Editing Causality (section)

=== Metaphysics ===
The nature of cause and effect is a concern of the subject known as [[metaphysics]]. [[Immanuel Kant|Kant]] thought that time and space were notions prior to human understanding of the progress or evolution of the world, and he also recognized the priority of causality. But he did not have the understanding that came with knowledge of [[Minkowski space#Causal structure|Minkowski geometry]] and the [[Special relativity|special theory of relativity]], that the notion of causality can be used as a prior foundation from which to [[Causal structure|construct notions]] of time and space.<ref name=Robb1911/><ref name=Whitehead1929/><ref name=Malament/>

==== Ontology ====
A general metaphysical question about cause and effect is: "what kind of entity can be a cause, and what kind of entity can be an effect?"

One viewpoint on this question is that cause and effect are of one and the same kind of entity, causality being an asymmetric relation between them. That is to say, it would make good sense grammatically to say either "''A'' is the cause and ''B'' the effect" or "''B'' is the cause and ''A'' the effect", though only one of those two can be actually true. In this view, one opinion, proposed as a metaphysical principle in [[process philosophy]], is that every cause and every effect is respectively some process, event, becoming, or happening.<ref name=Whitehead1929/> An example is 'his tripping over the step was the cause, and his breaking his ankle the effect'. Another view is that causes and effects are 'states of affairs', with the exact natures of those entities being more loosely defined than in process philosophy.<ref>[[David Malet Armstrong|Armstrong, D.M.]] (1997). ''A World of States of Affairs'', Cambridge University Press, Cambridge UK, {{ISBN|0-521-58064-1}}, pp.&nbsp;89, 265.</ref>

Another viewpoint on this question is the more classical one, that a cause and its effect can be of different kinds of entity. For example, in Aristotle's efficient causal explanation, an action can be a cause while an [[enduring]] object is its effect. For example, the generative actions of his parents can be regarded as the efficient cause, with Socrates being the effect, Socrates being regarded as an enduring object, in philosophical tradition called a 'substance', as distinct from an action.

==== Epistemology ====
Since causality is a subtle metaphysical notion, considerable intellectual effort, along with exhibition of evidence, is needed to establish knowledge of it in particular empirical circumstances. According to [[David Hume]], the human mind is unable to perceive causal relations directly. On this ground, the scholar distinguished between the regularity view of causality and the counterfactual notion.<ref name=Hume>{{Cite book|last=Hume|first=David|title=A Treatise on Human Nature|url=https://archive.org/details/atreatiseofhuman00humeuoft|publisher=Clarendon Press|year=1888|location=Oxford}}</ref> According to the [[Counterfactual conditional|counterfactual view]], ''X'' causes ''Y'' if and only if, without ''X, Y'' would not exist. Hume interpreted the latter as an ontological view, i.e., as a description of the nature of causality but, given the limitations of the human mind, advised using the former (stating, roughly, that ''X'' causes ''Y'' if and only if the two events are spatiotemporally conjoined, and ''X'' precedes ''Y'') as an epistemic definition of causality. We need an epistemic concept of causality in order to distinguish between causal and noncausal relations. The contemporary philosophical literature on causality can be divided into five big approaches to causality. These include the (mentioned above) regularity, [[Probabilistic causation|probabilistic]], counterfactual, [[Mechanism (philosophy)|mechanistic]], and manipulationist views. The five approaches can be shown to be reductive, i.e., define causality in terms of relations of other types.<ref>{{Cite book|last=Maziarz|first=Mariusz|title=The Philosophy of Causality in Economics: Causal Inferences and Policy Proposals.|publisher=Routledge.|year=2020|location=New York & London}}</ref> According to this reading, they define causality in terms of, respectively, empirical regularities (constant conjunctions of events), changes in [[conditional probability|conditional probabilities]], counterfactual conditions, mechanisms underlying causal relations, and invariance under intervention.

==== Geometrical significance ====
Causality has the properties of antecedence and contiguity.<ref name="Born"/><ref name="Sklar"/> These are topological, and are ingredients for space-time geometry. As developed by [[Alfred Robb]], these properties allow the derivation of the notions of time and space.<ref>[[Alfred Robb|Robb, A.A.]] (1936). [https://archive.org/details/geometryoftimean032218mbp ''Geometry of Time and Space''], Cambridge University Press, Cambridge UK.</ref> [[Max Jammer]] writes "the Einstein postulate ... opens the way to a straightforward construction of the causal topology ... of Minkowski space."<ref>[[Max Jammer|Jammer, M.]] (1982). 'Einstein and quantum physics', pp. 59–76 in ''Albert Einstein: Historical and Cultural Perspectives; the Centennial Symposium in Jerusalem'', edited by G. Holton, Y. Elkana, Princeton University Press, Princeton NJ, {{ISBN|0-691-08299-5}}, p. 61.</ref> Causal efficacy propagates no faster than light.<ref>Naber, G.L. (1992). ''The Geometry of Minkowski Spacetime: An Introduction to the Mathematics of the Special Theory of Relativity'', Springer, New York, {{ISBN|978-1-4419-7837-0}}, pp. 4–5.</ref>

Thus, the notion of causality is metaphysically prior to the notions of time and space. In practical terms, this is because use of the relation of causality is necessary for the interpretation of empirical experiments. Interpretation of experiments is needed to establish the physical and geometrical notions of time and space.

==== Volition ====
The [[determinism|deterministic]] world-view holds that the history of the [[universe]] can be exhaustively represented as a [[chain of events|progression of events]] following one after the other as cause and effect.<ref name="Sklar">Sklar, L. (1995). Determinism, pp. 117–119 in ''A Companion to Metaphysics'', edited by Kim, J. Sosa, E., Blackwell, Oxford UK, pp. 177–181.</ref> [[Incompatibilism]] holds that determinism is incompatible with free will, so if determinism is true, "[[free will]]" does not exist. [[Compatibilism]], on the other hand, holds that determinism is compatible with, or even necessary for, free will.<ref>Watson, G. (1995). Free will, pp. 175–182 in ''A Companion to Metaphysics'', edited by Kim, J. Sosa, E., Blackwell, Oxford UK, pp. 177–181.</ref>