Editing Essentialism (section)

==Examples==

=== Naturalism ===
Dating back to the 18th century, naturalism is a form of essentialism in which [[social]] matters are explained through the logic of natural dispositions.<ref name=":032">{{Citation |last=Guillaumin |first=Colette |title=The Practice of Power and Belief in Nature |date=1996 |work=Sex In Question |editor-last=Adkins |editor-first=Lisa |editor-last2=Leonard |editor-first2=Diana |url=https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/mono/10.4324/9780203646250-10/practice-power-belief-nature-lisa-adkins-diana-leonard?context=ubx&refId=784d9cbd-9840-4f8d-a64c-cf718a54a17d |access-date= |publisher=Taylor & Francis |isbn=978-0-203-64625-0}}</ref> The invoked [[Nature (philosophy)|nature]] can be biological, ontological or theological.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Grosz |first=Elizabeth |author-link=Elizabeth Grosz |url=https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/9781136204432 |title=Feminist Knowledge (RLE Feminist Theory): Critique and Construct |date=2013-05-20 |publisher=Routledge |isbn=978-0-203-09403-7 |editor-last=Gunew |editor-first=Sneja |edition=0 |language=en |chapter=Conclusion |doi=10.4324/9780203094037}}</ref> It is opposed by [[Antinaturalism (politics)|antinaturalism]] and [[culturalism]].<ref>{{Cite book |last=Hałas |first=Elżbieta |url=https://www.worldcat.org/title/503075283 |title=Towards the world culture society: Florian Znaniecki's culturalism |date=2010 |publisher=Peter Lang |isbn=978-3-631-59946-4 |series=Studies in sociology: symbols, theory and society |location=New York |oclc=503075283}}</ref>

====Human nature====
{{See also|Philosophical anthropology}}In the case of ''[[Homo sapiens]]'', the divergent conceptions of [[human nature]] may be partitioned into ''essentialist'' versus ''non-essentialist'' (or even ''anti-essentialist'') positions.<ref>[[Pojman, Louis]] (2006). ''Who are we? Theories of human nature.'' Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press</ref><ref>Kronfeldner, Maria; Roughley, Neil; Töpfer, Georg (2014) "Recent work on human nature: beyond traditional essences." ''Philos Compass'' 9:642–652</ref> Another established dichotomy is that of [[monism]] versus [[Pluralism (philosophy)|pluralism]] about the matter.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Agar |first1=Nicholas |title=Liberal Eugenics: In Defense of Human Enhancement |date=2004 |publisher=Wiley-Blackwell}}, p 41</ref>
{{Quote|text=Monism will demand that enhancement technologies be used to create humans as close as possible to the ideal state. [...] The Nazis would have proposed the list of characteristics for admission to the SS as the universal template for enhancement technologies. [[Biohappiness|Hedonistic utilitarianism]] is a less objectionable version of monism, according to which the best human life is one that contains as much pleasure and as little suffering as possible – but like Nazism, it leaves no room for meaningful choice about enhancement.|author=Nicholas Agar<ref>{{cite book |last1=Agar |first1=Nicholas |date=2004 |title=Liberal Eugenics: In Defense of Human Enhancement |publisher=Wiley-Blackwell}}, p 41</ref>}}

===Biological essentialism===
{{Main|Species#The species problem}}
Before [[evolution]] was developed as a [[scientific theory]], the essentialist view of [[biology]] posited that all species are unchanging throughout time. The historian Mary P. Winsor has argued that biologists such as [[Louis Agassiz]] in the 19th century believed that taxa such as species and genus were fixed, reflecting the mind of the creator.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Bowler |first1=Peter J. |title=Evolution. The History of an Idea |date=1989 |publisher=University of California Press |isbn=978-0-520-06386-0 |page=[https://archive.org/details/evolutionhistory0000bowl/page/128 128] |url=https://archive.org/details/evolutionhistory0000bowl/page/128 }}</ref> Some [[creation–evolution controversy|religious opponents of evolution]] continue to maintain this view of biology. 

