Editing Chinese unification (section)

== History ==
=== Mainland China ===
The concept of Chinese unification was developed in the 1970s as part of the CCP's strategy to address the "[[Political status of Taiwan|Taiwan issue]]" as China started to normalize [[Foreign relations of China|foreign relations]] with a number of countries including the United States and Japan.<ref>{{Cite web |title=U.S.-China Relations |url=https://www.cfr.org/report/us-china-relations |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171107165851/https://www.cfr.org/report/us-china-relations |archive-date=7 November 2017 |access-date=7 November 2017 |website=Council on Foreign Relations |language=en}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news|url=https://thediplomat.com/2015/08/the-politics-of-history-in-china-japan-relations/|title=The Politics of History in China-Japan Relations|last=Tao|first=Xie|work=The Diplomat|access-date=7 November 2017|language=en-US|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171107165658/https://thediplomat.com/2015/08/the-politics-of-history-in-china-japan-relations/|archive-date=7 November 2017|url-status=live}}</ref>

According to the state-run [[China Internet Information Center]], in 1979, the [[National People's Congress]] published the {{ill|Message to Compatriots in Taiwan|zh|告台湾同胞书}} ({{lang|zh-hans|告台湾同胞书}}) which included the term "Chinese reunification" as an ideal for [[Cross-Strait relations]].<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.china.org.cn/english/taiwan/7943.htm|title=Message to Compatriots in Taiwan|work=China.org.cn|access-date=3 October 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20181004021225/http://www.china.org.cn/english/taiwan/7943.htm|archive-date=4 October 2018|url-status=live}}</ref>{{Better source needed|date=January 2021}} In 1981, the chairman of the People's Congress Standing Committee [[Ye Jianying]] announced the "Nine Policies" for China's stance on Cross-Strait relations, with "Chinese Peaceful Unification" ({{lang|zh-hans|祖国和平统一}}) as the first policy.<ref>{{Cite web|url=http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64162/64165/70293/70323/4877134.html|website=cpc.people.com.cn|script-title=zh:1981年9月30日 叶剑英进一步阐明关于台湾回归祖国，实现和平统一的9条方针政策--中国共产党新闻--中国共产党新闻网|access-date=7 November 2017|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171107165649/http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64162/64165/70293/70323/4877134.html|archive-date=7 November 2017|url-status=live}}</ref> According to Xinhua, since then, "[[one country, two systems]]" and "Chinese reunification" have been emphasized at every [[National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party]] as the principles to deal with [[Hong Kong]], [[Macau]] and [[Taiwan]]. "One Country, Two Systems" is specifically about China's policy towards post-colonial Hong Kong and Macao, and "Chinese Unification" is specifically about Taiwan.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-10/18/c_136688642.htm|title="One country, two systems" best institutional guarantee for HK, Macao prosperity, stability: Xi|date=18 October 2017|publisher=Xinhua|location=Beijing|access-date=3 October 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20181004021347/http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-10/18/c_136688642.htm|archive-date=4 October 2018|url-status=live}}</ref> Taiwan has also been offered the resolution of "One Country, Two Systems”.<ref>{{Cite web |title=A policy of "one country, two systems" on Taiwan |url=https://www.mfa.gov.cn/ce/ceee/eng/zggk/xzgwjjs/t110298.htm |access-date=2022-09-13 |website=www.mfa.gov.cn |archive-date=13 September 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220913164309/https://www.mfa.gov.cn/ce/ceee/eng/zggk/xzgwjjs/t110298.htm |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |date=2020-05-20 |title=Taiwan's president rejects 'one country, two systems' deal with China |url=https://www.france24.com/en/20200520-taiwan-s-president-tsai-rejects-one-country-two-systems-deal-with-china |access-date=2022-09-13 |website=France 24 |language=en |archive-date=13 September 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220913165812/https://www.france24.com/en/20200520-taiwan-s-president-tsai-rejects-one-country-two-systems-deal-with-china |url-status=live }}</ref>

