Editing Correspondence theory of truth (section)

== Varieties ==
=== Correspondence as congruence ===
[[Bertrand Russell]]<ref name=R/><ref name=SEP/> and [[Ludwig Wittgenstein]]<ref name=W/><ref name=SEP/> have in different ways suggested that a statement, to be true, must have some kind of structural [[isomorphism]] with the [[State of affairs (philosophy)|state of affairs]] in the world that makes it true. For example, "A cat is on a mat" is true if, and only if, there is in the world a cat and a mat and the cat is related to the mat by virtue of being on it. If any of the three pieces (the cat, the mat, and the relation between them which correspond respectively to the subject, object, and verb of the statement) is missing, the statement is false.<ref>Kirkham, 1992, section 4.2</ref> Some sentences pose difficulties for this model, however. As just one example, adjectives such as "counterfeit", "alleged", or "false" do not have the usual simple meaning of restricting the meaning of the noun they modify: a "tall lawyer" is a kind of lawyer, but an "alleged lawyer" may not be.

=== Correspondence as correlation ===
[[J. L. Austin]]<ref name=A/><ref name=SEP/> theorized that there need not be any structural parallelism between a true statement and the state of affairs that makes it true. It is only necessary that the [[semantics]] of the [[language]] in which the statement is expressed are such as to correlate whole-for-whole the statement with the state of affairs. A false statement, for Austin, is one that is correlated by the language to a state of affairs that does not exist.<ref>See Kirkham, 1992, section 4.3</ref>