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Anchoring effect
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== Characteristics == ===Difficulty of avoiding=== Various studies have shown that anchoring is very difficult to avoid. For example, in one study students were given anchors that were wrong. They were asked whether [[Mahatma Gandhi]] died before or after age 9, or before or after age 140. Clearly neither of these anchors can be correct, but when the two groups were asked to suggest when they thought he had died, they guessed significantly differently (average age of 50 vs. average age of 67).<ref name="StrackMussweiler1997">{{cite journal|last1=Strack|first1=Fritz|last2=Mussweiler|first2=Thomas|s2cid=1095326|title=Explaining the enigmatic anchoring effect: Mechanisms of selective accessibility.|journal=Journal of Personality and Social Psychology|volume=73|issue=3|year=1997|pages=437β446|doi=10.1037/0022-3514.73.3.437}}</ref> Other studies have tried to eliminate anchoring much more directly. In a study exploring the causes and properties of anchoring, participants were exposed to an anchor and asked to guess how many physicians were listed in the local phone book. In addition, they were explicitly informed that anchoring would "contaminate" their responses, and that they should do their best to correct for that. A control group received no anchor and no explanation. Regardless of how they were informed and whether they were informed correctly, all of the experimental groups reported higher estimates than the control group. Thus, despite being expressly aware of the anchoring effect, most participants were still unable to avoid it.<ref name="WilsonHouston1996">{{cite journal|last1=Wilson|first1=Timothy D.|last2=Houston|first2=Christopher E.|last3=Etling|first3=Kathryn M.|last4=Brekke|first4=Nancy|title=A new look at anchoring effects: Basic anchoring and its antecedents.|journal=Journal of Experimental Psychology: General|volume=125|issue=4|year=1996|pages=387β402|doi=10.1037/0096-3445.125.4.387|pmid=8945789}}</ref> A later study found that even when offered monetary incentives, most people are unable to effectively adjust from an anchor.<ref name="SimmonsLeBoeuf2010">{{cite journal|last1=Simmons|first1=Joseph P.|last2=LeBoeuf|first2=Robyn A.|last3=Nelson|first3=Leif D.|title=The effect of accuracy motivation on anchoring and adjustment: Do people adjust from provided anchors?|journal=Journal of Personality and Social Psychology|volume=99|issue=6|year=2010|pages=917β932|doi=10.1037/a0021540|pmid=21114351|url=https://repository.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1375&context=marketing_papers}}</ref> Although it has been found through many research and experiments that attempt to mitigate the decision heuristic of anchoring bias is either marginally significant or not successful at all, it can be found that the consider-the-opposite (COS strategy) has been the most reliable in mitigating the anchoring bias (Adame, 2016). In short, the COS strategy is proposed to an individual by asking them to consider the possibilities the opposite of their perceptions and beliefs. Therefore, depriving the individual of their preexisting attitudes and limiting the decision bias. <ref>{{cite journal |last1=Adame |first1=Bradley |title=Training in the mitigation of anchoring bias: A test of the consider-the-opposite strategy |url=https://doi.org/10.1016/j.lmot.2015.11.002 |journal=Learning & Motivation|date=2016 |volume=53 |pages=36β48 |doi=10.1016/j.lmot.2015.11.002 |url-access=subscription }}</ref> ===Durability of anchoring=== Anchoring effects are also shown to remain adequately present given the accessibility of knowledge pertaining to the target. This, in turn, suggests that despite a delay in judgement towards a target, the extent of anchoring effects have seen to remain unmitigated within a given time period. A series of three experiments were conducted to test the longevity of anchoring effects. It was observed that despite a delay of one week being introduced for half the sample population of each experiment, similar results of immediate judgement and delayed judgement of the target were achieved. The experiments concluded that external information experienced within the delayed judgement period shows little influence relative to self-generated anchors even with commonly encountered targets (temperature) used in one of the experiments, showing that anchoring effects may precede [[priming (psychology)|priming]] in duration especially when the anchoring effects were formed during the task.<ref name="Mussweiler Durability">{{cite journal |last1=Mussweiler |first1=Thomas |title=The durability of anchoring effects |journal=European Journal of Social Psychology |date=July 2001 |volume=31 |issue=4 |pages=431β442 |doi=10.1002/ejsp.52}}</ref> Further research to conclude an effect that is effectively retained over a substantial period of time has proven inconsistent.