Editing Vote counting (section)

===Secure transport and internet===

The ballots can be carried securely to a central station for central tallying, or they can be tallied at each polling place, manually or by machine, and the results sent securely to the central elections office. Transport is often accompanied by representatives of different parties to ensure honest delivery. Colorado transmits voting records by internet from counties to the Secretary of State, with hash values also sent by internet to try to identify accurate transmissions.<ref name="co-25">{{Cite web |url=https://www.sos.state.co.us/pubs/rule_making/CurrentRules/8CCR1505-1/Rule25.pdf |title=Rule 25. Post-election audit |website=Colorado Secretary of State |access-date=2020-02-18}}</ref>

[[Postal voting]] is common worldwide, though France stopped it in the 1970s because of concerns about ballot security. Voters who receive a ballot at home may also hand-deliver it or have someone else to deliver it. The voter may be forced or paid to vote a certain way,<ref name="pickles"/> or ballots may be changed or lost during the delivery process,<ref name="bbc-mawrey">{{Cite news |url=http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/england/west_midlands/4406575.stm |title=Judge upholds vote-rigging claims |date=2005-04-04 |work=BBC |access-date=2020-02-18 |language=en-GB}}</ref>
<ref name="mawrey2004">{{Cite web |url=http://www.hmcourts-service.gov.uk/cms/2384.htm |title=Judgment of Commissioner Mawrey QC Handed down on Monday 4th April 2005 in the matters of Local Government elections for the Bordesley Green and Aston Wards of the Birmingham City Council both held on 10th June 2004 |last=Mawrey |first=Richard |date=2010-11-01 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20101101071354/http://www.hmcourts-service.gov.uk/cms/2384.htm |access-date=2020-02-18|archive-date=2010-11-01 }}</ref>
or delayed so they arrive too late to be counted or for signature mis-matches to be resolved.<ref name="fl1">{{Cite web|url=https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/elections/thousands-mailed-ballots-florida-were-not-counted-n946306|title=Thousands of mailed ballots in Florida were not counted|website=NBC News|date=11 December 2018 |language=en|access-date=2019-03-27}}</ref>
<ref name="fl2">{{Cite web|url=https://www.miamiherald.com/news/politics-government/state-politics/article218654810.html|title=If you vote by mail in Florida, it's 10 times more likely that ballot won't count|website=miamiherald|language=en|access-date=2019-03-27}}</ref>

Postal voting lowered turnout in California by 3%.<ref name="kousser-ca">{{Cite journal |url=http://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/ef55/4b60fc90c45bfd24add2e0f5ab7b5af95aac.pdf |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190306234735/http://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/ef55/4b60fc90c45bfd24add2e0f5ab7b5af95aac.pdf |url-status=dead |archive-date=2019-03-06 |title=Does Voting by Mail Increase Participation? Using Matching to Analyze a Natural Experiment |last=Kousser |first=Thad |author2=Megan Mullin |date=2007-07-13 |journal=Political Analysis |volume=15 |issue=4 |pages=428–445 |doi=10.1093/PAN/MPM014 |s2cid=33267753 |access-date=2020-02-18}}</ref>
It raised turnout in Oregon only in Presidential election years by 4%, turning occasional voters into regular voters, without bringing in new voters.<ref name="berinsky">{{Cite journal |url=http://web.mit.edu/berinsky/www/whovotesbymail.pdf |last=BERINSKY  |first=ADAM J. |author2=NANCY BURNS |author3=MICHAEL W. TRAUGOTT |title=Who Votes by Mail?: A Dynamic Model of the Individual-Level Consequences of Voting-by-Mail Systems |date=2001 |journal=Public Opinion Quarterly |volume=65 |issue=2 |pages=178–197 |doi=10.1086/322196 |pmid=11420755 |access-date=2020-02-18}}</ref>
Election offices do not mail to people who have not voted recently, and letter carriers do not deliver to recent movers they do not know, omitting mobile populations.<ref name="slater">{{Cite web|url=https://www.nonprofitvote.org/documents/2011/02/vote-by-mail-doesnt-deliver-slater.doc|title=Vote-by-Mail Doesn't Deliver|last=Slater|first=Michael |author2=Teresa James|work=NonprofitVote.org|date=2007-06-29|access-date=2020-02-18|archive-date=2017-05-10|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170510114256/http://www.nonprofitvote.org/documents/2011/02/vote-by-mail-doesnt-deliver-slater.doc|url-status=dead}}</ref>

