Editing Accountability (section)

== Political accountability==
Political accountability is when a politician makes choices on behalf of the people, and the people have the ability to reward or sanction the politician.<ref name=":0">{{cite book|title=Electoral Accountability and the Control of Politicians: Selecting Good Types versus Sanctioning Poor Performance|last=Fearon|first=James|publisher=Cambridge University Press|year=1999|location=Cambridge, MA}}</ref> In representative democracies, citizens delegate power to elected officials through periodic elections, and such officials are empowered to represent or act in the citizens' interest.<ref name=":0" /> A challenge is how to see to it that those with such power, who presumably have divergent interests from the citizens, nonetheless act in their best interests.<ref name=":1">{{cite book|title=Democracy, accountability, and representation |last1=Przeworski|first1= Adam |last2=Stokes|first2= Susan Carol |last3=Manin|first3=Bernard |date=2003 |publisher=Cambridge University Press|isbn=9780521641531|oclc=58400209}}</ref> Citizens can rely on rewards or sanctions to reward or threaten politicians who might otherwise act in a manner that is antithetical to the people's interest.<ref name=":1" /> Accountability occurs when citizens only vote to re-elect representatives who act in their interests, and if representatives then select policies that will help them be re-elected.<ref name=":1" /> "Governments are 'accountable' if voters can discern whether governments are acting in their interest and sanction them appropriately, so that those incumbents who act in the best interest of the citizens win reelection and those who do not lose them."<ref name=":1" />

Representatives can be held accountable through two mechanisms: electoral replacement and rational anticipation.<ref name=":2">{{cite journal|last1=Stimson|first1=James A.|last2=MacKuen|first2=Michael B.|last3=Erikson|first3=Robert S.|title=Dynamic Representation|journal=American Political Science Review|volume=98|issue=3|pages=543–565}}</ref> In electoral replacement, citizens vote to replace representatives who are out of step with their interests. Rational anticipation requires that representatives anticipate the consequences of being out of step with their constituency and then govern in accordance with citizens' wishes to avoid negative consequences.<ref name=":2" /> Accountability can still be achieved even if citizens are not perfectly knowledgeable about their representatives' actions; as long as representatives believe that they will be held accountable by citizens, they will still be motivated to act in accordance with the citizens' interests.<ref>{{cite book|title=The logic of congressional action.|last=Arnold|first= R. Douglas|year=1990|publisher=Yale University Press|isbn=0300056591|oclc=472546186|url-access=registration|url=https://archive.org/details/logicofcongressi00arno}}</ref>

=== Electoral accountability===
Electoral accountability refers to citizens using their vote to sanction or reward politicians.<ref name=":1" />

Some researchers have considered accountability using [[Formal theory (political science)|formal theory]], which makes assumptions about the state of the world to draw larger conclusions. Voters can hold representatives accountable through the process of sanctioning—voting the [[incumbent]] out of office in response to poor performance.{{r|:1}} While politicians face a decrease in vote share as a result of poor performance, they are less likely to see an increase in vote share for good performance.<ref name=":4">{{cite journal |last1=Martin|first1=Lucy|last2=Raffler|first2=Pia |date=4 August 2019 |title=Fault Lines: The Effects of Bureaucratic Power on Electoral Accountability |url=https://columbiapeseminar.files.wordpress.com/2019/09/martin_raffler_fault-lines.pdf |journal=American Journal of Political Science |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191206135401/https://columbiapeseminar.files.wordpress.com/2019/09/martin_raffler_fault-lines.pdf |archive-date=6 December 2019 |access-date=6 December 2019}}</ref> Selection—voters choosing candidates based on who will best represent their interests—is another method by which voters hold their representatives accountable.{{r|:1}} These methods of accountability can occur simultaneously, with voters holding representatives accountable using both sanctioning and selection.{{r|:1}} These conclusions rely on the assumption that voters do not observe the policy implemented by the incumbent, but do know their own welfare.{{clarify|how can you vote the incumbent out "in response to poor performance" if you "do not observe the policy implemented by the incumbent"?|date=July 2023}}{{r|:1}}

Some factors make it harder for voters to sanction incumbents. When politicians do not have control over outcomes, it becomes harder{{How|date=July 2023}} to hold them accountable.<ref name=":4" /> Additionally, when organizations are unable to monitor elections and provide information to voters, then voters struggle to sanction the incumbent.<ref name=":5">{{citation | last1=Grossman | first1=Guy | last2=Michelitch | first2=Kristin Grace | last3=Prato | first3=Carlo | title=The Effect of Sustained Transparency on Electoral Accountability | publisher=Center for Open Science | date=2 March 2022 | doi=10.31219/osf.io/qwcek }}</ref> When voters are better informed about the incumbent's performance, the incumbent is more vulnerable to voter sanctioning.<ref name=":5" /> Furthermore, when incumbents face sanctioning, challengers are more likely to enter the race.<ref name=":5" />

