Editing Consent decree (section)

==History==
Because judicial decrees are part of government civil enforcement in settlements that two parties typically agree to before [[litigation]] is filed, they act as a hybrid between a [[judicial order]] and a [[Settlement (litigation)|settlement]] without a party conceding criminal responsibility.<ref name="west" /><ref>{{cite report |title=Procedural and Institutional Norms in Antitrust Enforcement: The U.S. System |last1=First |first1=Harry |last2=Fox |first2=Eleanor M. |date=July 20, 2012 |publisher=Social Science Research Network |location=Rochester, New York |last3=Hemli |first3=Daniel E. |ssrn=2115886}}</ref>

Frederick Pollock and Frederic Maitland describe how courts during the 12th century of [[Medieval Europe]] used "fines" as a form of court orders to settle land disputes among litigants with the punitive power and legitimacy of courts through the use of consent decree.<ref name="resnik2015" /><ref>{{cite book |url= https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=coo1.ark:/13960/t5bc4jc23;view=1up;seq=9 |title=The History of English Law Before the Time of Edward I |last1=Pollock |first1=Frederick |last2=Maitland |first2=Frederic William |publisher=University Press |date=1899 |volume=2 |location=Cambridge |oclc=919797536 }}</ref> In the United States, 19th and 20th century legal treatises<ref>{{cite book |title=A Treatise on the Law of Judgments |last1=Freeman |first1=A. C |last2=Tuttle |first2=Edward W |publisher=Bankroft-Whitney |date=1925 |edition=5th |location=San Francisco |oclc=184847752 |ol=22895645M |ol-access=free }}</ref><ref>{{cite book |title=Civil Procedure of the Trial Court in Historical Perspective: Publ. by the Law Center of New York University |last=Millar |first=Robert Wymes |publisher=The national Conference of Judicial Councils |date=1952 |series=The Judicial Administration Series |location=New York |pages=356 |oclc=608618071 }}</ref><ref>{{cite book |url= https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=mdp.35112104662368;view=1up;seq=7 |title=A Treatise on Equity Pleading and Practice, With Illustrative Forms and Precedents |last=Fletcher |first=William Meade |publisher=Keefe Davidson Company |date=1902 |location=Saint Paul |oclc=1547525 }}</ref> show that consent decrees and the role of the court in the parties' settlement was ambiguous. The 1947 ''[[Corpus Juris Secundum]]'' declares that although consent decrees are "not the judgment of the court", they do have the "force and effect of a judgment".<ref name="resnik2015" /><ref>{{cite book |url= https://archive.org/stream/corpusjurissecun006795mbp#page/n327/mode/2up |title=Corpus Juris Secundum |last1=Ludes |first1=Francis J. |last2=Gilbert |first2=Harold J. |publisher=The American Law Book Co |date=1947 |volume=XLIX |at=§ 178 p. 308 }}</ref>

