Editing Conditionality (section)

==Ex-ante vs. ex-post==
Much debate in types of conditionality centers around ex-ante versus ex-post conditionality. In ex-post conditionality, the country receiving aid agrees to conditions set by the donor or lender that they will carry out ''after'' they receive the aid. Later follow-ups determine whether they might receive more aid. If conditions are not met or other political differences between the donor and recipient materialize, aid may be suspended.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Mertens |first=Claas |date=28 March 2024 |title=Carrots as Sticks: How Effective Are Foreign Aid Suspensions and Economic Sanctions? |url=https://academic.oup.com/isq/article/68/2/sqae016/7636632 |journal=International Studies Quarterly |volume=68 |issue=2}}</ref>
Ex-ante conditionality requires a country to meet certain conditions and prove it can maintain them ''before'' it will receive any aid.<ref>Susan M. Collins, University of Michigan Ford School of Public Policy. Public Policy 201 Lecture on Global Poverty</ref>

Traditionally, the [[IMF]] lends funds based on ex-post criteria, which might induce moral hazard behavior by the borrowing country. The moral hazard problem appears when a government behaves in a risky manner in the anticipation that it can turn to the IMF in the case of a crisis. Institutional reforms of the International Monetary Fund, such as the Flexible Credit Line (FCL) in 1999, attempt to reduce moral hazard by relying more on pre-set qualification criteria (i.e. ex-ante).<ref>Dreher, A. (2009), [https://doi.org/10.1007%2Fs11127-009-9486-z "IMF Conditionality: Theory and Evidence"], Public Choice, 141, 233-267</ref>