While elections provide a mechanism which can theoretically increase government accountability to citizens, they may instead lead to less egalitarian policy outcomes, because those who hold the government accountable tend to be from wealthier segments of society.<ref name=":29">{{Cite journal|last=Sances|first=Michael W.|date=January 2016|title=The Distributional Impact of Greater Responsiveness: Evidence from New York Towns|url=https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/full/10.1086/683026|journal=The Journal of Politics|volume=78|issue=1|pages=105–119|doi=10.1086/683026|s2cid=155437616|issn=0022-3816|url-access=subscription}}</ref> For example, a study of elected versus appointed property assessors in the state of New York shows that the election of property assessors leads to policies that severely undertax wealthier homes relative to poorer homes.<ref name=":29" />

Studies on political accountability have emphasized the key role of elections in promoting accountability in democratic settings. It is through elections that citizens hold governments accountable for past performance.{{r|:1}}<ref>{{cite SSRN |last1=Besley|first1=Timothy J.|last2=Kudamatsu|first2=Masayuki|date=1 May 2007|title=Making Autocracy Work|language=en|ssrn=1127017}}</ref> 

==== Electoral manipulation ====
{{Further|Political corruption|Electoral fraud}}
The role of elections in fostering accountability is often undermined by electoral manipulation and fraud.<ref name=":02">{{cite book |title=Why governments and parties manipulate elections: theory, practice, and implications |author1=Simpser, Alberto |date=2013|publisher=Cambridge University Press|isbn=978-1-107-30688-2|location=Cambridge|oclc=826857655}}</ref> By preventing citizens from removing leaders through elections based on their performance in office, electoral manipulation breaks down accountability and may undercut the consolidation of democratic institutions.<ref>{{cite thesis|url=https://escholarship.org/uc/item/2bs339cm|title=Voting, Fraud, and Violence: Political Accountability in African Elections|last=Long|first=James Dunway|publisher=University of California San Diego|year=2014}}</ref>

Electoral manipulation is not rare; some estimates are that in the 1990s and 2000s, up to one fourth of elections suffered some form of substantial manipulation.<ref name=":02" /> This includes a large array of pre-election and election-day tactics, such as outlawing rival parties and candidates, employing violence and [[intimidation]], and manipulating voter registration and vote count.<ref>{{cite journal|last=Schedler|first=Andreas|date=2002|title=The Menu of Manipulation|journal=Journal of Democracy|language=en|volume=13|issue=2|pages=36–50|doi=10.1353/jod.2002.0031|s2cid=154830665|issn=1086-3214}}</ref> Some efforts to improve accountability by preventing electoral manipulation and fraud have obtained a certain measure of success, such as using cell phone applications for monitoring and disseminating polling station results<ref name=":12b">{{cite journal|last1=Callen|first1=Michael|last2=Long|first2=James D.|date=2015|title=Institutional Corruption and Election Fraud: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Afghanistan|journal=American Economic Review|language=en|volume=105|issue=1|pages=354–381|doi=10.1257/aer.20120427|s2cid=7016902 |issn=0002-8282|url=http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/102931/1/In.pdf}}</ref> and employing domestic or international election observers.<ref name=":22">{{cite journal|last1=Ichino|first1=Nahomi|last2=Schündeln|first2=Matthias|date=2012|title=Deterring or Displacing Electoral Irregularities? Spillover Effects of Observers in a Randomized Field Experiment in Ghana|journal=The Journal of Politics|language=en|volume=74|issue=1|pages=292–307|doi=10.1017/S0022381611001368|s2cid=10426326|issn=0022-3816|url=http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:9282597|url-access=subscription}}</ref><ref name=":32">{{cite journal|last1=Beaulieu|first1=Emily|last2=Hyde|first2=Susan D.|date=2009|title=In the Shadow of Democracy Promotion: Strategic Manipulation, International Observers, and Election Boycotts|journal=Comparative Political Studies|language=en|volume=42|issue=3|pages=392–415|doi=10.1177/0010414008325571|s2cid=155078768|issn=0010-4140}}</ref> However, governments may simply alter the type of manipulation or where it occurs in order to deceive observers and monitoring agencies.<ref name=":22" /><ref name=":32" />

