Editing Electronic voting (section)

==Concerns and improvements==
{{Further|Vote counting#Errors in optical scans|Vote counting#Errors in direct-recording electronic voting}}
In a 2004 article for [[OpenDemocracy]], security analyst [[Bruce Schneier]] claimed that computer security experts at the time were "unanimous on what to do" about concerns regarding electronic voting. "DRE machines must have [[Voter-verified paper audit trail|voter-verifiable paper audit trails]]," he said, and "software used on DRE machines must be open to public scrutiny"<ref>Schneier, Bruce (September 2004), {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070609085245/http://opendemocracy.net/ |date=9 June 2007 }} [http://www.opendemocracy.net/media-voting/article_2213.jsp What’s wrong with electronic voting machines?] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080522033511/http://www.opendemocracy.net/media-voting/article_2213.jsp |date=22 May 2008 }}</ref> to ensure the accuracy of the voting system. Verifiable ballots are necessary because computers can and do malfunction and because voting machines can be compromised.

Concerns regarding security lapses in aging voting machines came to a head shortly before and during the [[2016 United States presidential election]].<ref name="An Incredibly Insecure Voting Machine">{{cite web|last1=Schneier|first1=Bruce|title=An Incredibly Insecure Voting Machine|url=https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2015/04/an_incredibly_i.html|website=Schneier on Security|date=23 April 2015 |access-date=3 December 2015|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20151208112521/https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2015/04/an_incredibly_i.html|archive-date=8 December 2015}}</ref><ref name="Feldman, Halterman & Felten">{{cite web|last1=Feldman, Halterman & Felten|title=Security Analysis of the Diebold AccuVote-TS Voting Machine|url=http://usenix.org/legacy/event/evt07/tech/full_papers/feldman/feldman_html/index.html|website=[[Usenix]]|access-date=3 December 2015|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20151208094204/http://usenix.org/legacy/event/evt07/tech/full_papers/feldman/feldman_html/index.html|archive-date=8 December 2015}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |last1=Norden |first1=Lawrence |last2=Codrington |first2=Wilfred |date=March 8, 2018 |title=America's Voting Machines at Risk – An Update |url=https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/americas-voting-machines-risk-update |access-date=September 14, 2024 |website=Brennan Center for Justice}}</ref> Cases were reported at the time of machines making unpredictable, inconsistent errors. The expert consensus centered on three primary solutions: the openness of a system to public examination from outside experts, the creation of an authenticable [[Voter-verified paper audit trail|paper record]] of votes cast, and a chain of custody for records.<ref name="What's Wrong With Electronic Voting Machines?">{{cite web|last1=Schneier|first1=Bruce|title=What's Wrong With Electronic Voting Machines?|url=https://www.schneier.com/essays/archives/2004/11/whats_wrong_with_ele.html|website=Schneier on Security|access-date=3 December 2015|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20151208155348/https://www.schneier.com/essays/archives/2004/11/whats_wrong_with_ele.html|archive-date=8 December 2015}}</ref><ref name="Wichita State mathematician says Kansas voting machines need to be audited to check accuracy">{{cite web|title=Wichita State mathematician says Kansas voting machines need to be audited to check accuracy|url=http://cjonline.com/news/2015-07-20/wichita-state-mathematician-says-kansas-voting-machines-need-be-audited-check|website=Topeka Capital-Journal|access-date=3 December 2015|url-status=live|archive-url=http://archive.wikiwix.com/cache/20151203222538/http://cjonline.com/news/2015-07-20/wichita-state-mathematician-says-kansas-voting-machines-need-be-audited-check|archive-date=3 December 2015}}</ref>

Several major reforms took place after the 2016 U.S. election, including the widespread adoption of voting machines that produce [[voter-verified paper audit trail]]s (VVPATs). These paper records allow election officials to conduct audits and recounts, significantly enhancing transparency and security. Congress provided $380 million in funding through the [[Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018|Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2018]] under the framework of the [[Help America Vote Act]] to replace old machines with more secure models with modern cybersecurity protections.  By 2020, 93% of U.S. votes had a paper record, and only 0.5 percent of jurisdictions reported using electronic voting machines without paper audit trails.<ref>{{Cite web |date=October 6, 2021 |title=Election Audits Across the United States |url=https://www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/bestpractices/Election_Audits_Across_the_United_States.pdf |access-date=September 14, 2024 |website=US Election Assistance Commission}}</ref> This reduced the risk of undetected cyber interference or machine malfunction by enabling verification through physical ballots.