Work by historians of [[systematics|systematic biology]] in the 21st century has cast doubt upon this view of pre-Darwinian thinkers. Winsor, Ron Amundson and Staffan Müller-Wille have each argued that in fact the usual suspects (such as [[Carl Linnaeus|Linnaeus]] and the Ideal Morphologists) were very far from being essentialists, and that the so-called "essentialism story" (or "myth") in biology is a result of conflating the views expressed and biological examples used by philosophers going back to [[Aristotle]] and continuing through to [[John Stuart Mill]] and [[William Whewell]] in the immediately pre-Darwinian period, with the way that biologists used such terms as ''species''.<ref>Amundson, R. (2005) ''The changing rule of the embryo in evolutionary biology: structure and synthesis'', New York, Cambridge University Press. {{ISBN|0-521-80699-2}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal | last1=Müller-Wille | first1=Staffan | year=2007 | title=Collection and collation: theory and practice of Linnaean botany | journal=Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences | volume=38 | issue=3| pages=541–562 | doi=10.1016/j.shpsc.2007.06.010| pmid=17893064 }}</ref><ref>{{cite journal | last1=Winsor | first1=M. P. | year=2003 | title=Non-essentialist methods in pre-Darwinian taxonomy | journal=Biology & Philosophy | volume=18 | issue=3| pages=387–400 |doi=10.1023/A:1024139523966| s2cid=54214030 }}</ref> 

Anti-essentialists contend that an essentialist typological categorization has been rendered obsolete and untenable by evolutionary theory for several reasons.<ref>[[Sober, Elliott]] (1980). "Evolution, population thinking, and essentialism." ''Philos'' Sci 47:350–383</ref><ref>Okasha S (2002). "Darwinian metaphysics: species and the question of essentialism." ''Synthese'' 131:191–213</ref> First, they argue that biological species are dynamic entities, emerging and disappearing as distinct populations are molded by natural selection. This view contrasts with the static essences that essentialists say characterize [[natural kinds|natural categories]]. Second, the opponents of essentialism argue that our current understanding of biological species emphasizes [[genealogical]] relationships rather than ''intrinsic'' traits. Lastly, non-essentialists assert that every organism has a [[mutational load]], and the variability and diversity within species contradict the notion of fixed biological natures.

===Gender essentialism===
{{main|Gender essentialism}}

In [[feminist theory]] and [[gender studies]], gender essentialism is the attribution of fixed essences to men and women—this  idea that men and women are fundamentally different continues to be a matter of contention.<ref>{{Cite book|last=Fausto-Sterling|first=Anne|title=Myths of Gender: Biological Theories about Women and Men|publisher=Basic Books|year=1992|isbn=978-0465047925}}</ref><ref name="Suzanne Kelly 2011">Suzanne Kelly, Gowri Parameswaran, and Nancy Schniedewind, ''Women: Images & Realities: A Multicultural Anthology'', 5th ed., McGraw-Hill, 2011.</ref> Gay/lesbian rights advocate [[Diana Fuss]] wrote: "Essentialism is most commonly understood as a belief in the real, true essence of things, the invariable and fixed properties which define the 'whatness' of a given entity."<ref>{{harvp|Fuss|2013|p=xi}}</ref> Women's essence is assumed to be universal and is generally identified with those characteristics viewed as being specifically feminine.<ref name=":03" /> These ideas of femininity are usually biologized and are often preoccupied with psychological characteristics, such as nurturance, empathy, support, and non-competitiveness, etc. Feminist theorist [[Elizabeth Grosz]] states in her 1995 publication ''Space, time and perversion: essays on the politics of bodies'' that essentialism "entails the belief that those characteristics defined as women's essence are shared in common by all women at all times. It implies a limit of the variations and possibilities of change—it is not possible for a subject to act in a manner contrary to her essence. Her essence underlies all the apparent variations differentiating women from each other. Essentialism thus refers to the existence of fixed characteristic, given attributes, and ahistorical functions that limit the possibilities of change and thus of social reorganization."<ref name=":03">{{cite book|last1 = Grosz|first1 = Elizabeth|title =Space, Time, and Perversion: Essays on the Politics of Bodies |date = 1995|publisher = Routledge|location = New York|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=Htf7y-rcVFwC |access-date=17 March 2017|isbn = 978-0415911375}}</ref>