Governments, politicians, and political parties are more likely to resort to electoral manipulation and fraud when they believe they might be removed from office and when they face few institutional constraints to their power.<ref>{{cite journal|last1=Hafner-Burton|first1=Emilie Marie|last2=Hyde|first2=Susan D.|last3=Jablonski|first3=Ryan S.|date=6 September 2012 |title=When Do Governments Resort to Election Violence? |journal=British Journal of Political Science |language=en|location=Rochester, N.Y. |ssrn=1667063}}</ref> Low political competition has also been linked to some forms of manipulation, such as abolishing presidential term limits.<ref>{{cite journal|last=McKie|first=Kristin|date=2019|title=Presidential Term Limit Contravention: Abolish, Extend, Fail, or Respect?|journal=Comparative Political Studies|language=en|volume=52|issue=10|pages=1500–1534|doi=10.1177/0010414019830737|s2cid=159155380|issn=0010-4140|doi-access=free}}</ref> Well-connected{{How|date=July 2023}} candidates are more likely to resort to vote count fraud.<ref name=":12b" /> Governments may engage in electoral manipulation not only to obtain victory at a given election or to remain in office longer, but also for post-election reasons, such as reducing the strength of the opposition or increasing their own bargaining power in the subsequent period.<ref name=":02" />

=== Administrative ===
==== Common goods ====
Politicians may be incentivized to provide [[common good]]s as a means of accountability.{{clarify|reason=how is providing public goods a means of accountability?|date=July 2023}}<ref name=":15">{{cite journal|last1=Batley|first1=Richard|last2=Mcloughlin|first2=Claire|date=October 2015|title=The Politics of Public Services: A Service Characteristics Approach|journal=World Development|language=en|volume=74|pages=275–285|doi=10.1016/j.worlddev.2015.05.018|doi-access=free}}</ref> The ability of voters to attribute the credit and blame of outcomes also determines the extent of public goods provision.<ref name=":15" /><ref name=":16">{{cite journal | last1=Martin | first1=Lucy | last2=Raffler | first2=Pia J. | title=Fault Lines: The Effects of Bureaucratic Power on Electoral Accountability | journal=American Journal of Political Science | publisher=Wiley | volume=65 | issue=1 | date=7 June 2020 | issn=0092-5853 | doi=10.1111/ajps.12530 | pages=210–224| s2cid=209526364 }}</ref> Research suggests that public goods provision {{vague|text=is conditional on|reason=conditional in what way? provision to whom by whom? who attributes the outcomes?|date=July 2023}} being able to attribute outcomes to politicians as opposed to civil servants.<ref name=":16" /> This attribution can be enhanced by more short-run and visible inputs and outcomes such as famine relief or access to drinking water, whereas lower-visibility issues such as sanitation and education may be more difficult to attribute credit for and thus less likely to provide for.<ref name=":15" />

Another condition determining how voters use the provision of public goods to hold leaders accountable is whether the prioritization of public goods is determined either directly via vote or delegated to a governing body.<ref name=":17">{{cite journal|last=Butler|first=Daniel M.|s2cid=155004601|date=22 August 2011|title=Can Learning Constituency Opinion Affect How Legislators Vote? Results from a Field Experiment|journal=Quarterly Journal of Political Science|volume=6|issue=1|pages=55–83|doi=10.1561/100.00011019}}</ref><ref name=":18">{{cite journal | last1=Beath | first1=Andrew | last2=Christia | first2=Fotini | last3=Enikolopov | first3=Ruben | title=Direct democracy and resource allocation: Experimental evidence from Afghanistan | journal=Journal of Development Economics | publisher=Elsevier BV | volume=124 | year=2017 | issn=0304-3878 | doi=10.1016/j.jdeveco.2016.10.001 | pages=199–213| hdl=1721.1/127650 | url=http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2012/07/16/000158349_20120716094426/Rendered/PDF/WPS6133.pdf | hdl-access=free }}</ref> An experiment in New Mexico regarding proposed spending during the state's 2008 special summer legislative session provides evidence that legislators update their positions when learning about voters' policy preferences, indicating that a representative democracy can increase accountability when politicians learn about voters' preferences.<ref name=":17" /> A 2016 experiment in Afghanistan regarding rural development projects, however, finds that when voters directly prioritize their preferences at the ballot box, they perceive the quality of local government to be higher than when a governing committee prioritizes development projects.<ref name=":18" /> These contrasting outcomes highlight a debate between trustees and delegates, though the lack of objective superior outcomes in projects decided by vote as opposed to committee in the Afghanistan experiment indicate neither is superior to the other in determining which public goods should be given priority.<ref>{{multiref2
|1={{cite journal|last=Rehfeld|first=Andrew|date=May 2009|title=Representation Rethought: On Trustees, Delegates, and Gyroscopes in the Study of Political Representation and Democracy|journal=American Political Science Review|language=en|volume=103|issue=2|pages=214–230|doi=10.1017/S0003055409090261|s2cid=53957756|issn=0003-0554}}
|2={{cite journal|last1=Fox|first1=Justin|last2=Shotts|first2=Kenneth W.|date=October 2009|title=Delegates or Trustees? A Theory of Political Accountability|journal=The Journal of Politics|language=en|volume=71|issue=4|pages=1225–1237|doi=10.1017/S0022381609990260|s2cid=9879793|issn=0022-3816}}
}}</ref>

