Editing Europe first (section)

==United States==

The Europe first strategy, in conjunction with a "holding action" against Japan in the Pacific, had originally been proposed to Roosevelt by the U.S. military in 1940.<ref>{{cite web|last1=Stoler|first1=Mark A.|title=George C. Marshall and the "Europe-First" Strategy, 1939–1951: A Study in Diplomatic as well as Military History|url=http://marshallfoundation.org/marshall/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2014/04/EDStoler.pdf|access-date=4 April 2016}}</ref> When [[German declaration of war against the United States|Germany declared war on the United States]] on December 11, 1941, the United States faced a decision about how to allocate resources between these two separate theaters of war. On the one hand, Japan had attacked the United States directly at Pearl Harbor, and the [[Imperial Japanese Navy|Japanese Navy]] threatened United States territory in a way that Germany, with a limited surface fleet, was not in a position to do. On the other hand, Germany was considered the stronger and more dangerous threat to Europe; and Germany's geographical proximity to the UK and the Soviet Union was a much greater threat to their survival.<ref>Hornfischer p. 11-15, 130, 151–153, 382, 383</ref>

Prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor, American planners foresaw the possibility of a two-front war. [[Chief of Naval Operations]] [[Harold Rainsford Stark]] authored the [[Plan Dog memo]], which advocated concentrating on victory in Europe while staying on the defensive in the Pacific. However, the U.S. reassurance to the UK notwithstanding, the U.S.'s immediate concern was with Japan. As the [[Chief of Staff of the United States Army|Army Chief of Staff]] General [[George Marshall]] later said, "we had a fair understanding of what we had best do rather than the necessity of engaging in prolonged conversations... This understanding, which included a recognition that Germany was the main enemy and that the major effort would be made initially in Europe, was obviously not applicable in the present situation. Of first importance now was the necessity to check the Japanese."<ref>Morton, 141–142</ref> Nonetheless, Marshall and other U.S. generals advocated the invasion of northern Europe in 1943, which the British rejected.<ref>{{cite book|last1=Husen|first1=editor, David T. Zabecki ; assistant editors, Carl O. Schuster, Paul J. Rose, William H. Van|title=World War II in Europe : an encyclopedia|date=1999|publisher=Garland Pub.|isbn=9780824070298|page=1270|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=gYDN-UfehEEC&pg=PA1270}}</ref><ref>{{cite book|last1=Mackenzie|first1=S.P.|title=The Second World War in Europe: Second Edition|date=2014|publisher=Routledge|isbn=978-1317864714|pages=54–55|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=GsUFBAAAQBAJ&pg=PA55}}</ref> After Churchill pressed for a landing in [[French North Africa]] in 1942, Marshall suggested instead to Roosevelt that the U.S. abandon the Germany-first strategy and take the offensive in the Pacific. Roosevelt "disapproved" the proposal saying it would do nothing to help Russia.<ref>{{cite book|last1=Ward|first1=Geoffrey C.|chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=V73CAwAAQBAJ&pg=PA402|title=The Roosevelts: An Intimate History|last2=Burns|first2=Ken|date=2014|publisher=Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group|isbn=978-0385353069|pages=402|chapter=The Common Cause: 1939-1944}}</ref> With Roosevelt's support, and Marshall unable to persuade the British to change their minds, in July 1942 [[Operation Torch]] was scheduled for later that year.<ref name=":0">{{cite book|title=Routledge Handbook of US Military and Diplomatic History|date=2013|publisher=Taylor and Francis|location=Hoboken|isbn=9781135071028|page=135|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=VRiYAAAAQBAJ&pg=PA135}}</ref>

The Europe First strategy remained in effect throughout the war but the terms "holding action" and "limited offensive" in the Pacific were subject to interpretation and modification by U.S. senior military commanders and at allied leaders conferences. The strategic situation in the Pacific and related logistical requirements dominated the United States' actions after its entry into the war and led to an initial focus on the Pacific. Even in the later stages of the war, there was intense competition for resources as operations in both regions were scaled up.<ref name=":0" /><ref name=Gray/>