Editing Distributive justice (section)

==Theories of distributive justice==
The listed theories below are some of the most prominent theories within the field. With this in mind, the list is in no way to be considered exhaustive for distributive justice theory.

=== Justice as fairness ===
In his book ''[[A Theory of Justice]],'' [[John Rawls]] outlines his famous theory about justice as fairness. The theory consists of three core components:<ref name=":0">{{Cite book|last=Rawls|first=John|title=A Theory of Justice: Revised Edition|publisher=Harvard University Press|year=1999|pages=266–267}}</ref>

# the equality of people in rights and liberties;
# the equality of opportunities for all; and
# an arrangement of economic inequalities focused on benefit maximisation for those who are least advantaged.

==== The just 'basic structure' ====
Building a modern view on [[Social contract|social contract theory]], Rawls bases his work on an idea of justice being rooted in the ''basic structure'', constituting the fundamental rules in society, which shape the social and economic institutions, as well as the governance.<ref name=":1">{{Cite book|last=Rawls|first=John|url=https://archive.org/details/theoryjusticerev00rawl|title=A Theory of Justice: Revised Edition|publisher=Harvard University Press|year=1999|isbn=0-674-00078-1|pages=[https://archive.org/details/theoryjusticerev00rawl/page/n32 10]–15|url-access=limited}}</ref> This basic structure is what shapes the citizens’ life opportunities. According to Rawls, the structure is based on principles about [[basic rights]] and duties that any self-interested, rational individual would accept in order to further his/her own interests in a context of social cooperation.<ref name=":1" />

==== The original position ====
{{Main|Original position}}
Rawls presents the concept of an ''original position'' as a hypothetical idea of how to establish "a fair procedure so that any principles agreed on will be just."<ref name=":2">{{Cite book|last=Rawls|first=John|title=A Theory of Justice: Revised Edition|publisher=Harvard University Press|year=1999|page=118}}</ref> In his envisioning of the original position, it is created from a judgement made through negotiations between a group of people who will decide on what a just distribution of primary goods is (according to Rawls, the primary goods include freedoms, opportunities, and control over resources).<ref name=":3">{{Cite book|last=Rawls|first=John|url=https://archive.org/details/theoryjusticerev00rawl|title=A Theory of Justice: Revised Edition|publisher=Harvard University Press|year=1999|pages=[https://archive.org/details/theoryjusticerev00rawl/page/n76 54]–55|url-access=limited}}</ref> These people are assumed to be guided by self-interest, while also having a basic idea of morality and justice, and thus capable of understanding and evaluating a moral argument.<ref name=":3" /> Rawls then argues that procedural justice in the process of negotiation will be possible via a nullification of temptations for these people to exploit circumstances so as to favor their own position in society.<ref name=":2" />

==== Veil of ignorance ====
{{Main|Veil of ignorance}}
This nullification of [[temptation]]s is realised through a ''veil of ignorance'', which these people will be behind. The veil prevents the people from knowing what particular preferences they will have by concealing their talents, objectives, and, most importantly, where in society they themselves will end up. The veil, on the other hand, does not conceal general information about the society, and the people are assumed to possess societal and economic knowledge beyond the personal level.<ref>{{Cite book|last=Rawls|first=John|url=https://archive.org/details/theoryjusticerev00rawl|title=A Theory of Justice|edition=Rev.|publisher=Harvard University Press|year=1999|pages=[https://archive.org/details/theoryjusticerev00rawl/page/n140 118]–119|url-access=limited}}</ref> Thereby, such veil creates an environment for negotiations where the evaluation of the distribution of goods is based on general considerations, regardless of place in society, rather than biased considerations based on personal gains for specific citizen positions.<ref name=":2" /> By this logic, the negotiations will be sensitive to both those who are worst off, given that a risk of being in that category yourself will incentivize protection of these people, but also the rest of society, as one would not wish to hinder maximal utilisation for these in case you would end up in higher classes.

==== Basic principles of a just distribution ====
In this original position, the main concern will be to secure the goods that are most essential for pursuing the goals of each individual, regardless of what this specific goal might be.<ref>{{Cite book|last=Rawls|first=John|url=https://archive.org/details/theoryjustice00rawl_606|title=A Theory of Justice: Revised Edition|publisher=Harvard University Press|year=1999|pages=[https://archive.org/details/theoryjustice00rawl_606/page/n4 10]–12|url-access=limited}}</ref> With this in mind, Rawls theorizes two basic [[Justice as Fairness|principles of just distribution]].

