Editing Rational choice model (section)

==== Criticism based on the assumption of realism ====
Some of the [[Skepticism|scepticism]] among sociologists regarding rational choice stems from a misunderstanding of the lack of realist assumptions. Social research has shown that social agents usually act solely based on habit or impulse, the power of emotion.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Rapetti |first=Martin |date=February 2012 |title=Animal Spirits: How Human Psychology Drives the Economy, and Why it Matters for Global Capitalism, by George A. Akerlof and Robert J. Shiller |url=http://link.springer.com/10.1057/eej.2010.16 |journal=Eastern Economic Journal |language=en |volume=38 |issue=2 |pages=276–278 |doi=10.1057/eej.2010.16 |s2cid=153652492 |issn=0094-5056|url-access=subscription }}</ref> Social Agents predict the expected consequences of options in stock markets and economic crises and choose the best option through collective "emotional drives," implying social forces rather than "rational" choices.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Fararo |first=Thomas J. |date=November 1993 |title=General Social Equilibrium: Toward Theoretical Synthesis |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/201972 |journal=Sociological Theory |volume=11 |issue=3 |pages=291–313 |doi=10.2307/201972|jstor=201972 |url-access=subscription }}</ref>

However, sociology commonly misunderstands rational choice in its critique of rational choice theory. Rational choice theory does not explain what rational people would do in a given situation, which falls under [[decision theory]].<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Haller |first=Max |date=2001-09-01 |title=Erklärt die Rational Choice Theorie die Ungleichheit der Bildungschancen? |url=https://doi.org/10.1007/s11577-001-0079-1 |journal=KZFSS Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie |language=de |volume=53 |issue=3 |pages=569–574 |doi=10.1007/s11577-001-0079-1 |s2cid=141730470 |issn=1861-891X|url-access=subscription }}</ref> Theoretical choice focuses on social outcomes rather than individual outcomes. Social outcomes are identified as stable equilibria in which individuals have no incentive to deviate from their course of action.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Quackenbush |first=Stephen |date=2004-04-01 |title=The Rationality of Rational Choice Theory |url=https://doi.org/10.1080/03050620490462595 |journal=International Interactions |volume=30 |issue=2 |pages=87–107 |doi=10.1080/03050620490462595 |s2cid=8811977 |issn=0305-0629|url-access=subscription }}</ref> This orientation of others' behaviour toward social outcomes may be unintended or undesirable. Therefore, the conclusions generated in such cases are relegated to the "study of irrational behaviour".<ref>{{Cite journal |title= Rational Choice Theory at the Origin? Forms and Social Factors of "Irrational Choice"|url=https://auth.uq.edu.au/idp/module.php/core/loginuserpass.php?AuthState=_1e3a271625f0748c647a27d5b571f765ed7a93240c%3Ahttps%3A%2F%2Fauth.uq.edu.au%2Fidp%2Fsaml2%2Fidp%2FSSOService.php%3Fspentityid%3Dhttps%253A%252F%252Fauth.library.uq.edu.au%252Fsso%252Fmodule.php%252Fsaml%252Fsp%252Fmetadata.php%252Fuqlsso%26RelayState%3Dhttps%253A%252F%252Fauth.library.uq.edu.au%252Flogin%253Freturn%253DaHR0cHM6Ly9hdXRoLmxpYnJhcnkudXEuZWR1LmF1L2xvZ2luP3R5cGU9ZXpwcm94eSZ1cmw9aHR0cHMlM2ElMmYlMmZkb2kub3JnJTJmMTAuMTA4MCUyZjAyNjkxNzI4LjIwMTYuMTE3MjM1OA%253D%253D%26cookieTime%3D1651224707 |access-date=2022-04-29 |journal=Social Epistemology | date=November 2016 | volume=30 | issue=5–6 | pages=728–763 |doi=10.1080/02691728.2016.1172358| s2cid=147848024 | last1=Zafirovski | first1=Milan | url-access=subscription }}</ref>