Editing Foundationalism (section)

==Definition==
Foundationalism is an attempt to respond to the [[regress problem]] of justification in epistemology. According to this argument, every proposition requires [[theory of justification|justification]] to support it, but any justification also needs to be justified itself. If this goes on ''[[ad infinitum]]'', it is not clear how anything in the chain could be justified. Foundationalism holds that there are 'basic beliefs' which serve as foundations to anchor the rest of our beliefs.<ref>O'Brien 2006, pp. 61–62</ref> Strong versions of the theory assert that an indirectly justified belief is completely justified by basic beliefs; more moderate theories hold that indirectly justified beliefs require basic beliefs to be justified, but can be further justified by other factors.<ref>Audi 2003, p. 194</ref>

Since [[ancient Greece]], [[Western philosophy]] has pursued a solid foundation as the ultimate and eternal reference system for all [[knowledge]]. This foundation serves not only as a starting point but also as the fundamental basis for understanding the truth of existence. Thinking is the process of proving the validity of knowledge, not proving the rationality of the foundation from which knowledge is shaped. This means, with ultimate cause, the foundation is true, absolute, entire and impossible to prove. [[Neopragmatism|Neopragmatist]] philosopher [[Richard Rorty]], a proponent of [[anti-foundationalism]], said that the fundamentalism confirmed the existence of the ''privileged representation''<ref>Rorty, Richard (1979). Philosophy and the mirror of nature. Princeton University Press. pp.&nbsp;165–173</ref> which constitutes the foundation, from which dominates epistemology.{{clarify|from which dominates|date=September 2020}} The earliest foundationalism is [[Plato]]'s [[theory of Forms]], which shows the general [[concept]] as a model for the release of existence, which is only the faint copy of the Forms of eternity, that means, understanding the expression of objects leads to acquiring all knowledge, then acquiring knowledge accompanies achieving the truth. Achieving the truth means understanding the foundation. This idea still has some appeal in for example [[international relations]] studies.<ref>Smith, Steve, Ownens Patrica, "Alternative approaches to international relations theory" in "The Globalisation of World Politics", Baylis, Smith and Owens, OUP, 4th ed, p177</ref>

===Classical foundationalism===
Foundationalism holds basic beliefs exist, which are justified without reference to other beliefs, and that nonbasic beliefs must ultimately be justified by basic beliefs. Classical foundationalism maintains that basic beliefs must be [[Infallibility#In philosophy|infallible]] if they are to justify nonbasic beliefs, and that only [[deductive reasoning]] can be used to transfer justification from one belief to another.<ref>Lemos 2007, pp. 50–51</ref> [[Laurence BonJour]] has argued that the classical formulation of foundationalism requires basic beliefs to be infallible, incorrigible, indubitable, and certain if they are to be adequately justified.<ref>BonJour 1985, p. 27</ref> Mental states and immediate experience are often taken as good candidates for basic beliefs because it is argued that beliefs about these do not need further support to be justified.<ref>Dancy 1985, pp. 53–54</ref>

===Modest foundationalism===
As an alternative to the classic view, modest foundationalism does not require that basic perceptual beliefs are infallible, but holds that it is reasonable to assume that perceptual beliefs are justified unless evidence to the contrary exists.<ref name=OB>O'Brien 2006, pp. 72–74</ref> This is still foundationalism because it maintains that all non-basic beliefs must be ultimately justified by basic beliefs, but it does not require that basic beliefs are infallible and allows [[inductive reasoning]] as an acceptable form of inference.<ref>Lemos 2007, p.55</ref> For example, a belief that 'I see red' could be defeated with psychological evidence showing my mind to be confused or inattentive. Modest foundationalism can also be used to avoid the problem of inference. Even if perceptual beliefs are infallible, it is not clear that they can infallibly ground empirical knowledge (even if my belief that the table looks red to me is infallible, the inference to the belief that the table actually is red might not be infallible). Modest foundationalism does not require this link between perception and reality to be so strong; our perception of a table being yellow is adequate justification to believe that this is the case, even if it is not infallible.<ref name=OB/>

[[Reformed epistemology]] is a form of modest foundationalism which takes religious beliefs as basic because they are non-inferentially justified: their justification arises from [[religious experience]], rather than prior beliefs. This takes a modest approach to foundationalism – religious beliefs are not taken to be infallible, but are assumed to be ''[[prima facie]]'' justified unless evidence arises to the contrary.<ref>O'Brien 2006, p. 184</ref>

===Internalism and externalism<!--Linked from 'Alvin_Goldman'-->===
Foundationalism can take [[internalism|internalist]] and [[externalism|externalist]] forms. Internalism requires that a believer's justification for a belief must be accessible to them for it to be justified.<ref>O'Brien 2006, p.87</ref> Foundationalist internalists have held that basic beliefs are justified by [[mental event]]s or states, such as experiences, that do not constitute beliefs. Alternatively, basic beliefs may be justified by some special property of the belief itself, such as its being [[self-evident]] or [[infallible]]. Externalism maintains that it is unnecessary for the means of justification of a belief to be accessible to the believer.<ref>O'Brien 2006, p. 88</ref>

[[Reliabilism]] is an externalist foundationalist theory, initially proposed by [[Alvin Goldman]], which argues that a belief is justified if it is reliably produced, meaning that it will be probably true. Goldman distinguished between two kinds of justification for beliefs: belief-dependent and belief-independent. A belief-dependent process uses prior beliefs to produce new beliefs; a belief-independent process does not, using other stimuli instead. Beliefs produced this way are justified because the processes that cause them are reliable; this might be because we have evolved to reach good conclusions when presented with [[sense-data]], meaning the conclusions we draw from our senses are usually true.<ref name=SEP>{{cite encyclopedia | url=http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/justep-foundational/#4 | title=Foundationalist Theories of Epistemic Justification | encyclopedia=Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy | date=21 February 2000 | access-date=19 August 2018 | author=Fumerton, Richard}}</ref>