=== Taiwan ===
{{Further|Dutch Formosa|Taiwan under Qing rule|Taiwan under Japanese rule}}
Taiwan has a complicated history of being at least partially occupied and administered by larger powers including the [[Dutch East India Company]], the [[Kingdom of Tungning]] (purporting to be a continuation of the [[Southern Ming]]), the Qing dynasty and the Empire of Japan. Taiwan first came under direct Chinese control when it was invaded by the Manchu-led Qing dynasty in 1683.<ref name="Franklin. 2007">{{Cite book|title=Historical dictionary of Taiwan (Republic of China)|last=Franklin.|first=Copper, John|date=2007|publisher=Scarecrow Press, Inc|isbn=9780810856004|edition=3rd|location=Lanham, Md.|oclc=71288776}}</ref>

The island remained under Qing rule until 1895 when it was ceded to the Empire of Japan under the Treaty of Shimonoseki. Following the [[Axis powers]]' defeat in World War II in 1945, the Kuomintang-led Republic of China gained control of Taiwan.<ref name="Franklin. 2007" /> Some Taiwanese resisted ROC rule in the years following World War II. The ROC violently suppressed this resistance which culminated in the [[February 28 Incident]] in 1947.<ref>{{Cite book|title=Memories of the Future: National Identity Issues and the Search for a New Taiwan.|last=Stéphane|first=Corcuff|date=2016|publisher=Taylor and Francis|isbn=9780765607911|oclc=959428520}}</ref> At the de facto end of the Chinese Civil War in 1950, KMT and CCP government faced each other across the Strait, with each aiming for a military takeover of the other.

From 1928 to 1942, the CCP maintained that Taiwan was a separate nation.<ref name=":22">{{Cite journal |last1=Hsiao |first1=Frank S. T. |last2=Sullivan |first2=Lawrence R. |date=1979 |title=The Chinese Communist Party and the Status of Taiwan, 1928-1943 |journal=[[Pacific Affairs]] |volume=52 |issue=3 |pages=446 |doi=10.2307/2757657 |jstor=2757657}}</ref> In a 1937 interview with [[Edgar Snow]], [[Mao Zedong]] stated "we will extend them (the Koreans) our enthusiastic help in their struggle for independence. The same thing applies for Taiwan."<ref name=":3">{{Cite web |last=van der Wees |first=Gerrit |date=3 May 2022 |title=When the CCP Thought Taiwan Should Be Independent |url=https://thediplomat.com/2022/05/when-the-ccp-thought-taiwan-should-be-independent/ |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20231108053621/https://thediplomat.com/2022/05/when-the-ccp-thought-taiwan-should-be-independent/ |archive-date=8 November 2023 |access-date=2023-11-09 |website=[[The Diplomat (magazine)|The Diplomat]] |language=en-US}}</ref>

The [[Chinese irredentism|irredentist]] narrative emphasizing the importance of a unified [[Greater China]] area, which purportedly include Taiwan, arose in both the Kuomintang and the CCP in the years during and after the civil war. For the PRC, the claim of the Greater China area was part of a nationalist argument for territorial integrity. In the civil war years it set the communist movement apart from the ROC, which had lost [[Manchukuo|Manchuria]], the ancestral homeland of the Qing emperors, to Japan in 1932.<ref name=":0">{{Cite book|title=Taiwan and Chinese nationalism : national identity and status in international society|last=W.|first=Hughes, Christopher|date=1997|publisher=Routledge|isbn=9780203444191|location=London|oclc=52630115}}</ref>