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Davies |first1=Martin F. |title=Belief Persistence after Evidential Discrediting: The Impact of Generated versus Provided Explanations on the Likelihood of Discredited Outcomes |journal=Journal of Experimental Social Psychology |date=November 1997 |volume=33 |issue=6 |pages=561β578 |doi=10.1006/jesp.1997.1336}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |last1=Mussweiler |first1=Thomas |last2=Neumann |first2=Roland |title=Sources of Mental Contamination: Comparing the Effects of Self-Generated versus Externally Provided Primes |journal=Journal of Experimental Social Psychology |date=March 2000 |volume=36 |issue=2 |pages=194β206 |doi=10.1006/jesp.1999.1415}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |last1=Mussweiler |first1=Thomas |last2=Strack |first2=Fritz |title=Hypothesis-Consistent Testing and Semantic Priming in the Anchoring Paradigm: A Selective Accessibility Model |journal=Journal of Experimental Social Psychology |date=1 March 1999 |volume=35 |issue=2 |pages=136β164 |doi=10.1006/jesp.1998.1364}}</ref> === Pervasiveness Across Contexts === One notable characteristic of the anchoring effect is its pervasiveness across diverse judgment scenarios. Furnham and Boo (2011) highlight that anchoring occurs not only in abstract estimation tasks (like guessing the height of Mount Everest) but also in real-world contexts such as legal sentencing, consumer purchasing, salary negotiations, and forecasting. Anchoring persists even when the anchor is implausible or clearly irrelevant (e.g., spinning a random wheel), demonstrating that anchoring can operate automatically, outside of conscious awareness or logical evaluation.<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Furnham |first1=Adrian |last2=Boo |first2=Hua Chu |date=February 2011 |title=A literature review of the anchoring effect |url=https://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S1053535710001411 |journal=The Journal of Socio-Economics |language=en |volume=40 |issue=1 |pages=35β42 |doi=10.1016/j.socec.2010.10.008|url-access=subscription }}</ref> ===Anchoring bias in groups=== Given the old saying that 'Two Heads are Better than One', it is often presumed that groups come to a more unbiased decision relative to individuals.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Tindale |first1=R. Scott |last2=Winget |first2=Jeremy R. |title=Group Decision-Making |journal=Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Psychology |date=26 March 2019 |doi=10.1093/acrefore/9780190236557.013.262|isbn=9780190236557 |url=http://psyarxiv.com/kq2ft/ }}</ref> However, this assumption is supported with varied findings that could not come to a general consensus.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Gigone |first1=Daniel |last2=Hastie |first2=Reid |title=The common knowledge effect: Information sharing and group judgment. |journal=Journal of Personality and Social Psychology |date=1993 |volume=65 |issue=5 |pages=959β974 |doi=10.1037/0022-3514.65.5.959}}</ref><ref name="Bias in judgment: Comparing individ">{{cite journal |last1=Kerr |first1=Norbert L. |last2=MacCoun |first2=Robert J. |last3=Kramer |first3=Geoffrey P. |title=Bias in judgment: Comparing individuals and groups. |journal=Psychological Review |date=October 1996 |volume=103 |issue=4 |pages=687β719 |doi=10.1037/0033-295X.103.4.687|url=https://kar.kent.ac.uk/41331/1/KerrMcCounKramer.1996.BiasPaper.pdf }}</ref><ref name="Group Performance and Decision Maki">{{cite journal |last1=Kerr |first1=Norbert L. |last2=Tindale |first2=R. Scott |title=Group Performance and Decision Making |journal=Annual Review of Psychology |date=February 2004 |volume=55 |issue=1 |pages=623β655 |doi=10.1146/annurev.psych.55.090902.142009|pmid=14744229 }}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |last1=Laughlin |first1=Patrick R. |last2=Bonner |first2=Bryan L. |last3=Altermatt |first3=T. William |title=Collective versus individual induction with single versus multiple hypotheses. |journal=Journal of Personality and Social Psychology |date=1998 |volume=75 |issue=6 |pages=1481β1489 |doi=10.1037/0022-3514.75.6.1481}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |last1=Laughlin |first1=Patrick R. |last2=VanderStoep |first2=Scott W. |last3=Hollingshead |first3=Andrea B. |title=Collective versus individual induction: Recognition of truth, rejection of error, and collective information processing. |journal=Journal of Personality and Social Psychology |date=1991 |volume=61 |issue=1 |pages=50β67 |doi=10.1037/0022-3514.61.1.50}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |last1=Sunstein |first1=Cass R. |title=Group Judgments: Deliberation, Statistical Means, and Information Markets |journal=SSRN Electronic Journal |date=2004 |doi=10.2139/ssrn.578301|url=https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1132&context=public_law_and_legal_theory |url-access=subscription }}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |last1=Whyte |first1=Glen |title=Escalating Commitment in Individual and Group Decision Making: A Prospect Theory Approach |journal=Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes |date=April 1993 |volume=54 |issue=3 |pages=430β455 |doi=10.1006/obhd.1993.1018}}</ref> Nevertheless, while some groups are able to perform better than an individual member, they are found to be just as biased or even more biased relative to their individual counterparts.