Editing Causal theory of reference (section)

== Motivation ==
Causal theories of reference were born partially in response to the widespread acceptance of Russellian descriptive theories. Russell found that certain [[logic]]al [[contradiction]]s could be avoided if names were considered disguised [[definite description]]s (a similar view is often attributed to [[Gottlob Frege]], mostly on the strength of a footnoted comment in "[[On Sense and Reference]]", although many Frege scholars consider this attribution misguided).{{citation needed|date=January 2012}} On such an account, the name 'Aristotle' might be seen as meaning 'the student of Plato and teacher of Alexander the Great'. Later description theorists expanded upon this by suggesting that a name expressed not one particular description, but many (perhaps constituting all of one's essential knowledge of the individual named), or a weighted average of these descriptions.

Kripke found this account to be deeply flawed, for a number of reasons. Notably:

* We can successfully refer to individuals for whom we have ''no'' uniquely identifying description. (For example, a speaker can talk about Phillie Sophik even if one only knows him as 'some poet'.)
* We can successfully refer to individuals for whom the only identifying descriptions we have fail to refer as we believe them to. (Many speakers have no identifying beliefs about [[Christopher Columbus]] other than 'the first European in North America' or 'the first person to believe that the earth was round'. Both of these beliefs are incorrect. Nevertheless, when such a person says 'Christopher Columbus', we acknowledge that they are referring to Christopher Columbus, not to whatever individual satisfies one of those descriptions.)
* We use names to speak hypothetically about what ''could'' have happened to a person. A name functions as a [[rigid designator]], while a definite description does not. (One could say 'If Aristotle had died young, he would never have taught Alexander the Great.' But if 'the teacher of Alexander the Great' were a component of the ''meaning'' of 'Aristotle' then this would be nonsense.)

A causal theory avoids these difficulties. A name refers rigidly to the bearer to which it is causally connected, regardless of any particular facts about the bearer, and in all [[possible worlds]] where the bearer exists.

The same motivations apply to causal theories in regard to other sorts of terms. Putnam, for instance, attempted to establish that 'water' refers rigidly to the stuff that we do in fact call 'water', to the exclusion of any possible identical water-like substance for which we have no causal connection. These considerations motivate [[semantic externalism]]. Because speakers interact with a natural kind such as water regularly, and because there is generally no naming ceremony through which their names are formalized, the multiple groundings described above are even more essential to a causal account of such terms. A speaker whose environment changes may thus observe that the referents of his terms shift, as described in the [[Twin Earth thought experiment|Twin Earth]] and [[Swampman]] [[thought experiment]]s.