Editing Elliptic-curve cryptography (section)

=== Security concerns ===

In 2013, ''[[The New York Times]]'' stated that [[Dual EC DRBG|Dual Elliptic Curve Deterministic Random Bit Generation]] (or Dual_EC_DRBG) had been included as a NIST national standard due to the influence of [[NSA]], which had included a deliberate weakness in the algorithm and the recommended elliptic curve.<ref>{{cite news |last1=Perlroth|first1=Nicole|last2=Larson|first2=Jeff|last3=Shane|first3=Scott |title=N.S.A. Able to Foil Basic Safeguards of Privacy on Web |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/06/us/nsa-foils-much-internet-encryption.html |archive-url=https://ghostarchive.org/archive/20220101/https://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/06/us/nsa-foils-much-internet-encryption.html |archive-date=2022-01-01 |url-access=limited |access-date=28 October 2018 |newspaper=New York Times |date=2013-09-05}}{{cbignore}}</ref> [[RSA Security]] in September 2013 issued an advisory recommending that its customers discontinue using any software based on Dual_EC_DRBG.<ref>Kim Zetter, [https://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2013/09/rsa-advisory-nsa-algorithm/ RSA Tells Its Developer Customers: Stop Using NSA-Linked Algorithm] ''[[Wired (magazine)|Wired]]'', 19 September 2013. "Recommending against the use of SP 800-90A Dual Elliptic Curve Deterministic Random Bit Generation: NIST strongly recommends that, pending the resolution of the security concerns and the re-issuance of SP 800-90A, the Dual_EC_DRBG, as specified in the January 2012 version of SP 800-90A, no longer be used."</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/PubsDrafts.html#SP-800-90-A+Rev+1+B+and+C|title=Search – CSRC|website=csrc.nist.gov}}</ref> In the wake of the exposure of Dual_EC_DRBG as "an NSA undercover operation", cryptography experts have also expressed concern over the security of the NIST recommended elliptic curves,<ref>[[Bruce Schneier]] (5 September) "I no longer trust the constants. I believe the NSA has manipulated them through their relationships with industry." See [http://it.slashdot.org/firehose.pl?op=view&type=story&sid=13/09/11/1224252 Are the NIST Standard Elliptic Curves Back-doored?], ''[[Slashdot]]'', 11 September 2013.</ref> suggesting a return to encryption based on non-elliptic-curve groups.

{{further|#Quantum computing attack}}

Additionally, in August 2015, the NSA announced that it plans to replace Suite B with a new cipher suite due to concerns about [[quantum computing]] attacks on ECC.<ref name="nsaquantum" /><ref name=nsaQCfaq>[https://cryptome.org/2016/01/CNSA-Suite-and-Quantum-Computing-FAQ.pdf Commercial National Security Algorithm Suite and Quantum Computing FAQ] U.S. National Security Agency, January 2016.</ref>