==== Rise of Tangwai and Taiwanese nationalism ====
From the end of the Chinese Civil War in 1950 until the mid-1970s the concept of unification was not the main subject of discourse between the governments of the PRC and the ROC. The Kuomintang believed that they would, probably with American help, one day retake mainland China, while Mao Zedong's communist regime would collapse in a popular uprising and the Kuomintang forces would be welcomed.<ref>{{Cite book|title=The United States and the Republic of China, 1949–1978: Suspicious Allies|last=Goldstein|first=Steven|publisher=Asia/Pacific Research Center|year=2000|isbn=9780965393591|pages=16–20}}</ref>

By the 1970s, the Kuomintang's authoritarian military dictatorship in Taiwan, led by the [[Chiang family]] was becoming increasingly untenable due to the popularity of the [[Tangwai movement]] and Taiwanese nationalism. In 1970, then-Vice Premier, [[Chiang Ching-kuo]] survived an [[Cheng Tzu-tsai#1970 assassination attempt|assassination attempt]] in [[New York City]] by [[Cheng Tzu-tsai]] and [[Peter Huang]], both members of the [[World United Formosans for Independence]]. In 1976, [[Wang Sing-nan]] sent a [[mail bomb]] to then-[[Governor of Taiwan Province]] [[Hsieh Tung-min]], who suffered serious injuries to both hands as a result.<ref>{{Cite web|url=http://english.www.gov.tw/TaiwanHeadlines/index.jsp?recordid=99169|title=TaiwanHeadlines – Home – Mail bomb explodes in Taipei office|date=29 September 2007|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070929083600/http://english.www.gov.tw/TaiwanHeadlines/index.jsp?recordid=99169|archive-date=29 September 2007|url-status=bot: unknown|access-date=31 October 2017}}</ref> The Kuomintang's heavy-handed oppression in the [[Kaohsiung Incident]], alleged involvement in the [[Lin family massacre]] and the murders of [[Chen Wen-chen]] and [[Henry Liu]], and the self-immolation of [[Cheng Nan-jung]] galvanized the Taiwanese community into political actions and eventually led to majority rule and democracy in Taiwan.

The concept of unification replaced the concept of liberation by the PRC in 1979 as it embarked, after Mao's death, on [[Chinese economic reform|economic reform]]s and pursued a more pragmatic foreign policy. In Taiwan, the possibility of the ROC retaking mainland China became increasingly remote in the 1970s, particularly after the [[United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2758|ROC's expulsion from the United Nations]] in 1971, the establishment of diplomatic relations between the PRC and United States in 1979, and Chiang Kai-shek's death in 1975.<ref name=":0" />

==== Majority rule in Taiwan ====
{{Unreferenced section|date=April 2023}}
With the end of authoritarian rule in the 1980s, there was a shift in power within the KMT away from the faction who had accompanied Chiang to Taiwan. Taiwanese who grew up under Japanese rule, which accounted for more than 85% of the population, gained more influence and the KMT began to move away from its ideology of cross-strait unification. After the exposure of [[1987 Lieyu massacre]] in June, [[Martial law in Taiwan|martial law]] was finally lifted in Taiwan on 15 July 1987. Following the [[Wild Lily student movement]], President [[Lee Teng-hui]] announced in 1991 that his government no longer disputed the rule of the CCP in China, leading to semi-official peace talks (leading to what would be termed as the "[[1992 Consensus]]") between the two sides. The PRC broke off these talks in 1999 when President Lee described relations with the PRC as "[[Special state-to-state relations]]".

Until the mid-1990s, unification supporters on Taiwan were bitterly opposed to the CCP. Since the mid-1990s, there has been a considerable warming of relations between the CCP and Taiwanese unification supporters, as both oppose the pro-Taiwan independence bloc. This brought about the accusation that unification supporters were attempting to sell out Taiwan. They responded saying that closer ties with mainland China, especially economic ties, are in Taiwan's interest.