<ref name="Bias in judgment: Comparing individ"/><ref name="Group Performance and Decision Maki"/> A possible cause would be the discriminatory fashion in which information is communicated, processed and aggregated based on each individual's anchored knowledge and belief.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=De Dreu |first1=Carsten K. W. |last2=Nijstad |first2=Bernard A. |last3=van Knippenberg |first3=Daan |title=Motivated Information Processing in Group Judgment and Decision Making |journal=Personality and Social Psychology Review |date=February 2008 |volume=12 |issue=1 |pages=22β49 |doi=10.1177/1088868307304092|pmid=18453471 |s2cid=37435044 }}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |last1=Schulz-Hardt |first1=Stefan |last2=Brodbeck |first2=Felix C. |last3=Mojzisch |first3=Andreas |last4=Kerschreiter |first4=Rudolf |last5=Frey |first5=Dieter |title=Group decision making in hidden profile situations: Dissent as a facilitator for decision quality. |journal=Journal of Personality and Social Psychology |date=2006 |volume=91 |issue=6 |pages=1080β1093 |doi=10.1037/0022-3514.91.6.1080|pmid=17144766 }}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |last1=Stasser |first1=Garold |last2=Titus |first2=William |title=Pooling of unshared information in group decision making: Biased information sampling during discussion. |journal=Journal of Personality and Social Psychology |date=June 1985 |volume=48 |issue=6 |pages=1467β1478 |doi=10.1037/0022-3514.48.6.1467}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |last1=Stasser |first1=Garold |last2=Titus |first2=William |title=Effects of information load and percentage of shared information on the dissemination of unshared information during group discussion. |journal=Journal of Personality and Social Psychology |date=1987 |volume=53 |issue=1 |pages=81β93 |doi=10.1037/0022-3514.53.1.81}}</ref> This results in a diminished quality in the decision-making process and consequently, amplifies the pre-existing anchored biases. The cause of group anchoring remains unsure. Group anchors may have been established at the group level or may simply be the culmination of several individual's personal anchors. Prior studies have shown that when given an anchor before the experiment, individual members consolidated the respective anchors to attain a decision in the direction of the anchor placed.<ref name="The Effect of Multiple Anchors on A">{{cite journal |last1=Whyte |first1=Glen |last2=Sebenius |first2=James K. |title=The Effect of Multiple Anchors on Anchoring in Individual and Group Judgment |journal=Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes |date=January 1997 |volume=69 |issue=1 |pages=75β85 |doi=10.1006/obhd.1996.2674}}</ref> However, a distinction between individual and group-based anchor biases does exist, with groups tending to ignore or disregard external information due to the confidence in the joint decision-making process.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Minson |first1=Julia A. |last2=Mueller |first2=Jennifer S. |title=The Cost of Collaboration: Why Joint Decision Making Exacerbates Rejection of Outside Information |journal=Psychological Science |date=March 2012 |volume=23 |issue=3 |pages=219β224 |doi=10.1177/0956797611429132|pmid=22344447 |s2cid=15978610 }}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |last1=Minson |first1=Julia A. |last2=Mueller |first2=Jennifer S. |title=Groups Weight Outside Information Less Than Individuals Do, Although They Shouldn't: Response to Schultze, Mojzisch, and Schulz-Hardt (2013) |journal=Psychological Science |date=July 2013 |volume=24 |issue=7 |pages=1373β1374 |doi=10.1177/0956797613476894|pmid=23640063 |s2cid=6062825 }}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |last1=Schultze |first1=Thomas |last2=Mojzisch |first2=Andreas |last3=Schulz-Hardt |first3=Stefan |title=Groups Weight Outside Information Less Than Individuals Do Because They Should: Response to Minson and Mueller (2012) |journal=Psychological Science |date=July 2013 |volume=24 |issue=7 |pages=1371β1372 |doi=10.1177/0956797612472206|pmid=23640064 |s2cid=41307737 |url=https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/8333 }}</ref> The presence of pre-anchor preferences also impeded the extent to which external anchors affected the group decision, as groups tend to allocate more weight to self-generated anchors, according to the 'competing anchor hypothesis'.