Editing Agreed Framework (section)

==Agreement==

* '''Motivation''' : North Korea announced intention to withdraw from [[Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty|NPT]] and [[non-compliance]] with [[IAEA safeguards]].
* '''Signed Date''': 21 October 1994 by American ambassador [[Robert Gallucci]] and North Korean vice minister [[Kang Sok-ju]]
* '''Summary''': Freeze of North Korean nuclear program, leading to [[denuclearization]] of the Korean Peninsula, and initial [[Peace agreement]] between the [[United States]] and North Korea<ref>{{cite web|url= https://inews.co.uk/essentials/news/world/north-korea-nuclear-negotiations-1994-2017-robert-gallucci/|title= "Prevented war with North Korea in 1994 – here's what needs to be done|date= 5 September 2017|publisher= .inews.co.uk|access-date= 2017-09-10|language= en|url-status= live|archive-url= https://web.archive.org/web/20170910220028/https://inews.co.uk/essentials/news/world/north-korea-nuclear-negotiations-1994-2017-robert-gallucci/|archive-date= 2017-09-10}}</ref><ref>{{cite web   |url=https://www.cartercenter.org/news/pr/north-korea-081017.html   |title=Statement from Former U.S. President Jimmy Carter on Current U.S.-North Korea Relations   |publisher=cartercenter.org   |access-date=2017-09-10   |language=en   |url-status=live   |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170910173323/https://www.cartercenter.org/news/pr/north-korea-081017.html   |archive-date=2017-09-10   }}</ref>

{| class="wikitable "
|-
! States !! Agreed Items !! Progress 
|-
| {{flag|United States }} ||* Deliver 500,000 tons of heavy oil annually to DPRK as an alternative energy <br /> * Make arrangements for two 1000 MWe [[light water reactor]]s to DPRK with target date of 2003.<br /> * Provide DPRK with formal assurance against the use of nuclear weapons by U.S. <br /> * Move toward full normalization of political and economic relations || * The heavy oil was delivered to the DPRK with some delays <br /> * United States established international consortium [[Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization|KEDO]] to build LWRs, though U.S. Congress rejected U.S. funding for the project
|-
| {{flag|North Korea }} ||* Freeze all graphite-moderated nuclear reactors (5MWe reactor and 50 & 200 MWe under construction) <br /> * Remain a party to the NPT <br /> * Take steps to implement 1992 [[Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula]] <br /> * Dismantle graphite-moderated reactors when LWR project is completed <br /> * Move toward full normalization of political and economic relations || * DPRK stopped operating 5 MWe reactor and abandoned reactors under construction <br /> * DPRK "suspended" notification of withdrawal from NPT
|-
|}

The main provisions of the agreement<ref name=iaea-INFCIRC457>{{cite news |url=http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/Others/infcirc457.pdf |title=Agreed Framework of 21 October 1994 Between the United States of America and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea |id=INFCIRC/457 |publisher=IAEA |date=2 November 1994 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20031217175315/http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/Others/infcirc457.pdf |archive-date=17 December 2003}}</ref> were:
* DPRK's graphite-moderated 5MWe [[nuclear power plant|nuclear reactor]], and the 50 MWe and 200 MWe reactors under construction, which could easily produce weapons grade [[plutonium]], would be replaced with two 1000MW [[light water reactors]] (LWR) power plants by a target date of 2003.
* Oil for heating and electricity production would be provided while DPRK's reactors were shut down and construction halted, until completion of the first LWR power unit. The amount of oil was 500,000 tons of heavy fuel oil per year.
* The two sides would move toward full normalization of political and economic relations.
* The U.S. would provide formal [[peace]] and [[national security]] assurances to the DPRK, against the threat or use of nuclear weapons by the U.S.
* The DPRK would take steps to implement the 1992 [[Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula]]<ref>[http://www.carnegieendowment.org/npp/koreadenuclearization.cfm NPP<!-- Bot generated title -->]{{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070930014646/http://www.carnegieendowment.org/npp/koreadenuclearization.cfm |date=2007-09-30 }}</ref> between South and North Korea.
* The DPRK would remain a party to the [[Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty]].
* [[IAEA]] ad hoc and routine inspections would resume for facilities not subject to the freeze.
* Existing spent nuclear fuel stocks would be stored and ultimately disposed of without [[Nuclear reprocessing|reprocessing]] in the DPRK.
* Before delivery of key LWR nuclear components, the DPRK would come into full compliance with its safeguards agreement with the IAEA.

There were also some confidential minutes supporting the agreement, which have not been made public.<ref name=KCNA-20021025>{{cite news|url=http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2002/200210/news10/25.htm#1 |title=Conclusion of non-aggression treaty between DPRK and U.S. called for |publisher=[[Korean Central News Agency|KCNA]] |date=October 25, 2002 |access-date=2009-03-15 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090908014926/http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2002/200210/news10/25.htm |archive-date=2009-09-08 }}</ref><ref name=clinton-19990304>{{citation|url=http://www.clintonfoundation.org/legacy/030499-presidential-memo-on-kedo.htm |title=Presidential Determination No. 99-16|author =William J. Clinton|publisher=[[The White House]]|date=March 4, 1999|access-date=2007-09-27 |archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20070927022519/http://www.clintonfoundation.org/legacy/030499-presidential-memo-on-kedo.htm |archive-date = 2007-09-27}}</ref> These are reported to include that full-scope IAEA safeguards would be applied when the major non-nuclear components of the first LWR unit were completed but before the delivery of key nuclear components.<ref name=IISS-net-assesment>{{citation|url=http://www.iiss.org/publications/strategic-dossiers/north-korean-dossier/north-koreas-weapons-programmes-a-net-asses/|title=North Korea's Weapons Programmes: A Net Assessment|author =International Institute for Strategic Studies|author-link =International Institute for Strategic Studies|publisher=Palgrave Macmillan|date=10 February 2004|isbn=978-1-4039-3324-9|access-date=2009-03-05| archive-url= https://web.archive.org/web/20090311214952/http://www.iiss.org/publications/strategic-dossiers/north-korean-dossier/north-koreas-weapons-programmes-a-net-asses/| archive-date= 11 March 2009 | url-status= live}}</ref>

