Editing Adaptive chosen-ciphertext attack (section)

==Preventing attacks==
In order to prevent adaptive-chosen-ciphertext attacks, it is necessary to use an encryption or encoding scheme that limits ciphertext [[malleability (cryptography)|malleability]] and a proof of security of the system. After the theoretical and foundation level development of CCA secure systems, a number of systems have been proposed in the Random Oracle model: the most common standard for RSA encryption is [[Optimal Asymmetric Encryption Padding]] (OAEP). Unlike improvised schemes such as the padding used in the early versions of PKCS#1, OAEP has been proven secure in the [[random oracle]] model,<ref>{{cite journal
|last1=Fujisaki
|first1=Eiichiro
|authorlink1=
|last2=Okamoto
|first2=Tatsuaki
|last3=Pointcheval
|first3=David
|last4=Stern
|first4=Jacques
|title=RSA-OAEP Is Secure under the RSA Assumption
|journal=Journal of Cryptology
|volume=17
|issue=2
|pages=81–104
|year=2004
|url=https://www.di.ens.fr/~pointche/Documents/Papers/2004_joc.pdf
|doi=10.1007/s00145-002-0204-y
|id=
|accessdate=2009-01-12|citeseerx=10.1.1.11.7519
|s2cid=218582909
}}</ref> OAEP was incorporated into PKCS#1 as of version 2.0 published in 1998 as the now-recommended encoding scheme, with the older scheme still supported but not recommended for new applications.<ref>{{cite IETF |title=PKCS #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.0 |rfc=2437 |last1=Kaliski |first1=B. |last2=Staddon |first2=J. |date=October 1998 |publisher=[[Internet Engineering Task Force |IETF]] |accessdate=February 20, 2019 |doi=10.17487/RFC2437}}</ref> However, the golden standard for security is to show the system secure without relying on the Random Oracle idealization.<ref name="katz">{{cite book |last1=Katz |first1=Jonathan |last2=Lindell |first2=Yehuda |title=Introduction to Modern Cryptography |date=2015 |publisher=Chapman & Hall/CRC |location=Boca Raton |isbn=978-1-4665-7027-6 |pages=174–175, 179–181 |edition=2}}</ref>