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Sniezek |first1=Janet A |title=Groups under uncertainty: An examination of confidence in group decision making |journal=Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes |date=June 1992 |volume=52 |issue=1 |pages=124β155 |doi=10.1016/0749-5978(92)90048-C}}</ref><ref name="The Effect of Multiple Anchors on A"/> Recently, it has been suggested that the group member who speaks first often has an unproportionally high impact on the final decision.<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Hartmann |first1=Stephan |last2=Rafiee Rad |first2=Soroush |date=2020-10-01 |title=Anchoring in Deliberations |url=https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-018-0064-y |journal=Erkenntnis |language=en |volume=85 |issue=5 |pages=1041β1069 |doi=10.1007/s10670-018-0064-y |issn=1572-8420}}</ref><ref>{{Cite thesis |title=Anchoring in deliberations of structured groups |url=https://edoc.ub.uni-muenchen.de/33309/ |publisher=Ludwig-Maximilians-UniversitΓ€t MΓΌnchen |date=2024-02-23 |degree=Text.PhDThesis |doi=10.5282/edoc.33309 |language=English |first=JosΓ© Antonio |last=Leyva Galano}}</ref> A series of experiments were conducted to investigate anchoring bias in groups and possible solutions to avoid or mitigate anchoring. The first experiment established that groups are indeed influenced by anchors while the other two experiments highlighted methods to overcome group anchoring bias. Methods that were utilized include the use of process accountability<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Ten Velden |first1=Femke S. |last2=Beersma |first2=Bianca |last3=De Dreu |first3=Carsten K. W. |title=It Takes One to Tango: The Effects of Dyads' Epistemic Motivation Composition in Negotiation |journal=Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin |date=November 2010 |volume=36 |issue=11 |pages=1454β1466 |doi=10.1177/0146167210383698|pmid=20841436 |s2cid=6252360 }}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |last1=Scholten |first1=Lotte |last2=van Knippenberg |first2=Daan |last3=Nijstad |first3=Bernard A. |last4=De Dreu |first4=Carsten K.W. |title=Motivated information processing and group decision-making: Effects of process accountability on information processing and decision quality |journal=Journal of Experimental Social Psychology |date=July 2007 |volume=43 |issue=4 |pages=539β552 |doi=10.1016/j.jesp.2006.05.010}}</ref> and motivation through competition instead of cooperation<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Nijstad |first1=Bernard A. |last2=Oltmanns |first2=Jan |title=Motivated information processing and group decision refusal |journal=Group Processes & Intergroup Relations |date=September 2012 |volume=15 |issue=5 |pages=637β651 |doi=10.1177/1368430212454588|s2cid=147023588 }}</ref> to reduce the influence of anchors within groups. === Business intelligence === A peer-reviewed study<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Ni|first1=Feng|last2=Arnott|first2=David|last3=Gao|first3=Shijia|date=2019-04-03|title=The anchoring effect in business intelligence supported decision-making|url=https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/12460125.2019.1620573|journal=Journal of Decision Systems|language=en|volume=28|issue=2|pages=67β81|doi=10.1080/12460125.2019.1620573|s2cid=182259743|issn=1246-0125|url-access=subscription}}</ref> sought to investigate the effect of [[business intelligence]] (BI) systems on the anchoring effect. Business intelligence denotes an array of software and services used by businesses to gather valuable insights into an organisation's performance.<ref>{{Cite web|last=Fruhlinger|first=Mary K. Pratt and Josh|date=2019-10-16|title=What is business intelligence? Turning data into business insights|url=https://www.cio.com/article/2439504/business-intelligence-definition-and-solutions.html|access-date=2021-04-26|website=CIO|language=en}}</ref> The extent to which cognitive bias is mitigated by using such systems was the overarching question in this study. While the independent variable was the use of the BI system, the dependent variable was the outcome of the decision-making process. The subjects were presented with a 'plausible' anchor and a 'spurious' anchor in a forecasting decision. It was found that, while the BI system mitigated the negative effects of the spurious anchor, it had no influence on the effects of the plausible anchor. This is important in a business context, because it shows that humans are still susceptible to cognitive biases, even when using sophisticated technological systems. One of the subsequent recommendations from the experimenters was to implement a forewarning into BI systems as to the anchoring effect.
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