Editing Heuristic (section)

==Heuristic rigour models==
{{Epistemology sidebar}}
{{InfoMaps}}
{{Incomplete list|date=May 2024}}
{{Main|Rigour}}
{{Broader|Expectation (epistemic)|Cybernetics}}
{{see also|Heuristic (computer science)|Heuristic evaluation}}

Lakatosian heuristics is based on the key term: [[Justification (epistemology)]].<ref>{{cite journal
	| last1 = Nickles
	| first1 = Thomas
	| date = 1987
	| title = Lakatosian Heuristics and Epistemic Support
	| url = http://www.jstor.org/stable/687047
	| journal = The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
	| volume = 38
	| issue = 2
	| pages = 181–205
	| doi = 10.1093/bjps/38.2.181
	| jstor = 687047
	| access-date = 5 May 2024
    | quote = As Popperians and Lakatosians use the term, a 'justificationist' theory of knowledge is one committed to the existence of foundations of knowledge, at least probabilistic foundations.| url-access = subscription
	}}</ref>

===One-reason decisions===
{{See also|Optimal stopping}}

One-reason decisions are [[algorithm]]s that are made of three rules: search rules, ''confirmation rules'' (stopping), and decision rules<ref>{{Cite journal
| last1 = Gigerenzer
| first1 = Gerd
| last2 = Brighton
| first2 = Henry
| doi = 10.1111/j.1756-8765.2008.01006.x
| title = Homo Heuristicus: Why Biased Minds Make Better Inferences
| journal = Topics in Cognitive Science
| volume = 1
| issue = 1
| pages = 107–143
| year = 2009
| pmid = 25164802
| url = https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1756-8765.2008.01006.x
| access-date = 6 May 2024
| quote = This stopping rule, termed a ''confirmation rule'', works well in situations where (a) the decision maker knows little about the validity of the cues, and (b) the costs of cues are rather low (Karelaia, 2006).| hdl = 11858/00-001M-0000-0024-F678-0
| hdl-access = free
}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal
| last1 = Gigerenzer
| first1 = G.
| last2 = Gaissmaier
| first2 = W.
| date = 2011
| title = Heuristic Decision Making
| url = https://pure.mpg.de/rest/items/item_2099042_4/component/file_2099041/content
| journal = Annual Review of Psychology
| volume = 62
| issue = 
| pages = 451–482
| doi = 10.1146/annurev-psych-120709-145346
| pmid = 21126183
| access-date = 6 May 2024
| quote ='''One-reason decisions''': a class of heuristics that bases judgments on one good reason only, ignoring other cues (e.g., take-the-best and hiatus heuristic)| hdl = 11858/00-001M-0000-0024-F16D-5
| hdl-access = free
}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal
| last1 = Gigerenzer
| first1 = Gerd
| last2 = Brighton
| first2 = Henry
| doi = 10.1111/j.1756-8765.2008.01006.x
| title = Homo Heuristicus: Why Biased Minds Make Better Inferences
| journal = Topics in Cognitive Science
| volume = 1
| issue = 1
| pages = 107–143
| year = 2009
| pmid = 25164802
| url = https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1756-8765.2008.01006.x
| access-date = 6 May 2024
| quote = Just as there is a class of such tracking heuristics, there is a class of one-good-reason heuristics, of which take-the-best is one member. These heuristics also have three building blocks: search rules, stopping rules, and decision rules.| hdl = 11858/00-001M-0000-0024-F678-0
| hdl-access = free
}}</ref>
*{{Annotated link|Take-the-best heuristic}}<ref>{{cite journal
	| last1 = Todd
	| first1 = P
	| last2 = Dieckmann
	| first2 = A
	| date = 2004
	| title = Heuristics for Ordering Cue Search in Decision Making
	| url = https://www.researchgate.net/publication/221620559
	| journal = Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems
	| volume = 
	| issue = 
	| pages = 13–18
	| doi = 
	| access-date = 6 May 2024
    | quote = TTB consists of three building blocks. (1) Search rule: Search through cues in the order of their validity, a measure of accuracy equal to the proportion of correct decisions made by a cue out of all the times that cue discriminates between pairs of options. (2) Stopping rule: Stop search as soon as one cue is found that discriminates between the two options. (3) Decision rule: Select the option to which the discriminating cue points, that is, the option that has the cue value associated with higher criterion values.}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal
	| last1 = Gigerenzer
	| first1 = Gerd
	| date = 2008