The first principle, the '''liberty principle''', is the equal access to basic rights and liberties for all. With this, each person should be able to access the most extensive set of liberties that is compatible with similar schemes of access by other citizens. Thereby, it is not only a question of positive individual access but also of negative restrictions so as to respect others’ basic rights and liberties.<ref name=":0" />

The second principle, the '''difference principle''', addresses how the arrangement of social and economic inequalities, and thus the just distribution should look. Firstly, Rawls argues that such distribution should be based on a reasonable expectation of advantage for all, but also to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged in society. Secondly, the offices and positions attached to this arrangement should be open to all.<ref name=":0" />

These principles of justice are then prioritised according to two additional principles:<ref name=":0" />

{{Ordered list|the principles of the priority of liberty, wherein basic liberties only can be restricted if this is done for the sake of protecting liberty either:
{{ordered list|type=lower-alpha|1=by strengthening “the total system of liberties shared by all;” or|2=if a less than equal liberty is acceptable to those who are subject to this same lesser liberty.}}|inequality of opportunity, and the priority of efficiency & welfare, can only be acceptable if:
{{ordered list|type=lower-alpha|1=it enhances “the opportunities of those with lesser opportunities” in society; and/or|2=excessive saving either balances out or lessens the gravity of hardship for those who do not traditionally benefit.}}}}

=== Utilitarianism ===
{{Main|Utilitarianism}}
In 1789, [[Jeremy Bentham]] published his book ''[[An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation]].'' Centred on individual utility and welfare, utilitarianism builds on the notion that any action which increases the overall welfare in society is good, and any action that decreases welfare is bad. By this notion, utilitarianism's focus lies with its outcomes and pays little attention to how these outcomes are shaped.<ref name=":4">{{Cite journal|last=Knight|first=Carl|date=20 Feb 2014|title=Theories of Distributive Justice and Post-Apartheid South Africa|journal=Politikon|volume= 41, 2014 - Issue 1|pages=3–4|via=Taylor & Francis Online}}</ref> This idea of utilisation maximisation, while being a much broader philosophical consideration, also translates into a theory of justice.<ref>{{Cite book|last=Mill|first=John Stuart|title=Utilitarianism|publisher=Toronto University Press|year=1969|pages=241–242}}</ref>

==== Conceptualising welfare ====
While the basic notion that utilitarianism builds on seems simple, one major dispute within the school of utilitarianism revolved around the conceptualisation and measurement of [[welfare spending|welfare]].<ref name=":4" /> With disputes over this fundamental aspect, utilitarianism is evidently a broad term embracing many different sub-theories under its umbrella, and while much of the theoretical framework transects across these conceptualisations, using the different conceptualisation have clear implications for how we understand the more practical side of utilitarianism in distributive justice.

Bentham originally conceptualised this according to the [[hedonistic calculus]], which also became the foundation for [[John Stuart Mill|John Stuart Mill's]] focus on intellectual pleasures as the most beneficial contribution to societal welfare.<ref name=":4" /> Another path has been painted by [[Aristotle]], based on an attempt to create a more universal list of conditions required for human prosperity.<ref>{{Cite journal|doi=10.20318/fons.2016.2529 |title=The Meaning of Distributive Justice for Aristotle's Theory of Constitutions |year=2016 |last1=Knoll |first1=Manuel Andreas |journal=Πηγη/Fons |volume=1 |pages=57–97 |doi-access=free }}</ref> Opposite this, another path focuses on a subjective evaluation of happiness and satisfaction in human lives.<ref name=":5">{{Cite journal|last=Sumner 1996 as referred to in|first=Carl Knight|date=20 Feb 2014|title=Theories of distributive justice and post-apartheid South Africa.|journal=Politikon|volume=41|issue=1|pages=23–38|doi=10.1080/02589346.2014.885669|s2cid=154627483|url=http://eprints.gla.ac.uk/92559/1/92559.pdf}}</ref>

