Editing Freedom Evolves (section)

=== Free will  and altruism===

Dennett's stance on [[free will]] is [[compatibilism]] with an evolutionary twist &ndash; the view that, although in the strict physical sense our actions might be determined, we can still be free in all the ways that matter, because of the abilities we evolved.  Free will, seen this way, is about [[agency (philosophy)|freedom to make decisions]] without duress (and so is a version of Kantian positive practical free will, i.e., Kantian autonomy), as opposed to an impossible and unnecessary freedom from causality itself.  To clarify this distinction, he uses the term 'evitability' (the opposite of 'inevitability'), defining it as the ability of an agent to anticipate likely consequences and act to avoid undesirable ones. ''Evitability'' is entirely compatible with, and actually requires, human action being deterministic.
Dennett moves on to [[altruism]], denying that it requires acting to the benefit of others without gaining any benefit yourself.  He argues that it should be understood in terms of helping yourself by helping others, expanding the self to be more inclusive as opposed to being selfless.  To show this blend, he calls such actions 'benselfish', and finds the roots of our capacity for this in the [[evolution]]ary pressures that produced [[kin selection]].  
In his treatment of both free will and altruism, he starts by showing why we should not accept the traditional definitions of either term.