Gender essentialism is pervasive in popular culture, as illustrated by the #1 ''New York Times'' best seller ''[[Men Are from Mars, Women Are from Venus]]'',<ref>John Gray, ''Men Are from Mars, Women Are from Venus'', HarperCollins, 1995.</ref> but this essentialism is routinely critiqued in introductory [[women's studies]] textbooks such as ''Women: Images & Realities''.<ref name="Suzanne Kelly 2011"/> Starting in the 1980s, some feminist writers have put forward essentialist theories about gender and science. [[Evelyn Fox Keller]],<ref>Evelyn Fox Keller, ''Reflections on Gender and Science'', Yale University Press, 1985.</ref> [[Sandra Harding]],
<ref>Sandra Harding, ''The Science Question in Feminism'', Cornell University Press, 1986.</ref> and [[Nancy Tuana]]
<ref>Nancy Tuana, ''The Less Noble Sex'', Indiana University Press, 1993.</ref> argued that the modern scientific enterprise is inherently patriarchal and incompatible with women's nature. Other feminist scholars, such as [[Ann Hibner Koblitz]],<ref>Ann Hibner Koblitz, "A historian looks at gender and science," ''International Journal of Science Education'', vol. 9 (1987), pp. 399–407.</ref> [[Lenore Blum]],<ref>Lenore Blum, "AWM's first twenty years: The presidents' perspectives," in Bettye Anne Case and Anne M. Leggett, eds., ''[[Complexities: Women in Mathematics]]'', Princeton University Press, 2005, pp. 94–95.</ref> [[Mary W. Gray|Mary Gray]],<ref>Mary Gray, "Gender and mathematics: Mythology and Misogyny," in [[Gila Hanna]], ed., ''Towards Gender Equity in Mathematics Education: An ICMI Study'', Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1996.</ref> [[Mary Beth Ruskai]],<ref>Mary Beth Ruskai, "Why women are discouraged from becoming scientists," ''The Scientist'', March 1990.</ref> and [[Pnina Abir-Am]] and Dorinda Outram<ref>[[Pnina Abir-Am]] and Dorinda Outram, "Introduction," ''Uneasy Careers and Intimate Lives: Women in Science, 1789–1979'', Rutgers University Press, 1987.</ref> have criticized those theories for ignoring the diverse nature of scientific research and the tremendous variation in women's experiences in different cultures and historical periods.

===Racial, cultural and strategic essentialism===
{{main|Race (human categorization)|Strategic essentialism}}
Cultural and racial essentialism is the view that fundamental biological or physical characteristics of human "races" produce personality, heritage, cognitive abilities, or 'natural talents' that are shared by all members of a racial group.<ref name="Soylu Yalcinkaya Estrada-Villalta Adams 2017 p. ">{{cite journal | last1=Soylu Yalcinkaya | first1=Nur | last2=Estrada-Villalta | first2=Sara | last3=Adams | first3=Glenn | title=The (Biological or Cultural) Essence of Essentialism: Implications for Policy Support among Dominant and Subordinated Groups | journal=Frontiers in Psychology | publisher=Frontiers Media SA | volume=8 | date=2017-05-30 | page=900 | issn=1664-1078 | doi=10.3389/fpsyg.2017.00900 | pmid=28611723 | quote=Whereas, endorsement of biological essentialism may have similarly negative implications for social justice policies across racial categories, we investigated the hypothesis that endorsement of cultural essentialism would have different implications across racial categories. In Studies 1a and 1b, we assessed the properties of a cultural essentialism measure we developed...| pmc=5447748 | doi-access=free }}</ref><ref name="Stubblefield 1995 pp. 341–368">{{cite journal |last=Stubblefield |first=Anna |year=1995 |title=Racial Identity and Non-Essentialism About Race |url=http://www.jstor.org/stable/23557192 |journal=Social Theory and Practice |publisher=Florida State University Department of Philosophy |volume=21 |issue=3 |pages=341–368 |doi=10.5840/soctheorpract19952131 |issn=0037-802X |jstor=23557192 |access-date=2023-07-22 |quote=Essentialist conceptions of race hold that the characteristics of physical appearance referred to by racial terms are indicative of more profound characteristics (whether positively or negatively construed) of personality, inclinations, `culture,' heritage, cognitive abilities, or `natural talents' that are taken to be shared by all members of a racially defined group.}}</ref> In the early 20th century, many [[Anthropology|anthropologists]] taught this theory – that race was an entirely biological phenomenon and that this was core to a person's behavior and identity.<ref name="cravens">{{harvnb|Cravens|2010}}</ref> This, coupled with a belief that [[linguistics|linguistic]], cultural, and social groups fundamentally existed along racial lines, formed the basis of what is now called [[scientific racism]].<ref name="currell">{{harvnb|Currell|Cogdell|2006}}</ref> After the [[Nazi eugenics]] program, along with the rise of anti-colonial movements, racial essentialism lost widespread popularity.<ref>{{cite journal|author-last=Hirschman |author-first=Charles |date=2004 |title=The Origins and Demise of the Concept of Race |journal=Population and Development Review |volume=30 |issue=3 |pages=385–415 |doi=10.1111/j.1728-4457.2004.00021.x |s2cid=145485765 |issn=1728-4457 }}</ref> New studies of [[culture]] and the fledgling field of [[population genetics]] undermined the scientific standing of racial essentialism, leading race anthropologists to revise their conclusions about the sources of phenotypic variation.<ref name="cravens" /> A significant number of modern anthropologists and [[biologist]]s in the West came to view race as an invalid genetic or biological designation.<ref name="Cravens; Angier; et al.">See:
* {{harvnb|Cravens|2010}}
* {{harvnb|Angier|2000}}
* {{harvnb|Amundson|2005}}
* {{harvnb|Reardon|2005}}
</ref>