In collaboration with the [[United States Department of Homeland Security|U.S. Department of Homeland Security]] and other organizations, election officials also took steps to harden voting systems against potential cyberattacks. This included training election officials, sharing threat intelligence, and establishing secure systems for vote transmission and counting.<ref>{{Cite journal |date=2016-09-13 |title=Protecting the 2016 Elections from Cyber and Voting Machine Attacks |url=https://www.nist.gov/speech-testimony/protecting-2016-elections-cyber-and-voting-machine-attacks |journal=NIST |language=en}}</ref>

In addition to concerns about [[electoral fraud]] and auditability, electronic voting has been criticized as unnecessary and expensive to introduce. While countries like India continue to use electronic voting, several countries have cancelled e-voting systems or decided against a large-scale rollout, notably the [[Netherlands]], Ireland, Germany and the United Kingdom due to issues in reliability or transparency of EVMs.<ref name="Why electronic voting isn't secure">{{cite web|last1=Kobie|first1=Nicole|title=Why electronic voting isn't secure|url=https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/mar/30/why-electronic-voting-is-not-secure|website=[[The Guardian]]|date=30 March 2015|access-date=3 December 2015|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20151208073412/http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/mar/30/why-electronic-voting-is-not-secure|archive-date=8 December 2015}}</ref><ref name="Should Britain introduce electronic voting?">{{cite web|last1=Hern|first1=Alex|title=Should Britain introduce electronic voting?|url=https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/feb/26/should-britain-introduce-electronic-voting|website=[[The Guardian]]|date=26 February 2015|access-date=3 December 2015|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20151208080136/http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/feb/26/should-britain-introduce-electronic-voting|archive-date=8 December 2015}}</ref>

Moreover, people without internet or the skills to use it are excluded from the service. The so-called digital divide describes the gap between those who have access to the internet and those who do not. Depending on the country or even regions in a country the gap differs. This concern is expected to become less important in future since the number of internet users tends to increase.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.statista.com/statistics/273018/number-of-internet-users-worldwide/|title=Number of internet users worldwide 2005-2018|website=Statista|access-date=10 June 2019|archive-date=3 March 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210303091308/https://www.statista.com/statistics/273018/number-of-internet-users-worldwide/|url-status=live}}</ref>

Expenses for the installation of an electronic voting system are high. For some governments they may be too high so that they do not invest. This aspect is even more important if it is not sure whether electronic voting is a long-term solution.<ref name="auto"/>

===New South Wales 2021 iVote failures===
During the 2021 NSW Local Government Elections the online voting system "iVote" had technical issues that caused some access problems for some voters. Analysis done of these failures indicated a significant chance of the outages having impacted on the electoral results for the final positions. In the Kempsey ward, where the margin between the last elected and first non-elected candidates was only 69 votes, the electoral commission determined that the outage caused a 60% chance that the wrong final candidate was elected. Singleton had a 40% chance of having elected the wrong councillor, Shellharbour was a 7% chance and two other races were impacted by a sub-1% chance of having elected the wrong candidate. The NSW Supreme Court ordered the elections in Kempsey, Singleton and Shellharbour Ward A to be re-run. In the 2022 Kempsey re-vote the highest placed non-elected candidate from 2021, Dean Saul, was instead one of the first councillors elected.<ref>{{cite news | url=https://www.abc.net.au/news/2022-06-08/ivote-system-failure-election-re-runs-to-be-held-july-30/101135812 | title='Angry and disappointed' voters in three NSW local government areas forced back to the polls on July 30 | newspaper=ABC News | date=8 June 2022 | access-date=27 January 2023 | archive-date=27 January 2023 | archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230127130346/https://www.abc.net.au/news/2022-06-08/ivote-system-failure-election-re-runs-to-be-held-july-30/101135812 | url-status=live }}</ref> This failure caused the NSW Government to suspend the iVote system from use in the [[2023 New South Wales state election]].