	| title = Why Heuristics Work
	| url = http://www.jstor.org/stable/40212224
	| journal = Perspectives on Psychological Science
	| volume = 3
	| issue = 1
	| pages = 20–29
	| doi = 10.1111/j.1745-6916.2008.00058.x
	| jstor = 40212224
	| pmid = 26158666
	| access-date = 5 May 2024
    | quote =Take the best (Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996). Infer which of two alternatives has the higher value by (a) searching through cues in order of validity, (b) stopping the search as soon as a cue discriminates, (c) choosing the alternative this cue favors.| url-access = subscription
	}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal
| last1 = Gigerenzer
| first1 = Gerd
| last2 = Brighton
| first2 = Henry
| doi = 10.1111/j.1756-8765.2008.01006.x
| title = Homo Heuristicus: Why Biased Minds Make Better Inferences
| journal = Topics in Cognitive Science
| volume = 1
| issue = 1
| pages = 107–143
| year = 2009
| pmid = 25164802
| url = https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1756-8765.2008.01006.x
| access-date = 6 May 2024
| quote = Take-the-best is a member of the one-good-reason family of heuristics because of its stopping rule: Search is stopped after finding the first cue that enables an inference to be made.| hdl = 11858/00-001M-0000-0024-F678-0
| hdl-access = free
}}</ref>
*''Hiatus heuristic'': a "recency-of-last-purchase rule"<ref>{{cite journal
| last1 = Gigerenzer
| first1 = G.
| last2 = Gaissmaier
| first2 = W.
| date = 2011
| title = Heuristic Decision Making
| url = https://pure.mpg.de/rest/items/item_2099042_4/component/file_2099041/content
| journal = Annual Review of Psychology
| volume = 62
| issue = 
| pages = 451–482
| doi = 10.1146/annurev-psych-120709-145346
| pmid = 21126183
| access-date = 6 May 2024
| quote = Wubben & Wangenheim (2008) reported that experienced managers use a simple recency-of-last-purchase rule: 'Hiatus heuristic: If a customer has not purchased within a certain number of months (the hiatus), the customer is classified as inactive; otherwise, the customer is classified as active.'| hdl = 11858/00-001M-0000-0024-F16D-5
| hdl-access = free
}}</ref>
*{{Annotated link|Default effect}}<ref>{{cite journal
	| last1 = Gigerenzer
	| first1 = Gerd
	| date = 2008
	| title = Why Heuristics Work
	| url = http://www.jstor.org/stable/40212224
	| journal = Perspectives on Psychological Science
	| volume = 3
	| issue = 1
	| pages = 20–29
	| doi = 10.1111/j.1745-6916.2008.00058.x
	| jstor = 40212224
	| pmid = 26158666
	| access-date = 5 May 2024
| quote =Default heuristic (Johnson & Goldstein, 2003). If there is a default, do nothing about it.| url-access = subscription
	}}</ref>
*{{Annotated link|Priority heuristic}}<ref>{{Cite journal
| last1 = Gigerenzer
| first1 = Gerd
| last2 = Brighton
| first2 = Henry
| doi = 10.1111/j.1756-8765.2008.01006.x
| title = Homo Heuristicus: Why Biased Minds Make Better Inferences
| journal = Topics in Cognitive Science
| volume = 1
| issue = 1
| pages = 107–143
| year = 2009
| pmid = 25164802
| url = https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1756-8765.2008.01006.x
| access-date = 6 May 2024
| quote = The priority heuristic, a one-good-reason heuristic with no free parameters (Brandstätter, Gigerenzer, & Hertwig, 2008; Brandstätter et al., 2006) that has similar building blocks to take-the-best, has been shown to imply (not just have parameter sets that are consistent with) several of the major violations simultaneously, including the Allais paradox and the fourfold pattern (Katsikopoulos & Gigerenzer, 2008).| hdl = 11858/00-001M-0000-0024-F678-0
| hdl-access = free
}}</ref>
*''Take-the-first heuristic''<ref>{{cite journal
| last1 = Gigerenzer
| first1 = G.
| last2 = Gaissmaier
| first2 = W.
| date = 2011
| title = Heuristic Decision Making
| url = https://pure.mpg.de/rest/items/item_2099042_4/component/file_2099041/content
| journal = Annual Review of Psychology
| volume = 62
| issue = 
| pages = 451–482
| doi = 10.1146/annurev-psych-120709-145346
| pmid = 21126183
| access-date = 6 May 2024
| quote = Johnson & Raab (2003) proposed a variant of the fluency heuristic when alternatives are sequentially retrieved rather than simultaneously perceived: 'Take-the-first heuristic: Choose the first alternative that comes to mind.'| hdl = 11858/00-001M-0000-0024-F16D-5
| hdl-access = free
}}</ref>