Historically, beliefs which posit that social identities such as ethnicity, nationality or gender determine a person's essential characteristics have in many cases been shown to have destructive or harmful results. It has been argued by some that essentialist thinking lies at the core of many [[Reductionism|simplistic]], [[Discrimination|discriminatory]] or [[Extremism|extremist]] ideologies.<ref>{{cite journal|last=Kurzwelly|first=J.|author2=Fernana, H.|author3=Ngum, M. E.|year=2020|title=The allure of essentialism and extremist ideologies|journal=[[Anthropology Southern Africa]]|volume=43|issue=2|pages=107–118|doi=10.1080/23323256.2020.1759435|s2cid=221063773}}</ref> Psychological essentialism is also correlated with [[Racism|racial prejudice]].<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Chen|first1=Jacqueline M.|last2=Ratliff|first2=Kate A.|date=June 2018|title=Psychological Essentialism Predicts Intergroup Bias|url=https://www.researchgate.net/publication/325508855|journal=Social Cognition|volume=36|issue=3|pages=301–323|doi=10.1521/soco.2018.36.3.301|s2cid=150259817}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Mandalaywala|first1=Tara M.|last2=Amodio|first2=David M.|last3=Rhodes|first3=Marjorie|date=19 June 2017|title=Essentialism Promotes Racial Prejudice by Increasing Endorsement of Social Hierarchies|url=|journal=Social Psychological and Personality Science|volume=19|issue=4|pages=461–469|doi=10.1177/1948550617707020|pmc=7643920|pmid=33163145}}</ref> In medical sciences, essentialism can lead to an over-emphasis on the role of identities—for example assuming that differences in hypertension in African-American populations are due to [[Race (human categorization)|racial]] differences rather than social causes—leading to fallacious conclusions and potentially unequal treatment.<ref>{{cite journal|last=Duster|first=Troy|title=Race and Reification in Science|journal=Science|year=2005|volume=307|issue=5712|pages=1050–1051|doi=10.1126/science.1110303|pmid=15718453|s2cid=28235427}}</ref> Older social theories were often conceptually essentialist.<ref>{{cite journal|last=Kurzwelly|first=J.|author2=Rapport, N.|author3=Spiegel, A. D.|title=Encountering, explaining and refuting essentialism|journal=Anthropology Southern Africa|year=2020|volume=43|issue=2|pages=65–81|doi=10.1080/23323256.2020.1780141|hdl=10023/24669|s2cid=221063562|hdl-access=free}}</ref>

