Editing Containment (section)

==Origin (1944–1947)==

Key State Department personnel grew increasingly frustrated with and suspicious of the Soviets as the war drew to a close. [[Averell Harriman]], U.S. Ambassador in Moscow, once a "confirmed optimist" regarding U.S.–Soviet relations,<ref name="Larson69">Larson, Deborah Welch, ''Origins of Containment: A Psychological Explanation'', p. 69.</ref> was disillusioned by what he saw as the Soviet betrayal of the 1944 [[Warsaw Uprising]] as well as by violations of the February 1945 [[Yalta Agreement]] concerning [[Poland]].<ref name="Larson116">Larson, p. 116.</ref> Harriman would later have a significant influence in forming Truman's views on the Soviet Union.<ref name="Larson68">Larson, p.68.</ref>

In February 1946, the U.S. State Department asked [[George F. Kennan]], then at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, why the Russians opposed the creation of the [[World Bank]] and the [[International Monetary Fund]]. He responded with a wide-ranging analysis of Russian policy now called the ''[[X Article|Long Telegram]]'':<ref name="John Lewis Gaddis 2011 pp 201-24">John Lewis Gaddis, ''George F. Kennan: An American Life'' (2011) pp 201–24</ref>

{{blockquote| Soviet power, unlike that of Hitlerite Germany, is neither schematic nor adventuristic. It does not work with fixed plans. It does not take unnecessary risks. Impervious to the logic of reason, and it is highly sensitive to the logic of force. For this reason, it can easily withdraw—and usually does when strong resistance is encountered at any point.<ref name="LongTel">Kennan, George, "[[s:The Long Telegram|The Long Telegram]]"</ref>}}

Kennan's cable was hailed in the State Department as "the appreciation of the situation that had long been needed."<ref name="Larson28">Larson, p. 28.</ref> Kennan himself attributed the enthusiastic reception to timing: "Six months earlier the message would probably have been received in the State Department with raised eyebrows and lips pursed in disapproval. Six months later, it would probably have sounded redundant."<ref name="Larson28"/> [[Clark Clifford]] and [[George Elsey]] produced a report elaborating on the ''Long Telegram'' and proposing concrete policy recommendations based on its analysis. This report, which recommended "restraining and confining" Soviet influence, was presented to Truman on September 24, 1946.<ref name="Hechler1996">{{cite book|last=Hechler|first=Ken|author-link=Ken Hechler|title=Working with Truman: a personal memoir of the White House years|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=92HTPugIIoIC&pg=PA44|access-date=23 September 2011|year=1996|publisher=University of Missouri Press|isbn=978-0-8262-1067-8|page=44}}</ref>

In January 1947, Kennan drafted an essay entitled "[[X Article|The Sources of Soviet Conduct]]."<ref name="John Lewis Gaddis 2011 pp 201-24"/> Navy Secretary [[James Forrestal]] gave permission for the report to be published in the journal ''[[Foreign Affairs]]'' under the pseudonym "X."<ref>Gaddis, ''George F. Kennan: An American Life'' (2011) pp 249–75.</ref> Biographer [[Douglas Brinkley]] has dubbed Forrestal "godfather of containment" on account of his work in distributing Kennan's writing.<ref>"[http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/47988/william-g-hyland/driven-patriot-the-life-and-times-of-james-forrestal-the-chairman Driven Patriot: The Life And Times Of James Forrestal]"</ref> The use of the word "containment" originates from this so-called "X Article": "In these circumstances, it is clear that the main element of any United States policy toward the Soviet Union must be that of long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies."<ref>{{cite book|author=Adrian R. Lewis|title=The American Culture of War: A History of US Military Force from World War II to Operation Iraqi Freedom|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=JT0WQxnbdxIC&pg=PA67|year=2006|publisher=Taylor & Francis|page=67|isbn=9780203944523}}</ref>

Kennan later turned against the containment policy and noted several deficiencies in his X Article. He later said that by containment he meant not the containment of Soviet Power "by military means of a military threat, but the political containment of a political threat."<ref>George F. Kennan, ''Memoirs 1925–1950'' P. 358</ref> Second, Kennan admitted a failure in the article to specify the geographical scope of "containment", and that containment was not something he believed the United States could necessarily achieve everywhere successfully.<ref>George F. Kennan, ''Memoirs 1925–1950'' P. 359</ref>