==== Rise of the Democratic Progressive Party ====
{{Unreferenced section|date=April 2023}}
After the [[2000 Taiwanese presidential election]], which brought the independence-leaning Democratic Progressive Party's candidate President [[Chen Shui-bian]] to power, the Kuomintang, faced with defections to the People First Party, expelled Lee Teng-hui and his supporters and reoriented the party towards unification. At the same time, the People's Republic of China shifted its efforts at unification away from military threats (which it de-emphasized but did not renounce) towards economic incentives designed to encourage Taiwanese businesses to invest in mainland China and aiming to create a pro-Beijing bloc within the Taiwanese electorate.

Within Taiwan, unification supporters tend to see "China" as a larger cultural entity divided by the Chinese Civil War into separate states or governments within the country. In addition, supporters see Taiwanese identity as one piece of a broader Chinese identity rather than as a separate cultural identity. However, supporters do oppose [[desinicization]] inherent in Communist ideology such as that seen during the [[Cultural Revolution]], along with the effort to emphasize a Taiwanese identity as separate from a Chinese one. As of the 2008 election of President [[Ma Ying-jeou]], the KMT agreed to the One China principle, but defined it as led by the Republic of China rather than the People's Republic of China.

===Military operations===
[[File:Bailey bridge barge.webp|thumb|3D sketch of a [[bailey bridge]] barge dock being developed by China to potentially invade Taiwan]]
Military clashes between the two sides include the [[First Taiwan Strait crisis|First]], [[Second Taiwan Strait crisis|Second]] and [[Third Taiwan Strait Crisis]].

=== One China, Two Systems proposal ===
[[File:Anti-Taiwan independence movement protesters in Washington DC 20051020.jpg|thumb|Anti-Taiwan independence protesters in Washington, D.C. during [[Lee Teng-hui]]'s visit.]]
{{Main|One country, two systems}}
[[Deng Xiaoping]] developed the principle of one country, two systems in relation to Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan.<ref name=":04">{{Cite book |last=Hu |first=Richard |title=Reinventing the Chinese City |date=2023 |publisher=[[Columbia University Press]] |isbn=978-0-231-21101-7 |location=New York}}</ref>{{Rp|page=176}} According to the 1995 proposal outlined by [[General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party|CCP General Secretary]] and [[paramount leader]] [[Jiang Zemin]], Taiwan would lose sovereignty and the right to self-determination, but would keep its armed forces and send a representative to be the "number two leader" in the PRC central government. Thus, under this proposal, the Republic of China would become fully defunct.{{Citation needed|date=August 2015}}

In May 1998, the [[Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party]] convened a Work Conference on Taiwan Affairs which stated that the whole party and the whole nation should work together for peaceful unification.<ref name=":12">{{Cite book |last=Zhao |first=Suisheng |author-link=Suisheng Zhao |title=The Taiwan Question in Xi Jinping's Era: Beijing's Evolving Taiwan Policy and Taiwan's Internal and External Dynamics |publisher=[[Routledge]] |year=2024 |isbn=9781032861661 |editor-last=Zhao |editor-first=Suisheng |editor-link=Suisheng Zhao |location=London and New York |pages= |chapter=Is Beijing's Long Game on Taiwan about to End? Peaceful Unification, Brinksmanship, and Military Takeover |doi=10.4324/9781003521709}}</ref>{{Rp|page=11}}

Few Taiwanese are in support of the One Country, Two Systems policy while some unification supporters argued to uphold the ''status quo'' until mainland China democratized and industrialized to the same level as Taiwan. In the 2000 presidential election, independent candidate [[James Soong]] proposed a [[European Union]]-style relation with mainland China (this was echoed by [[Hsu Hsin-liang]] in 2004) along with a non-aggression pact. In the [[2004 Taiwanese presidential election|2004 presidential election]], [[Lien Chan]] proposed a [[confederation]]-style relationship. Beijing objected to the plan, claiming that Taiwan was already part of China, and was not a state and, as such, could not form a confederation with it. Developments in Hong Kong have caused the population of Taiwan in recent years to find "One China, Two Systems" to be "unpersuasive, unappealing, and even untrustworthy."<ref name=":1">{{Cite web |last=Chong |first=Ja Ian |date=February 20, 2023 |title=The Many "One Chinas": Multiple Approaches to Taiwan and China |url=https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2023/02/the-many-one-chinas-multiple-approaches-to-taiwan-and-china?lang=en |access-date=31 March 2024 |archive-date=3 May 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230503074117/https://carnegieendowment.org/2023/02/09/many-one-chinas-multiple-approaches-to-taiwan-and-china-pub-89003 |url-status=live }}</ref>