Strategic essentialism, a major concept in [[postcolonial theory]], was introduced in the 1980s by the [[India]]n [[literary critic]] and [[literary theory|theorist]] [[Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak]].<ref>{{cite book |editor=G. Ritze and J.M. Ryan |title=The Concise Encyclopedia of Sociology |date=2010 |page=193}}</ref> It refers to a political tactic in which minority groups, nationalities, or ethnic groups mobilize on the basis of shared gendered, cultural, or political identity. While strong differences may exist between members of these groups, and among themselves they engage in continuous debates, it is sometimes advantageous for them to temporarily "essentialize" themselves, despite it being based on erroneous logic,<ref>{{cite journal|last=Kurzwelly|first=J.|author2=Rapport, N.|author3=Spiegel, A. D.|title=Encountering, explaining and refuting essentialism|journal=[[Anthropology Southern Africa]]|year=2020|volume=43|issue=2|pages=65–81|doi=10.1080/23323256.2020.1780141|hdl=10023/24669 |s2cid=221063562|hdl-access=free}}</ref> and to bring forward their group identity in a simplified way to achieve certain goals, such as [[wikt:equal rights|equal rights]] or [[antiglobalization]].<ref>{{cite book |author=B. Ashcroft |display-authors=etal |title=Key Concepts in Post-colonial Studies |url=https://archive.org/details/keyconceptsinpos0000ashc |url-access=registration |date=1998 |pages=[https://archive.org/details/keyconceptsinpos0000ashc/page/159 159–60]|publisher=Psychology Press |isbn=9780415153041 }}</ref>

===Machine learning===

Pelillo argues that traditional [[machine learning]] techniques often align with an essentialist paradigm by relying on [[feature (machine learning)|features]] - properties assumed to be essential for [[classification]] tasks. For instance, [[pattern recognition]], which attempts to extract essential attributes from data, is described as inherently essentialist since it presupposes that objects have stable, identifiable essences that define their categories. This perspective extends to [[similarity learning|similarity-based]] approaches, which use [[prototype theory]] to establish relationships within data by grouping instances around central prototypes that exhibit the "essence" of a category.<ref>{{cite journal|last=Pelillo|first=M.|title=Introduction: The SIMBAD Project|journal=Similarity-Based Pattern Analysis and Recognition|editor=M. Pelillo|year=2013|volume=Advances in Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition|pages=1–10|doi=10.1007/978-1-4471-5628-4_1}}</ref>

Expanding on this, Pelillo and Scantamburlo highlight that certain machine-learning scenarios, such as when data is highly dimensional or features are poorly defined, challenge the essentialist framework. They advocate for alternative paradigms that consider relational and [[Context (linguistics)|context]]ual [[information]] instead of isolated feature analysis. This relational focus aligns with anti-essentialist stances, which view categories as dynamic and context-dependent rather than fixed.<ref>{{cite journal|last=Pelillo|first=M.|author2=Scantamburlo, T.|title=How Mature Is the Field of Machine Learning?|journal=AI*IA 2013: Advances in Artificial Intelligence|year=2013|volume=8249|pages=121–132|doi=10.1007/978-3-319-03524-6_11}}</ref>

Šekrst and Skansi build on these ideas, noting that [[supervised learning]], by utilizing labeled [[dataset]]s, reflects essentialist tendencies since it relies on predefined human-defined categories. However, they argue that this does not commit machine learning to an ontological stance on essentialism. Instead, they propose that the categories used in supervised learning are human-constructed in [[feature selection]] processes and reflect [[epistemology|epistemological]] practices rather than [[metaphysics|metaphysical]] truths. Similarly, [[unsupervised learning]]'s [[Cluster analysis|clustering]] and similarity-based approaches often resemble prototypical reasoning but do not inherently affirm or deny essentialism, focusing instead on [[pragmatics|pragmatic]] task performance.<ref>{{cite journal|last=Šekrst|first=K.|author2=Skansi, S.|title=Machine Learning and Essentialism|journal=Philosophical Problems in Science (Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce)|year=2022|volume=73|pages=171–196|url=https://philpapers.org/rec/EKRMLA|doi=}}</ref>