Other research indicates that voters use elections to hold politicians accountable for the provision of public goods.<ref name=":19">{{cite journal |last1=Min |first1=Brian |last2=Golden |first2=Miriam |author-link2=Miriam A. Golden |date=February 2014 |title=Electoral cycles in electricity losses in India |journal=Energy Policy |language=en |volume=65 |pages=619–625 |bibcode=2014EnPol..65..619M |doi=10.1016/j.enpol.2013.09.060}}</ref><ref name=":20">{{cite journal|last=Harding|first=Robin|date=October 2015|title=Attribution And Accountability: Voting for roads in Ghana|journal=World Politics|language=en|volume=67|issue=4|pages=656–689|doi=10.1017/S0043887115000209|s2cid=20470554|issn=0043-8871|url=https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:219e71c2-1b53-41de-b418-b61f10bf2039}}</ref> In India, rural areas are charged a flat rate for electricity, but in the province of Uttar Pradesh, line loss—electricity that is consumed but not billed—is significantly higher in election years than non-election years, and increases in line loss reliably predict electoral gains.<ref name=":19" /> Voters rewarded incumbent politicians with a 12% increase in party seats in response to a 10% increase of unbilled electricity, in 2007 elections.<ref name=":19" /> In Ghana, the improvement of road conditions is linked to an increasing vote share for incumbent parties.<ref name=":20" /> Both of these research outcomes hinge on voters being able to attribute the service of public goods to politicians.<ref name=":19" /><ref name=":20" /><ref name=":16" />

Politicians may also have incentives to respond to pressure for public goods provision in electoral autocracies.<ref name=":21">{{cite journal|last=Miller|first=Michael K.|date=October 2015|title=Electoral Authoritarianism and Human Development|journal=Comparative Political Studies|language=en|volume=48|issue=12|pages=1526–1562|doi=10.1177/0010414015582051|s2cid=154285722|issn=0010-4140}}</ref><ref name=":23">{{cite journal|last=Miller|first=Michael K.|date=May 2015|title=Elections, Information, and Policy Responsiveness in Autocratic Regimes|journal=Comparative Political Studies|language=en|volume=48|issue=6|pages=691–727|doi=10.1177/0010414014555443|s2cid=154879177|issn=0010-4140}}</ref> There is evidence that as autocratic governments lose seats in their party's legislatures, they respond by increasing spending on public goods such as education, healthcare, and pensions.<ref name=":21" /> There is further evidence suggesting higher quality of life, civil liberties, and human development in electoral autocracies, lending credence to the theory that autocratic rulers use elections as a bellwether against popular discontent and citizen opposition, and in turn increase public goods provision to dampen the grievances of disgruntled citizens, even in non-democracies.<ref name=":23" />

While the introduction of elections is generally thought to improve public goods provision, in some cases, researchers have shown that it may reduce its quality.<ref name=":30">{{Cite journal|last1=Pierskalla|first1=Jan H.|last2=Sacks|first2=Audrey|date=October 2020|title=Personnel Politics: Elections, Clientelistic Competition and Teacher Hiring in Indonesia|journal=British Journal of Political Science|language=en|volume=50|issue=4|pages=1283–1305|doi=10.1017/S0007123418000601|s2cid=149452970|issn=0007-1234|doi-access=free}}</ref> For example, the introduction of direct elections for local district office in Indonesia resulted in political interference in the hiring process for bureaucrats in the public education sector, reducing the quality of education provision; politicians were incentivized to dole out patronage positions in the education sector, especially in election years, and where such positions were added, student test scores were lower.<ref name=":30" />