=== Stasis ===
Unification proposals were not actively floated in Taiwan and the issue remained moot under President Chen Shui-bian, who refused to accept talks under Beijing's pre-conditions. Under the PRC administration of [[Hu Jintao]], incorporating Taiwan lost emphasis amid the reality that the DPP presidency in Taiwan would be held by pro-independence President Chen until 2008. Instead, the emphasis shifted to meetings with politicians who opposed independence.{{cn|date=April 2024}}

A series of [[2005 Pan–Blue visits to mainland China|high-profile visits in 2005]] to China by the leaders of the three pan-Blue Coalition parties was seen as an implicit recognition of the status quo by the PRC government. Notably, Kuomintang chairman Lien Chan's trip was marked by unedited coverage of his speeches and tours (and some added positive commentary) by government-controlled media and meetings with high level officials including Hu Jintao. Similar treatment (though marked with less historical significance and media attention) was given during subsequent visits by PFP chairman James Soong and New Party chairman Yok Mu-ming. The CCP and the Pan-Blue Coalition parties emphasized their common ground in renewed negotiations under the 1992 consensus, opening the [[Three Links]], and opposing Taiwan's formal independence.{{cn|date=April 2024}}

The PRC passed an Anti-Secession Law shortly before Lien's trip. While the Pan-Green Coalition held mass rallies to protest the codification of using military force to retake Taiwan, the Pan-Blue Coalition was largely silent. The language of the Anti-Secession Law was clearly directed at the independence supporters in Taiwan (termed "'Taiwan independence' secessionist forces" in the law) and designed to be somewhat acceptable to the Pan-Blue Coalition. It did not explicitly declare Taiwan to be part of the People's Republic of China but instead used the term "China" on its own, allowing definitional flexibility. It made repeated emphasis of promoting peaceful national unification but left out the concept of "one country, two systems" and called for negotiations in "steps and phases and with flexible and varied modalities" in recognition of the concept of eventual rather than immediate incorporation of Taiwan.{{cn|date=April 2024}}

Under both President Chen and President Ma Ying-jeou, the main political changes in cross-straits relationship involved closer economic ties and increased business and personal travel. Such initiatives were met by grassroots oppositions such as the [[Sunflower Student Movement]], which successfully scuttled [[Cross-Strait Service Trade Agreement]] in 2014. President Ma Ying-Jeou advocated for the revitalization of Chinese culture, as in the re-introduction of [[traditional Chinese characters|traditional Chinese]] in texts to mainland China used in Taiwan and historically in China. It expressed willingness to allow the usage [[simplified Chinese characters|simplified Chinese]] in informal writing.{{cn|date=April 2024}}

Starting in 2017, the [[All-China Federation of Taiwan Compatriots]], a group of Taiwanese residing in the PRC, took on a more prominent role in the CCP's [[United front in Taiwan|united front]] efforts directed at Taiwan.<ref>{{Cite web |date=2017-05-07 |title=Civilian group from mainland China to take more prominent role in cross-strait affairs |url=https://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/2093280/civilian-group-mainland-china-take-more-prominent-role |access-date=2023-08-27 |website=[[South China Morning Post]] |language=en |archive-date=15 May 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230515024912/https://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/2093280/civilian-group-mainland-china-take-more-prominent-role |url-status=live }}</ref>