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Bundle theory
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==Objections== Bundle theory maintains that properties are ''bundled'' together in a collection without describing how they are tied together. For example, bundle theory regards an apple as red, {{convert|4|in|mm|spell=in}} wide, and juicy but lacking an underlying ''substance''. The apple is said to be a ''bundle of properties'' including redness, being {{convert|4|in|mm|spell=in}} wide, and juiciness. Hume used the term "bundle" in this sense, also referring to the [[personal identity]], in his main work: "I may venture to affirm of the rest of mankind, that they are nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions, which succeed each other with inconceivable rapidity, and are in a perpetual flux and movement".<ref>Hume, David ''A Treatise of Human Nature'', Book I, part IV, sec.6.</ref> Critics question how bundle theory accounts for the properties' ''[[wikt:compresence|compresence]]'' (the ''togetherness'' relation between those properties) without an underlying ''substance''. Critics also question how any two given properties are determined to be properties of the same object if there is no ''substance'' in which they both ''inhere''. This argument is done away with if one considers spatio-temporal location to be a property as well. Traditional bundle theory explains the ''compresence'' of properties by defining an object as a collection of properties ''bound'' together. Thus, different combinations of properties and relations produce different objects. Redness and juiciness, for example, may be found together on top of the table because they are part of a bundle of properties located on the table, one of which is the "looks like an apple" property. By contrast, [[substance theory]] explains the ''compresence'' of properties by asserting that the properties are found together because it is the ''substance'' that has those properties. In substance theory, a ''substance'' is the thing in which properties ''inhere''. For example, redness and juiciness are found on top of the table because redness and juiciness ''inhere'' in an apple, making the apple red and juicy. The ''bundle theory of substance'' explains ''compresence''. Specifically, it maintains that properties' compresence itself engenders a ''substance''. Thus, it determines ''substancehood'' empirically by the ''togetherness'' of properties rather than by a ''bare particular'' or by any other non-empirical underlying strata. The ''bundle theory of substance'' thus rejects the substance theories of [[Aristotle]], [[Descartes]], [[Leibniz]], and more recently, [[J. P. Moreland]], Jia Hou, Joseph Bridgman, [[Quentin Smith]], and others.
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