Editing Being and Time (section)

==Summary==
===''Dasein''===
''Being and Time'' explicitly rejects [[Descartes]]' notion of the human being as a subjective spectator of objects, according to Marcella Horrigan-Kelly (et al.).<ref name="journals.sagepub.com">Horrigan-Kelly, Marcella; Michelle Millar; Maura Dowling. [https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/1609406916680634 "Understanding the Key Tenets of Heidegger’s Philosophy for Interpretive Phenomenological Research"], in ''[[International Journal of Qualitative Methods]]'',
January–December 2016: 1–8.</ref> The book instead holds that both subject and object are inseparable. In presenting the subject, "being" as inseparable from the objective "world," Heidegger introduced the term "Dasein" (literally being there), intended to embody a "living being" through their activity of "being there" and "being in the world" (Horrigan-Kelly).<ref name="journals.sagepub.com"/> Understood as a unitary phenomenon rather than a contingent, additive combination, being-in-the-world is an essential characteristic of Dasein, according to [[Michael Wheeler (philosopher)|Michael Wheeler]] (2011).<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2020/entries/heidegger/|title=Martin Heidegger|date=12 October 2011|last1=Wheeler|first1=Michael}}</ref>

Heidegger's account of Dasein passes through an analysis of ''[[angst]]'', "the Nothing" and mortality, and of the structure of "care" as such. He then defines "authenticity," as a means to grasp and confront the finite possibilities of Dasein. Moreover, Dasein is "the being that will give access to the question of the meaning of Being," according to Heidegger.<ref>[[Simon Glendinning|Glendinning, S.]], ed., ''The Edinburgh Encyclopedia of Continental Philosophy'' ([[Edinburgh]]: [[Edinburgh University Press]], 1999), [https://books.google.com/books?id=qJwwL6wBOqwC&pg=PA154&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q&f=false p. 154].</ref>

===Being===
The work claims that ordinary and even mundane "being-in-the-world" provides "access to the meaning, or 'sense of being' [''Sinn des Seins'']." This access via Dasein is also that "in terms of which something becomes intelligible as something."<ref>"aus dem her etwas als etwas verständlich wird," ''Sein und Zeit'', p. 151.</ref> This meaning would then elucidate ordinary "prescientific" understanding, which precedes abstract ways of knowing, such as logic or theory.<ref name="Ibid., p. 12">''Sein und Zeit'', p. 12.</ref>

Heidegger's concept of Being is metaphorical, according to [[Richard Rorty]], who agrees with Heidegger that there is no "hidden power" called Being. Heidegger emphasizes that no particular understanding of Being (nor of Dasein) is to be valued over another, according to an account of Rorty's analysis by Edward Grippe.<ref name="Grippe, Edward 2007">Grippe, Edward, ''Richard Rorty (1931—2007)'' Internet Encyclopedia</ref> This supposed "non-linguistic, pre-cognitive access" to the meaning of Being did not underscore any particular, preferred narrative.

[[Thomas Sheehan (philosopher)|Thomas Sheehan]] and [[Mark Wrathall]] each separately assert that commentators' emphasis on the term "Being" is misplaced, and that Heidegger's central focus was never on "Being" as such. Wrathall wrote (2011) that Heidegger's elaborate concept of "unconcealment" was his central, life-long focus, while Sheehan (2015) proposed that the philosopher's prime focus was on that which "brings about being as a givenness of entities."<ref>Wrathall, Mark: Heidegger and Unconcealment: Truth, Language, and History, Cambridge University Press, 2011</ref><ref>see also, Sheehan, "Making sense of Heidegger. A paradigm shift." New Heidegger Research. London (England), 2015.</ref>
''Being and Time'' actually offers "no sense of how we might answer the question of being as such," writes [[Simon Critchley]] in a nine-part blog commentary on the work for ''[[The Guardian]]'' (2009). The book instead provides "an answer to the question of what it means to be human" (Critchley).<ref>Critchley, S., [https://theguardian.com/commentisfree/belief/2009/jul/27/heidegger-being-time-philosophy "Heidegger's Being and Time, part 8: Temporality"], ''The Guardian'', July 27, 2009.</ref> Nonetheless, Heidegger does present the concept: "'Being' is not something like a being but is rather "what determines beings as beings."<ref>"...das Sein, das, was Seiendes als Seiendes bestimmt, das, woraufhin Seiendes, mag es wie immer erörtert werden, je schon verstanden ist,"''Sein und Zeit'', p. 6.</ref>

===Time===
Heidegger believes that time finds its meaning in death, according to Michael Kelley. That is, time is understood only from a finite or mortal vantage. Dasein's fundamental characteristic and mode of "being-in-the-world" is temporal: Having been "thrown" into a world implies a "pastness" in its being. "The present is the nodal moment which makes past and future intelligible," writes Lilian Alweiss.<ref>Alweiss, L., [http://lib.csu.ru/ER/ER_Philosophy/fulltexts/AlweissL.pdf "Heidegger and 'the concept of time'"], ''[[History of the Human Sciences]]'', Vol. 15, Nr. 3, 2002.</ref> Dasein occupies itself with the present tasks required by goals it has projected on the future.<ref>Kelley, M., [https://iep.utm.edu/phe-time/ "Phenomenology and Time-Consciousness"], ''[[Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy]]''.</ref>

Dasein as an intertwined subject/object cannot be separated from its objective "historicality," a concept Heidegger credits in the text to [[Wilhelm Dilthey]]. Dasein is "stretched along" temporally between birth and death, and thrown into its world; into its future ''possibilities'' which ''Dasein'' is charged with assuming. ''Dasein's'' access to this world and these possibilities is always via a history and a tradition—or "world historicality".