The commitments in the agreement were voluntary and non-binding,{{citation needed|date=June 2018}} not approved by the [[United States Senate]] as with a [[treaty]], though noted by the [[United Nations Security Council]].<ref name=wp-20150313/><ref name="UNSC-S/PRST/1994/64">{{citation |url=http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/PRST/1994/64 |title=Statement by the President of the Security Council |id=S/PRST/1994/64 |publisher=[[United Nations Security Council]] |date=4 November 1994 |access-date=7 September 2017 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160912223420/http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S%2FPRST%2F1994%2F64 |archive-date=12 September 2016 }}</ref> It was signed in the wake of North Korea's 90-day advance notification of its intended withdrawal from the [[Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty]] (which North Korea "suspended" after 89 days), a U.S. military buildup near the country, and U.S. plans to bomb the active [[Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Center|Yongbyon nuclear reactor]].<ref>{{cite web |url=https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kim/interviews/acarter.html |title=frontline: kim's nuclear gamble: interviews: ashton carter |publisher=PBS |date=2003-03-03 |access-date=2009-06-09 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090329085454/http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kim/interviews/acarter.html |archive-date=2009-03-29 }}</ref>

The U.S. regarded the Agreed Framework primarily as a non-proliferation agreement, whereas North Korea placed greater value on measures normalizing relations with the U.S.<ref name=bridge-hecker-2010>{{Cite journal |url=http://cisac.stanford.edu/publications/north_koreas_choice_bombs_over_electricity/ |title=North Korea's Choice: Bombs Over Electricity |author1=Siegfried S. Hecker |author2=Sean C. Lee |author3=Chaim Braun |date=Summer 2010 |journal=The Bridge |volume=40 |issue=2 |pages=5–12 |publisher=[[National Academy of Engineering]] |access-date=5 March 2011 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20101205175419/http://cisac.stanford.edu/publications/north_koreas_choice_bombs_over_electricity/ |archive-date=2010-12-05 }}</ref>

Terms of the pact and consequent agreements included the shutdown of the pilot [[Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Center|Yongbyon nuclear reactor]], abandoning the construction of two larger nuclear power plants, and the canning and sealing, under [[IAEA]] monitoring, of spent fuel that could have been reprocessed to create plutonium for a [[nuclear weapon]].
In exchange two [[light water reactor]]s would be constructed in North Korea by 2003 at a cost of $4 billion, primarily supplied by South Korea.<ref>{{cite web |url=http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c104:H.J.RES.83.EH: |title=Bill Text - 104th Congress (1995-1996) - THOMAS (Library of Congress) |website=thomas.loc.gov |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150904103407/http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c104:H.J.RES.83.EH: |archive-date=2015-09-04}}</ref> In the interim, North Korea would be supplied with 500,000 tons of [[heavy fuel oil]] annually, at no cost, to make up for lost energy production. North Korea was required to come into full compliance with its IAEA safeguards agreement, allowing the IAEA to verify the correctness and completeness of its initial declaration, before key nuclear components of the reactor would be delivered.  When the LWR plants were completed, North Korea would dismantle its other nuclear reactors and associated facilities.

The [[Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization]] (KEDO) is a consortium of the United States, South Korea, Japan, and various other states that is responsible for implementing the energy-related parts of the agreement. North Korea would repay KEDO over a 20-year interest-free period after the completion of each LWR plant.<ref>[http://www.kedo.org/pdfs/SupplyAgreement.pdf Agreement on Supply of a Light-Water Reactor Project to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090923120058/http://www.kedo.org/pdfs/SupplyAgreement.pdf |date=2009-09-23 }}, KEDO, 1995</ref>

It was reported that [[President of the United States|US President]] [[Bill Clinton]]'s officials agreed to the plan only because they thought that the North Korean government would collapse before the nuclear power project was completed as North Korea's leader [[Kim Il Sung]] [[Death and state funeral of Kim Il Sung|had recently died]].<ref>{{cite news |url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/07/12/AR2005071200220.html |title=South Korea Offers To Supply Energy if North Gives Up Arms |work=Washingtonpost.com |date=2005-07-13 |access-date=2009-06-09 |first=Glenn |last=Kessler |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20121108180137/http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/07/12/AR2005071200220.html |archive-date=2012-11-08 }}</ref>
North Korean officials at the time also suspected the U.S. anticipated an early collapse of the DPRK.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www1.korea-np.co.jp/pk/188th_issue/2003012701.htm |title=DPRK Will Re-Operate Nuclear Facilities Within A Few Weeks to Produce Electricity |author=Kim Ji Yong |publisher=The People's Korea |date=2003-01-27 |access-date=2009-06-09 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090909024331/http://www1.korea-np.co.jp/pk/188th_issue/2003012701.htm |archive-date=2009-09-09 }}</ref>