===Federal Rules of Civil and Criminal Procedure===
The [[Federal Rules of Civil Procedure]] and the [[Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure]], which both went into effect in 1938,<ref name="resnik2015" /> lay many of the legal foundations that govern the use of consent decrees.<ref name=":3">{{cite journal |last=Tobias |first=Carl |date=January 1, 1989 |title=Public Law Litigation and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure |url= http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3405&context=clr |journal=Cornell Law Review |volume=74 |issue=2 |pages=270 |issn=0010-8847 }}</ref><ref name=":4">{{cite journal |last=Chayes |first=Abram |title=The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation |journal=Harvard Law Review |volume=89 |issue=7 |pages=1281–1316 |doi=10.2307/1340256 |jstor=1340256 |year=1976}}</ref> Creating space for courts, which are important actors in implementing a consent decree, to enter into a settlement, [[Federal Rules of Civil Procedure#Title IV – Parties|Rule 23]]<ref>{{cite web |url= https://www.law.cornell.edu/rules/frcp/rule_23 |title=Rule 23. Class Actions |website=Federal Rules of Civil Procedure |publisher=Legal Information Institute}}</ref> of the [[Federal Rules of Civil Procedure]] gives [[Federal District Court|federal district courts]] the power to approve [[class action]] settlements as long as they are "fair, reasonable, and adequate".<ref name="resnik2015" /><ref name=west /><ref name=":3" /> Rule 54(b) defines ''judgment'', which refers to consent decree, and allows the court to "direct entry of a final judgment" when multiple parties are involved,<ref>{{cite web |url= https://www.law.cornell.edu/rules/frcp/rule_54 |title=Rule 54: Judgement; Costs |website=Federal Rules of Civil Procedure |publisher=Legal Information Institute}}</ref> and Rule 58 describes the procedure of how parties may enter judgment.<ref>{{cite web |url= https://www.law.cornell.edu/rules/frcp/rule_58#rule_58 |title=Rule 58: Entering Judgement |website=Federal Rules of Civil Procedure |date=November 30, 2011 |publisher=Legal Information Institute}}</ref><ref name=":5">{{cite journal |last=Zitko |first=Robert R. |date=1994 |title=The Appealability of Conditional Consent Judgments |journal=University of Illinois Law Review |volume=1994 |pages=241 }}</ref> Additionally, Rule 60 describes conditions under which parties can be granted "relief from a judgment or order" (such as a consent decree).<ref>{{cite web |url= https://www.law.cornell.edu/rules/frcp/rule_58#rule_60 |title=Rule 60: Relief from a Judgement or Order |website=Federal Rules of Civil Procedure |date=November 30, 2011 |publisher=Legal Information Institute}}</ref>{{sfn|Tobias|1989|p=320}} As Rule 48 in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure stipulates that dismissals in criminal cases may not occur without "leave of court",<ref name="resnik2015" /><ref>{{cite web |url= https://www.law.cornell.edu/rules/frcp/rule_58#rule_48 |title=Rule 48: Dismissal |website=Federal Rules of Civil Procedure |date=November 30, 2011 |publisher=Legal Information Institute}}</ref> Rule 41 allows, if all the parties agree, the court to dismiss any suit besides [[Class action|class action suits]], [[Derivative suit|shareholder derivative suits]], or bankruptcy action.<ref name=mengler1987 /><ref>{{cite web |url= https://www.law.cornell.edu/rules/frcp/rule_41 |title=Rule 41: Dismissal of Actions |website=Federal Rules of Civil Procedure |publisher=Legal Information Institute}}</ref> Many of these rules create the space for consent decree by establishing the role of judges within the settlement of two parties.<ref name=":3" /><ref>{{cite journal |last=Resnik |first=Judith |date=1989 |title=The Domain of Courts |url= http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1929&context=fss_papers |journal=University of Pennsylvania Law Review |volume=137 |issue=6 |pages=2219–2230 |doi=10.2307/3312214 |issn=0041-9907 |jstor=3312214 |s2cid=56043703 |url-access=subscription }}</ref>

===Precedents===
Many of the early court cases involving consent decree set precedents for the roles that judges would play in the negotiating, approving, interpreting, and modifying a settlement between two parties.<ref name="resnik2015" /><ref name=west /><ref name=":4" /> The role of the judge in regard to consent decree wavers between "rubber stamping" versus applying their own judgments to a proposed settlement.<ref name="west" /><ref>{{cite journal |last=Anderson |first=Lloyd C. |date=1996 |title=United States v. Microsoft, Antitrust Consent Decrees, and the Need for a Proper Scope of Judicial Review |journal=Antitrust Law Journal |volume=65 |pages=40 }}</ref> In 1879, ''Pacific Railroad of Missouri v. Ketchum'' bound the court's role in consent decrees to simply supporting to an agreement that parties have already established on their own.<ref name="resnik2015" /><ref>
{{ussc |name=Pacific Railroad of Missouri v. Ketchum |volume=111 |page=505 |date=1884}}.</ref> In regard to antitrust decrees, the first consent decree used in antitrust regulation under the [[Sherman Antitrust Act]] was ''[[Swift & Co. v. United States]]''.<ref name=":7">{{ussc |namee=Swift & Co. v. United States |volume=196 |page=375 |date=1905}}.</ref><ref name=":6">{{cite web |url= https://www.thirteen.org/wnet/supremecourt/capitalism/landmark_swift.html| title=Swift & Co. v. U.S. (1905) |last=McBride |first=Alez |date=2006 |work=Thirteen: Media with Impact |publisher=[[PBS]] |access-date=March 25, 2014}}</ref> With ''[[Swift & Co. v. United States]]'', the Supreme Court ruled that a consent decree could be modified or terminated only when new developments over time bring out a "grievous wrong" in how the ruling of the consent decree affects the parties of the suit.<ref name=":7" /><ref name=":8">{{cite book |title=Antitrust Consent Decrees in Theory and Practice: Why Less Is More |last=Epstein |first=Richard A. |publisher=AEI Press |date=2007 |isbn=978-0-8447-4250-2 |location=Washington DC |url= https://archive.org/details/antitrustconsent0000epst }}</ref><ref name=":5" /> The Supreme Court supported this limited flexibility of consent decrees in ''[[United States v. Terminal Railroad Association]]'': "[A] decree will not be expanded by implication or intendment beyond the meaning of its terms when read in the light of the issues and the purposes for which the suit was brought."<ref name="mengler1987" /><ref>{{ussc |name=United States v. Terminal Railroad Association |volume=224 |page=383 |date=1912}}.</ref>

