Editing Fact–value distinction (section)

==Naturalistic fallacy==
{{related|{{annotated link|Ethical naturalism}}}}
The fact–value distinction is closely related to the [[naturalistic fallacy]], a topic debated in ethical and [[moral philosophy]]. [[G. E. Moore]] believed it essential to all ethical thinking.<ref>Casimir Lewy 1965 – G. E. Moore on the naturalistic fallacy.</ref> However, contemporary philosophers like [[Philippa Foot]] have called into question the validity of such assumptions. Others, such as [[Ruth Anna Putnam]], argue that even the most "scientific" of disciplines are affected by the "values" of those who research and practice the vocation.<ref>Putnam, Ruth Anna. "Perceiving Facts and Values", ''[[Philosophy (journal)|Philosophy]]'' 73, 1998. {{JSTOR|3752124}} This article and her earlier one, "Creating Facts and Values", ''Philosophy'' 60, 1985 {{JSTOR|3750998}}, examine how scientists may base their choice of investigations on their unexamined subjectivity, which undermines the objectivity of their hypothesis and findings</ref><ref>J. C. Smart, "Ruth Anna Putnam and the Fact-Value Distinction", ''Philosophy'' 74, 1999. {{JSTOR|3751844}}</ref> Nevertheless, the difference between the naturalistic fallacy and the fact–value distinction is derived from the manner in which modern [[social science]] has used the fact–value distinction, and not the strict naturalistic fallacy to articulate new fields of study and create academic disciplines.