Editing Form of the Good (section)

==Scholarly analysis==
Plato writes that the Form (or Idea) of the Good is the origin of knowledge although it is not knowledge itself, and from the Good, things that are just and true, gain their usefulness and value. Humans are compelled to pursue the good, but no one can hope to do this successfully without philosophical reasoning. According to Plato, true [[epistemology|knowledge]] is conversant, not about those material objects and imperfect intelligences which we meet within our daily interactions with all mankind, but rather it investigates the nature of those purer and more perfect patterns which are the models after which all created beings are formed. Plato supposes these perfect types to exist from all eternity and calls them the ''Forms'' or ''Ideas''.<ref>"Idea" from the Greek ἰδέα, often transliterated in the past but now typically translated as "character". The archaic sense must be distinguished from the modern sense meaning "thought". Cf. Russell: "It must not be supposed that 'ideas', in his sense, exist in minds, though they may be apprehended by minds.... The word 'idea' has acquired, in the course of time, many associations which are quite misleading when applied to Plato's 'ideas'. (''The Problems of Philosophy'', chapter 9).</ref>  As these Forms cannot be perceived by human senses, whatever [[knowledge]] we attain of the Forms must be seen through the mind's eye (cf. ''[[Parmenides dialogue|Parmenides]]'' 132a), while ideas derived from the concrete world of flux are ultimately unsatisfactory and uncertain (see the ''[[Theaetetus (dialogue)|Theaetetus]]''). He maintains that degree of skepticism which denies all permanent authority to the evidence of sense. In essence, Plato suggests that justice, truth, equality, beauty, and many others ultimately derive from the Form of the Good.

===Aristotle's criticism===
[[Aristotle]] discusses the Forms of Good in critical terms several times in both of his major surviving ethical works, the ''[[Eudemian Ethics|Eudemian]]'' and ''[[Nicomachean Ethics]]''. Aristotle argues that Plato's Form of the Good does not apply to the physical world, for Plato does not assign "goodness" to anything in the existing world.  Because Plato's Form of the Good does not explain events in the physical world, humans have no reason to believe that the Form of the Good exists and the Form of the Good is thereby irrelevant to human ethics.<ref name=plat>{{cite book|last=Fine|first=Gail|title=Plato on Knowledge and Forms|date=2003|publisher=Oxford University Press|location=New York|isbn=0-19-924559-2|page=350}}</ref>

===Other criticisms===
Plato's Form of the Good is often criticized as too general.<ref name=BAR>{{cite book|last=Reeve|first=C.D.C.|title=Blindness and reorientation : problems in Plato's Republic|date=2013|publisher=Oxford University Press|location=Oxford|isbn=978-0-19-993443-0|pages=165, 166|edition=1.}}</ref>  Plato's Form of the Good does not define things in the physical world that are good, and therefore lacks connectedness to reality.<ref>{{cite book|last=Herman|first=Arthur|title=The cave and the light : Plato versus Aristotle, and the struggle for the soul of Western civilization|date=2013|publisher=Bantam Books|location=New York|isbn=978-0-553-80730-1|page=46|edition=First}}</ref>  Because Plato's Form of the Good lacks instruction, or ways for the individual to be good, Plato's Form of the Good is not applicable to human ethics since there is no defined method for which goodness can be pursued.  Through Socrates in ''The Republic'', Plato acknowledges the Form of the Good as an elusive concept and proposes that the Form of the Good be accepted as a hypothesis, rather than criticized for its weaknesses.  According to Socrates in ''The Republic'', the only alternative to accepting a hypothesis is to refute all the objections against it, which is counterproductive in the process of contemplation.<ref name=BAR />

Aristotle along with other scholars sees the Form of the Good as synonymous with  the idea of One.<ref name=Rev>{{cite journal|last=Jordan|first=R.W.|title=Platos Idee des Guten by Rafael Ferber Review|journal=The Classical Review|date=1986|volume=36|pages=65–67|jstor=3064234|doi=10.1017/s0009840x00105001|s2cid=170977273 }}</ref>  Plato claims that Good is the highest Form, and that all objects aspire to be good.<ref>{{cite web|last=Banach|first=David|title=Plato's Theory of Forms|url=http://www.anselm.edu/homepage/dbanach/platform.htm|access-date=2 May 2014|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140803230257/http://www.anselm.edu/homepage/dbanach/platform.htm|archive-date=3 August 2014|url-status=dead}}</ref>  Since Plato does not define good things, interpreting Plato's Form of the Good through the idea of One allows scholars to explain how Plato's Form of the Good relates to the physical world. According to this philosophy, in order for an object to belong to the Form of the Good, it must be One and have the proper harmony, uniformity, and order to be in its proper form.<ref name=Rev />

Philosopher Rafael Ferber dismissed Aristotle's view that the 'Good' is 'One' and wrote that the Form of the Good is self-contradictory.  Ferber claimed that Plato's Form of the Good could be simultaneously defined and unknown, and be in a state of both "being" and "not being".<ref name=Rev />

Plato's Forms are also critiqued for being treated as the reason for all things, as opposed to being an essence in itself.  Some scholars also believe that Plato intended the Form to be the essence of which things come into existence.  These different interpretations of Plato's intention for the Form may be attributed to the idea that Plato did not have a systematic definition of the Form itself.<ref name=plat />