Editing Arms control (section)

== Enforcement ==

Enforcement of arms control agreements has proven difficult over time.  Most agreements rely on the continued desire of the participants to abide by the terms to remain effective.  Usually, when a nation no longer desires to abide by the terms, they usually will seek to either covertly circumvent the terms or to end their participation in the treaty.  This was seen with the [[Washington Naval Treaty]]<ref>{{cite web |title=CONFERENCE ON THE LIMITATION OF ARMAMENT, WASHINGTON, NOVEMBER 12 1921-FEBRUARY 6, 1922. |url=http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/pre-war/1922/nav_lim.html |work=ibiblio |publisher= University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill |access-date=21 May 2012}}</ref> (and the subsequent [[London Naval Treaty]]<ref>{{cite web |title=INTERNATIONAL TREATY FOR THE LIMITATION AND REDUCTION OF NAVAL ARMAMENT |url=http://www.microworks.net/pacific/road_to_war/london_treaty.htm |work= microworks.net |access-date=21 May 2012}}</ref>), where most participants sought to work around the limitations, some more legitimately than others.<ref>{{cite web |title=Naval Treaties: Born of the Second London Naval Treaty:A concise investigation of the qualitative limitations of capital ships 1936 – 1941 |url=http://www.bismarck-class.dk/miscellaneous/naval_treaties/born_of_the_second_london_naval_treaty.html |work=Bismarck & Tirpitz |publisher=John Asmussen |access-date=21 May 2012 |author=Peter Beisheim MA |format=Essay |archive-date=22 January 2012 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120122185106/http://www.bismarck-class.dk/miscellaneous/naval_treaties/born_of_the_second_london_naval_treaty.html |url-status=dead }}</ref>  The United States developed better technology to get better performance from their ships while still working within the weight limits, the United Kingdom exploited a loop-hole in the terms, the Italians misrepresented the weight of their vessels, and when up against the limits, Japan left the treaty. The nations which violated the terms of the treaty did not suffer great consequences for their actions.  Within little more than a decade, the treaty was abandoned. The [[Geneva Protocol]]<ref>{{cite web |title=Geneva Protocol |url=https://fas.org/nuke/control/geneva/intro.htm |work=FAS: Weapons of Mass Destruction |publisher=Federation of American Scientists |access-date=21 May 2012}}</ref>  has lasted longer and been more successful at being respected, but still nations have violated it at will when they have felt the need.  Enforcement has been haphazard, with measures more a matter of politics than adherence to the terms.  This meant sanctions and other measures tended to be advocated against violators primarily by their natural political enemies, while violations have been ignored or given only token measures by their political allies.<ref>{{cite web |title=WMD: Law instead of lawless self help |url=http://www.blixassociates.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/03/No37.pdf |id=Briefing paper 37 |publisher=The Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission |author=Harald Müller |date=August 2005|archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20160610161859/http://www.blixassociates.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/03/No37.pdf |archive-date = 10 June 2016}}</ref>

More recent arms control treaties have included more stringent terms on enforcement of violations as well as verification.  This last has been a major obstacle to effective enforcement, as violators often attempt to covertly circumvent the terms of the agreements.  Verification is the process of determining whether or not a nation is complying with the terms of an agreement, and involves a combination of release of such information by participants<ref>{{cite web |title=Chemical and Biological Weapons Status at a Glance |url=http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/cbwprolif |publisher=Arms Control Association |format=Fact Sheet |date=June 2018}}</ref>  as well as some way to allow participants to examine each other to verify that information.<ref>{{cite book |chapter=Compliance mechanisms for disarmament treaties |title=Verification Yearbook 2000 |chapter-url=http://www.walterdorn.org/pub/27 |author=A. Walter Dorn |author2=Douglas S. Scott |publisher=Verification Research, Training and Information Centre |location=London |pages=229–247 |year=2000 |via=walterdorn.org}}</ref>  This often involves as much negotiation as the limits themselves, and in some cases questions of verification have led to the breakdown of treaty negotiations (for example, verification was cited as a major concern by opponents of the [[Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty]], ultimately not ratified by the United States).<ref>{{cite report|title=Comprehensive Nuclear Ban Treaty: Background and Current Developments |url= http://www.thereaganvision.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/08/CRS-Comprehensive-Nuclear-Test-Ban-Treaty-Background-and-Current-Developments.pdf |work=CRS Report for Congress |publisher=Congressional Research Service |access-date=17 May 2012 |author=Jonathan Medalia |date=3 August 2011}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |title=Fukushima: Another reason to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty |url= http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/op-eds/fukushima-another-reason-to-ratify-the-comprehensive-test-ban-treaty |website=Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists |first = Alexander H. |last=Rothman |date=23 March 2011}}</ref>

States may remain in a treaty while seeking to break the limits of that treaty as opposed to withdrawing from it. This is for two major reasons. To openly defy an agreement, even if one withdraws from it, often is seen in a bad light politically and can carry diplomatic repercussions. Additionally, if one remains in an agreement, competitors who are also participatory may be held to the limitations of the terms, while withdrawal releases your opponents to make the same developments you are making, limiting the advantage of that development.