Inability to defend ====
* No [[fallout shelter]] networks of sufficient capacity to protect large segments of the population and/or industry.
* No development of anti-missile technology or deployment of remedial protective gear.

==== Inherent instability ====
Another reason is that deterrence has an inherent instability. As Kenneth Boulding said: "If deterrence were really stable... it would cease to deter." If decision-makers were perfectly rational, they would never order the largescale use of nuclear weapons, and the credibility of the nuclear threat would be low.

However, that apparent perfect rationality criticism is countered and so is consistent with current deterrence policy. In ''[[Essentials of Post-Cold War Deterrence]]'', the authors detail an explicit advocation of ambiguity regarding "what is permitted" for other nations and its endorsement of "irrationality" or, more precisely, the perception thereof as an important tool in deterrence and foreign policy. The document claims that the capacity of the United States, in exercising deterrence, would be hurt by portraying US leaders as fully rational and cool-headed: 

{{quote|The fact that some elements may appear to be potentially 'out of control' can be beneficial to creating and reinforcing fears and doubts in the minds of an adversary's decision makers. This essential sense of fear is the working force of deterrence. That the U.S. may become irrational and vindictive if its vital interests are attacked should be part of the national persona we project to all adversaries.}}

==== Terrorism ====
*The threat of [[Nuclear terrorism|foreign and domestic nuclear terrorism]] has been a criticism of MAD as a defensive strategy. Deterrent strategies are ineffective against those who attack without regard for their life.<ref name=":1" /> Furthermore, the doctrine of MAD has been critiqued in regard to terrorism and asymmetrical warfare. Critics contend that a retaliatory strike would not be possible in this case because of the decentralization of terrorist organizations, which may be operating in several countries and dispersed among civilian populations. A misguided retaliatory strike made by the targeted nation could even advance terrorist goals in that a contentious retaliatory strike could drive support for the terrorist cause that instigated the nuclear exchange.<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Fischhoff|first1=Baruch|last2=Atran|first2=Scott|last3=Sageman|first3=Marc|date=2008|title=Mutually Assured Support: A Security Doctrine for Terrorist Nuclear Weapon Threats|url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/40375782|journal=The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science|volume=618|pages=160–167|doi=10.1177/0002716208317247|jstor=40375782|s2cid=146145387|issn=0002-7162|url-access=subscription}}</ref>

However [[Robert Gallucci]], the president of the [[John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation]], argues that although traditional deterrence is not an effective approach toward terrorist groups bent on causing a nuclear catastrophe, "the United States should instead consider a policy of expanded deterrence, which focuses not solely on the would-be nuclear terrorists but on those states that may deliberately transfer or inadvertently lead nuclear weapons and materials to them. By threatening retaliation against those states, the United States may be able to deter that which it cannot physically prevent."<ref>{{cite journal|last=Gallucci|first=Robert|title=Averting Nuclear Catastrophe: Contemplating Extreme Responses to U.S. Vulnerability|journal=Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science|date=September 2006|volume= 607|pages=51–58|doi=10.1177/0002716206290457|s2cid=68857650}}</ref>

[[Graham Allison]] makes a similar case and argues that the key to expanded deterrence is coming up with ways of tracing nuclear material to the country that forged the fissile material: "After a nuclear bomb detonates, [[nuclear forensics|nuclear forensic]] cops would collect debris samples and send them to a laboratory for radiological analysis. By identifying unique attributes of the fissile material, including its impurities and contaminants, one could trace the path back to its origin."<ref name=":0a">{{cite news|last=Allison|first=Graham|title=How to Keep the Bomb From Terrorists|url=http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2009/03/13/how-to-keep-the-bomb-from-terrorists.html|accessdate=28 January 2013|newspaper=Newsweek|date=13 March 2009|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130513111324/http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2009/03/13/how-to-keep-the-bomb-from-terrorists.html|archive-date=13 May 2013|url-status=dead}}</ref> The process is analogous to identifying a criminal by fingerprints: "The goal would be twofold: first, to deter leaders of nuclear states from selling weapons to terrorists by holding them accountable for any use of their own weapons; second, to give leaders every incentive to tightly secure their nuclear weapons and materials."<ref name=":0a" />

==== Space weapons ====
* Strategic analysts have criticized the doctrine of MAD for its inability to respond to the proliferation of space weaponry. First, military space systems have unequal dependence across countries. This means that less-dependent countries may find it beneficial to attack a more-dependent country's space weapons, which complicates deterrence. This is especially true for countries like North Korea which have extensive ballistic missiles that could strike space-based systems.<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Finch|first1=James P.|last2=Steene|first2=Shawn|date=2011|title=Finding Space in Deterrence: Toward a General Framework for "Space Deterrence"|url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/26270535|journal=Strategic Studies Quarterly|volume=5|issue=4|pages=10–17|doi=|jstor=26270535|issn=1936-1815}}</ref>  Even across countries with similar dependence, anti-satellite weapons ([[Anti-satellite weapon|ASATs]]) have the ability to remove the command and control of nuclear weapons.{{Citation needed|date=January 2023}} This encourages crisis-instability and pre-emptive nuclear-disabling strikes. Third, there is a risk of asymmetrical challengers.  Countries that fall behind in space weapon advancement may turn to using chemical or biological weapons. This may heighten the risk of escalation, bypassing any deterrent effects of nuclear weapons.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Dorn|first=Bryan|date=2005|title=THE WEAPONISATION OF SPACE: justification and consequences|url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/45235390|journal=New Zealand International Review|volume=30|issue=3|pages=2–5|jstor=45235390|issn=0110-0262}}</ref>

==== Entanglements ====
* Cold-war bipolarity no longer is applicable to the global power balance. The complex modern alliance system makes allies and enemies tied to one another. Thus, action by one country to deter another could threaten the safety of a third country. "Security trilemmas" could increase tension during mundane acts of cooperation, complicating MAD. <ref>{{Cite journal|last=Talbot|first=Brent J.|date=2020|title=Getting Deterrence Right: The Case for Stratified Deterrence|journal=Journal of Strategic Security|volume=13|issue=1|pages=26–40|doi=10.5038/1944-0472.13.1.1748|jstor=26907411|s2cid=216198899|issn=1944-0464|doi-access=free}}</ref>

==== Emerging hypersonic weapons ====
* Hypersonic ballistic or cruise missiles threaten the retaliatory backbone of mutual assured destruction. The high precision and speed of these weapons may allow for the development of "decapitory" strikes that remove the ability of another nation to have a nuclear response. In addition, the secretive nature of these weapons' development can make deterrence more asymmetrical.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Ekmektsioglou|first=Eleni|date=2015|title=Hypersonic Weapons and Escalation Control in East Asia|url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/26271074|journal=Strategic Studies Quarterly|volume=9|issue=2|pages=43–68|jstor=26271074|issn=1936-1815}}</ref>

==== Failure to retaliate ====
* If it was known that a country's leader would not resort to nuclear retaliation, adversaries may be emboldened. [[Edward Teller]], a member of the Manhattan Project, echoed these concerns as early as 1985 when he said that "The MAD policy as a deterrent is totally ineffective if it becomes known that in case of attack, we would not retaliate against the aggressor."<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Teller|first=Edward|date=1985|title=Defense as a Deterrent of War|url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/42762238|journal=Harvard International Review|volume=7|issue=4|pages=11–13|jstor=42762238|issn=0739-1854}}</ref>