Editing German spring offensive (section)

===Strategy===
[[File:Riflemen-1918-Western-Front.jpg|thumb|upright=1.6|Comparative numbers of German and Allied front-line infantry from April to November 1918.<ref>Leonard P. Ayers, ''The war with Germany: a statistical summary'' (1919) p 104 [https://archive.org/stream/warwithgermanyst00ayreuoft#page/n1/mode/1up online]</ref>]]

The German High Command—in particular General [[Erich Ludendorff]], the Chief Quartermaster General at [[Oberste Heeresleitung]], the supreme army headquarters—has been criticised by military historians{{who|date=November 2010}} for the failure to formulate sound and clear strategy. Ludendorff privately conceded that Germany could no longer win a [[Attrition warfare|war of attrition]], yet he was not ready to give up the German gains in the west and east and was one of the main obstacles to the German government's attempts to reach a settlement with the Western Allies.<ref>Martin Kitchen, ''The German Offensive of 1918'' (2001)</ref>{{page needed|date=June 2021}}

Although Ludendorff was unsure whether the Americans would enter the war in strength, at a meeting of the Chiefs of Staff of the German armies on the Western Front on 11 November 1917, he decided to launch an offensive.<ref>Blaxland, p.25</ref> The German government and Field Marshal [[Paul von Hindenburg]], nominally the Chief of the General Staff, were not party to the planning process. Eventually it was decided to launch [[Operation Michael]] near [[Saint-Quentin, Aisne|Saint-Quentin]], at the hinge between the French and British armies, and strike north to Arras. The main reason for the choice was tactical expediency. The ground on this sector of the front would dry out much sooner after the winter and spring rains and would therefore be easier to advance across. It was also a line of least resistance as the British and French armies were weak in the sector.{{Citation needed|date=June 2024}}

The intention was not to reach the [[English Channel]] coast, but to break through the Allied lines and roll up the flank of the British army from the south, pushing it back toward the Channel ports or destroying it if the British chose to stand and fight. Further operations such as [[Operation Georgette]] and Operation Mars were designed to strike further north to seize the remaining Allied ports in Belgium and France while diverting Allied forces from ''Michael''. However, these remained only secondary and weaker operations, subordinate to ''Michael''.<ref>Middlebrook 1983, pp. 30–34.</ref>

The constant changing of operational targets once the offensive was underway gave the impression the German command had no coherent strategic goal. Any capture of an important strategic objective, such as the Channel ports, or the vital railway junction of [[Amiens]], would have occurred more by chance than by design.<ref>Brown 1998, p. 184.</ref><ref>Robson 2007, p. 93.</ref>{{incomplete short citation|date=June 2021}}