Some jurisdictions let ballots be sent to the election office by email, fax, internet or app.<ref name="ncsl">{{Cite web |url=https://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/internet-voting.aspx |title=Electronic Transmission of Ballots |website=National Conference of State Legislatures |access-date=2020-02-18}}</ref> 
Email and fax are highly insecure.<ref name="fax">{{Cite web |url=https://www.verifiedvoting.org/resources/internet-voting/email-fax/ |title=What About Email and Fax? |website=Verified Voting |last=Jefferson |first=David |language=en-US |access-date=2020-02-18 |archive-date=2020-02-18 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200218231508/https://www.verifiedvoting.org/resources/internet-voting/email-fax/ |url-status=dead }}</ref>
Internet so far has also been insecure, including in [[Electronic voting in Switzerland|Switzerland]],<ref name="zetter-swiss">{{Cite news |last=Zetter |first=Kim |url=https://www.vice.com/en/article/experts-find-serious-problems-with-switzerlands-online-voting-system-before-public-penetration-test-even-begins/ |title=Experts Find Serious Problems With Switzerland's Online Voting System |date=2019-02-21 |work=Vice |access-date=2020-02-18 |language=en}}</ref>
Australia,<ref name="cso">{{Cite news |last=Porup |first=J. M. |url=https://www.csoonline.com/article/3269297/online-voting-is-impossible-to-secure-so-why-are-some-governments-using-it.html |title=Online voting is impossible to secure. So why are some governments using it? |date=2018-05-02 |work=CSO |access-date=2020-02-18 |language=en}}</ref>
and [[Electronic voting in Estonia|Estonia]].<ref name="est">{{Cite web |url=https://estoniaevoting.org/ |title=Independent Report on E-voting in Estonia - A security analysis of Estonia's Internet voting system by international e-voting experts. |access-date=2020-02-18}}</ref>
Apps try to verify the correct voter is using the app by name, date of birth and signature,<ref name="parks">{{Cite news |last=Parks |first=Miles |url=https://www.npr.org/2020/01/22/798126153/exclusive-seattle-area-voters-to-vote-by-smartphone-in-1st-for-u-s-elections |title=Exclusive: Seattle-Area Voters To Vote By Smartphone In 1st For U.S. Elections |date=2020-01-22 |work=NPR |access-date=2020-02-18 |language=en}}</ref>
which are widely available for most voters, so can be faked; or by name, ID and video selfie, which can be faked by loading a pre-recorded video.<ref name="sc-voatz"/> Apps have been particularly criticized for operating on insecure phones, and pretending to more security during transmission than they have.<ref name="zetter-voatz">{{Cite news |last=Zetter |first=Kim |url=https://www.vice.com/en/article/sloppy-mobile-voting-app-used-in-four-states-has-elementary-security-flaws/ |title='Sloppy' Mobile Voting App Used in Four States Has 'Elementary' Security Flaws |date=2020-02-13|work=Vice |access-date=2020-02-18 |language=en}}</ref>
<ref name="mit-voatz">{{Cite web |url=https://internetpolicy.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/SecurityAnalysisOfVoatz_Public.pdf |title=The Ballot is Busted Before the Blockchain: A Security Analysis of Voatz, the First Internet Voting Application Used in U.S. Federal Elections |last=Specter |first=Michael A. |author2=James Koppel |author3=Daniel Weitzner |date=2020-02-12 |website=MIT |access-date=2020-02-18}}</ref>
<ref name="sc-voatz">{{Cite web |url=https://cse.sc.edu/~buell/blockchain-papers/documents/WhatWeDontKnowAbouttheVoatz_Blockchain_.pdf |title=What We Don't Know About the Voatz "Blockchain" Internet Voting System |last=Jefferson |first=David |date=2019-05-01 |website=University of South Carolina |access-date=2020-02-18}}</ref>