Editing EMV (section)

==Differences and benefits==
There are two major benefits to moving to smart-card-based credit card payment systems: improved security (with associated fraud reduction), and the possibility for finer control of "offline" credit-card transaction approvals. One of the original goals of EMV was to provide for multiple applications on a card: for a credit and [[debit card]] application or an e-purse. Beginning in 2013, new-issue debit cards in the US contain two applications&nbsp;— a card association (Visa, Mastercard etc.) application, and a common debit application.<ref>{{cite web |title=Visa and MasterCard Support Common Solutions to Enable U.S. Chip Debit Routing |url=https://newsroom.mastercard.com/press-releases/visa-and-mastercard-support-common-solutions-to-enable-u-s-chip-debit-routing/ |publisher=Mastercard |access-date=7 October 2020 |archive-date=14 June 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210614141746/https://newsroom.mastercard.com/press-releases/visa-and-mastercard-support-common-solutions-to-enable-u-s-chip-debit-routing/ |url-status=dead }}</ref>

EMV chip card transactions improve security against fraud compared to magnetic stripe card transactions that rely on the holder's signature and visual inspection of the card to check for features such as [[Holography|hologram]]. The use of a PIN and cryptographic algorithms such as [[Triple DES]], [[RSA (cryptosystem)|RSA]] and [[Secure Hash Algorithm|SHA]] provide authentication of the card to the processing terminal and the card issuer's host system. The processing time is comparable to online transactions, in which communications delay accounts for the majority of the time, while cryptographic operations at the terminal take comparatively little time. The supposed increased protection from fraud has allowed banks and credit card issuers to establish a "liability shift", such that merchants are liable (as of 1 January 2005 in the EU region and 1 October 2015 in the US) for any fraud that results from transactions on systems that are not EMV-capable.<ref name=Cutover2015/><ref>{{cite web |title=Shift of liability for fraudulent transactions
 |url =http://www.chipandpin.co.uk/business/card_payments/means/shift_liability.html |publisher=The UK Cards Association |access-date=10 May 2015}}</ref><ref name="US Fraud Liability Shift">{{cite web
 |title=Understanding the 2015 U.S. Fraud Liability Shifts
 |url=http://www.emv-connection.com/downloads/2015/05/EMF-Liability-Shift-Document-FINAL5-052715.pdf |website=www.emv-connection.com |publisher=EMV Migration Forum |access-date=15 November 2015
 |archive-url= https://web.archive.org/web/20150919095559/http://www.emv-connection.com/downloads/2015/05/EMF-Liability-Shift-Document-FINAL5-052715.pdf
 |archive-date=19 September 2015|url-status=dead |df=dmy-all}}</ref> The majority of implementations of EMV cards and terminals confirm the identity of the cardholder by requiring the entry of a [[personal identification number]] (PIN) rather than signing a paper receipt. Whether or not PIN authentication takes place depends upon the capabilities of the terminal and programming of the card.

When credit cards were first introduced, merchants used mechanical rather than magnetic portable card imprinters that required [[carbon paper]] to make an imprint. They did not communicate electronically with the card issuer, and the card never left the customer's sight. The merchant had to verify transactions over a certain currency limit by telephoning the card issuer. During the 1970s in the United States, many merchants subscribed to a regularly-updated list of stolen or otherwise invalid credit card numbers. This list was commonly printed in booklet form on newsprint, in numerical order, much like a slender phone book, yet without any data aside from the list of invalid numbers. Checkout cashiers were expected to thumb through this booklet each and every time a credit card was presented for payment of any amount, prior to approving the transaction, which incurred a short delay.<ref name=CHIPnPIN_NYT/>

Later {{when|date=August 2024}}, terminal equipment at the merchant electronically contacted the card issuer, using information from the magnetic stripe to verify the card and authorize the transaction. This was much faster, but required the transaction to occur in a fixed location. Consequently, if the transaction did not take place near a terminal (in a restaurant, for example) the clerk or waiter had to take the card away from the customer and to the card machine. It was easily possible for a dishonest employee to swipe the card surreptitiously through a cheap machine that instantly recorded the information on the card and stripe; in fact, even at the terminal, a thief could bend down in front of the customer and swipe the card on a hidden reader. This made illegal cloning of cards relatively easy and a more common occurrence than before.{{citation needed|date=March 2020}}

Since the introduction of payment card chip and PIN, cloning of the chip is not feasible; only the magnetic stripe can be copied, and a copied card cannot be used by itself on a terminal requiring a PIN. The introduction of chip and PIN coincided with [[Wireless LAN|wireless]] data transmission technology becoming inexpensive and widespread. In addition to mobile-phone-based magnetic readers, merchant personnel can now bring wireless PIN pads to the customer, so the card is never out of the cardholder's sight. Thus, both chip and PIN and wireless technologies can be used to reduce the risks of unauthorized swiping and card cloning.<ref>{{cite news 
 |title=Why You're Still Not Safe From Fraud If You Have a Credit Card With a Chip
 |url=https://abcnews.go.com/Business/safe-fraud-credit-card-chip/story?id=38345575 |work=[[ABC News (United States)|ABC News]]}}</ref>