=== Egalitarianism ===
{{Main|Egalitarianism}}
Based on a fundamental notion of equal worth and moral status of human beings,<ref>{{Cite web|date=April 24, 2013|title=Egalitarianism|url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/egalitarianism/|access-date=May 15, 2020|website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy}}</ref> egalitarianism is concerned with equal treatment of all citizens in both respect and in concern, and in relation to the state as well as one another.<ref name=":6">Pierik, Roland. 2020. ''Developing responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism: A synthesis of five decades of liberal-egalitarian theorizing''. [[University of Amsterdam]]. Pp. 16–17.</ref>  Egalitarianism focuses more on the process through which distribution takes place, egalitarianism evaluates the justification for a certain distribution based on how the society and its institutions have been shaped, rather than what the outcome is.<ref name=":5" />  Attention is mainly given to ways in which unchosen person circumstances affect and hinder individuals and their life opportunities.<ref name=":6" /> As Elizabeth Anderson defines it, "the positive aim of egalitarian justice is...to create a community in which people stand in relation of equality to others."<ref>{{Cite book|last=Anderson|first=Elizanbeth|title=What is the Point of Equality?|publisher=Chicago University Press|year=1999|location=Chicago|pages=288–289}}</ref>

The main issue with egalitarian conceptions of distributive justice is the question concerning what kind of equality should be pursued. This is because one kind of equality might imply or require inequality of another kind.<ref name="Temkin">{{cite book |last1=Temkin |first1=Larry S. |title=Contemporary Debates in Political Philosophy |chapter=Illuminating Egalitarianism |date=2009 |publisher=Blackwell Publishing Ltd |pages=159–160 |doi=10.1002/9781444310399.ch9 |isbn=9781444310399 |chapter-url=https://doi.org/10.1002/9781444310399.ch9}}</ref> Strict egalitarianism, for instance, requires the equal allocation of material resources to every person of a given society.<ref name="Lamont">{{cite web |last1=Lamont |first1=Julian |title=Distributive Justice |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/justice-distributive/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |access-date=11 March 2023}}</ref> The principle of strict equality therefore holds that even if an unequal distribution would make everyone better off, or if an unequal distribution would make some better off but no one worse off, the strictly egalitarian distribution should be upheld. This notion of distributive justice can be critiqued because it can result in Pareto suboptimal distributions. Thus, the Pareto norm suggests that principles of distributive justice should result in allocations in which it is no longer possible to make anyone better off without making anyone else worse off. <ref>{{cite book |last1=Arneson |first1=Richard J. |title=A Companion to Contemporary Political Philosophy |chapter=Equality |date=2017 |publisher=Blackwell Publishing Ltd |pages=604–606 |doi=10.1002/9781405177245.ch31 |isbn=9781405136532 |chapter-url=https://doi.org/10.1002/9781405177245.ch31}}</ref>  This illustrates a concern for the equality of welfare, which is an ex post conception of equality as it is concerned with the  equality in outcomes. This conception has been critiqued by those in favour of ex ante equality, that is equality in people´s prospects, which is captured by alternative conceptions of equality such as those that demand equality of opportunity.<ref name="Temkin" />

While much academic work distinguishes between [[luck egalitarianism]] and [[social egalitarianism]], Roland Pierik presents a synthesis combining the two branches.<ref name=":6" /> In his synthesis, he argues that instead of focusing on compensations for unjust inequalities in society via redistribution of primary goods, egalitarianism scholars should instead, given the fundamental notion upon which the theory is built, strive to create institutions that creates and promotes meaningful equal opportunities from the get-go. Pierik thus moves egalitarianism's otherwise reactive nature by emphasising a need for attention to the development of fundamentally different institutions that would eradicate the need for redistribution and instead focus on the initial equal distribution of opportunities from which people then themselves be able to shape their lives.<ref name=":6" />

===Marxism===
The slogan "[[From each according to his ability, to each according to his needs]]" refers to distributive justice in [[Marxism]] according to [[Karl Marx]].<ref name="n289">{{cite journal | last=Husami | first=Ziyad I. | title=Marx on Distributive Justice | journal=Philosophy & Public Affairs | publisher=Wiley | volume=8 | issue=1 | year=1978 | issn=00483915 | jstor=2264878 | pages=27–64 | url=http://www.jstor.org/stable/2264878 | access-date=31 August 2024}}</ref> In [[Marxism-Leninism]] according to [[Vladimir Lenin]] the slogan "[[He who does not work, neither shall he eat]]" is a necessary approach to distributive justice on the path towards a [[communist]] society.<ref name="e474">{{cite web | last=Lenin | first=Vladimir | title=The State and Revolution, Chapter 5, Section 3 | website=Marxists Internet Archive | date=25 March 2006 | url=https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1917/staterev/ch05.htm#s3 | access-date=31 August 2024}}</ref>