In 1968, the Supreme Court ruled in ''United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp.'', that to promote finality, a court's changes to consent a decree should be rare—but the courts can modify a consent decree or frame [[injunction|injunctive]] relief to ensure the litigation achieves its purpose.<ref name=mengler1987 /><ref>{{ussc |name=United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp. |volume=391 |page=244 |date=1968}}.</ref> Before a judge can enter a consent decree, according to the rulings in ''Firefighters v. City of Cleveland''<ref name=mengler1987 /><ref name=":9">{{ussc |name=Firefighters v. City of Cleveland |volume=478 |page=501 |date=1986}}.</ref> and ''Firefighters v. Stotts''<ref>{{ussc |name=Firefighters v. Stotts |volume=467 |page=561 |date=1984}}.</ref> they must have [[Subject matter jurisdiction|subject-matter jurisdiction]], and they cannot modify a consent decree when one of the parties objects.<ref name="resnik2015" /><ref>{{cite journal |last1=Rabkin |first1=Jeremy A. |last2=Devins |first2=Neal E. |date=1987|title=Averting Government by Consent Decree: Constitutional Limits on the Enforcement of Settlements with the Federal Government |url= http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1423&context=facpubs |journal=[[Stanford Law Review]] |volume=40 |issue=1 |pages=205 |doi=10.2307/1228830 |issn=0038-9765 |jstor=1228830 |url-access=subscription }}</ref> The Supreme Court's position on how much authority a judge possesses in regard to influencing how the settlement is agreed upon is conflicting. In ''Firefighters v. City of Cleveland'', the Supreme Court ruled that consent decrees "have attributes both of contracts and of judicial decrees", so consent decrees should be treated differently for different purposes.<ref name="west" /><ref name=":5" /><ref name=":9" /> In ''Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail'',<ref name=rufo>{{ussc |name=Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail |volume=502 |page=367 |date=1992}}.</ref> the Supreme Court decided that courts could take into account the changing times and circumstances for more flexibility in the administration of consent decrees.<ref name=":5" /><ref name=":8" />

In regard to litigation in [[performance rights organisation|performance rights organizations]] such as [[American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers]] and [[Broadcast Music, Inc.]] in ''[[United States v. ASCAP]]'', which began in 1941, the [[United States Department of Justice|Department of Justice]] used consent decrees (which are amended according to the times and technology) to regulate how they issued blanket licenses to ensure that trade is not restrained and that the prices of licenses would not be competitive.<ref name=":10">{{cite web |last1=Curtner |first1=Gregory L. |last2=Kaur |first2=Atleen |title=Music Licenses: Rhyme or Reason for Antitrust |publisher=American Bar Association |url= https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/Forums/entsports/PublicDocuments/musiclicensesandantitrust.authcheckdam.pdf }}</ref><ref>{{cite report|url= https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1144246 |title=Transactions Costs and Administered Markets: License Contracts for Music Performance Rights |last=Einhorn |first=Michael A. |date=June 13, 2008 |publisher=Social Science Research Network |location=Rochester, New York |pages=61–74|ssrn=1144246 }}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |last=Einhorn |first=Michael A. |date=2000 |title=Intellectual Property and Antitrust: Music Performing Rights in Broadcasting |url=http://mediatechcopy.com.orchid.arvixe.com/wp3/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/ascapcolumbia.pdf |journal=Columbia-VLA Journal of Law & the Arts |volume=24 |pages=349 |access-date=February 12, 2018 |archive-date=February 12, 2018 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180212083654/http://mediatechcopy.com.orchid.arvixe.com/wp3/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/ascapcolumbia.pdf |url-status=dead }}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |last=Kleit |first=An |date=October 1, 2000 |title=ASCAP versus BMI (versus CBS): Modeling competition between and bundling by performance rights organizations |journal=Economic Inquiry |volume=38 |issue=4 |pages=579–590 |doi=10.1111/j.1465-7295.2000.tb00037.x |issn=1465-7295 }}</ref> The Department of Justice reviewed the music consent decrees starting 2019, and issued a statement in January 2021 that they would not be terminating them as they still offered several efficiencies in music licensing that maintained benefits to the artists.<ref>{{cite web | url = https://deadline.com/2021/01/justice-department-antitrust-division-music-licensing-1234674832/ | title = DOJ Won't Seek To Terminate Or Modify Consent Decrees Governing Music Licensing | first=  Ted | last = Johnson | date = January 15, 2021 | access-date = January 15, 2021 | work = [[Deadline Hollywood]] }}</ref>