===Recognition-based decisions===
A class whose function is to determine and filter out superfluous things.<ref>{{cite journal
| last1 = Gigerenzer
| first1 = G.
| last2 = Gaissmaier
| first2 = W.
| date = 2011
| title = Heuristic Decision Making
| url = https://pure.mpg.de/rest/items/item_2099042_4/component/file_2099041/content
| journal = Annual Review of Psychology
| volume = 62
| issue = 
| pages = 451–482
| doi = 10.1146/annurev-psych-120709-145346
| pmid = 21126183
| access-date = 6 May 2024
| quote ='''Recognition-based decisions''': a class of heuristics that bases judgments on recognition information only, ignoring other cues (e.g., recognition and fluency heuristic)| hdl = 11858/00-001M-0000-0024-F16D-5
| hdl-access = free
}}</ref>
*{{Annotated link|Recognition heuristic}}<ref>{{cite journal
| last1 = Gigerenzer
| first1 = G.
| last2 = Gaissmaier
| first2 = W.
| date = 2011
| title = Heuristic Decision Making
| url = https://pure.mpg.de/rest/items/item_2099042_4/component/file_2099041/content
| journal = Annual Review of Psychology
| volume = 62
| issue = 
| pages = 451–482
| doi = 10.1146/annurev-psych-120709-145346
| pmid = 21126183
| access-date = 6 May 2024
| quote =For two alternatives, the heuristic is defined as (Goldstein & Gigerenzer 2002): 'Recognition heuristic: If one of two alternatives is recognized and the other is not, then infer that the recognized alternative has the higher value with respect to the criterion.'| hdl = 11858/00-001M-0000-0024-F16D-5
| hdl-access = free
}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal
	| last1 = Gigerenzer
	| first1 = Gerd
	| date = 2008
	| title = Why Heuristics Work
	| url = http://www.jstor.org/stable/40212224
	| journal = Perspectives on Psychological Science
	| volume = 3
	| issue = 1
	| pages = 20–29
	| doi = 10.1111/j.1745-6916.2008.00058.x
	| jstor = 40212224
	| pmid = 26158666
	| access-date = 5 May 2024
    | quote = Recognition heuristic (Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 2002). If one of two alternatives is recognized, infer that it has the higher value on the criterion.| url-access = subscription
	}}</ref>
*{{Annotated link|Fluency heuristic}}<ref>{{cite journal
	| last1 = Gigerenzer
	| first1 = Gerd
	| date = 2008
	| title = Why Heuristics Work
	| url = http://www.jstor.org/stable/40212224
	| journal = Perspectives on Psychological Science
	| volume = 3
	| issue = 1
	| pages = 20–29
	| doi = 10.1111/j.1745-6916.2008.00058.x
	| jstor = 40212224
	| pmid = 26158666
	| access-date = 5 May 2024
    | quote =Fluency heuristic (Schooler & Hertwig, 2005). If one alternative is recognized faster than another, infer that it has the higher value on the criterion.| url-access = subscription
	}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal
| last1 = Gigerenzer
| first1 = G.
| last2 = Gaissmaier
| first2 = W.
| date = 2011
| title = Heuristic Decision Making
| url = https://pure.mpg.de/rest/items/item_2099042_4/component/file_2099041/content
| journal = Annual Review of Psychology
| volume = 62
| issue = 
| pages = 451–482
| doi = 10.1146/annurev-psych-120709-145346
| pmid = 21126183
| access-date = 6 May 2024
| quote = 'Fluency heuristic: If both alternatives are recognized but one is recognized faster, then infer that this alternative has the higher value with respect to the criterion.' The fluency heuristic builds on earlier work on fluency (Jacoby & Dallas 1981).| hdl = 11858/00-001M-0000-0024-F16D-5
| hdl-access = free
}}</ref>

===Tracking heuristics===
{{Broader|Predation}}
''Tracking heuristics'' is a [[Class (knowledge representation)|class]] of heuristics.<ref name=gaze1>{{Cite journal
| last1 = Gigerenzer
| first1 = Gerd
| last2 = Brighton
| first2 = Henry
| doi = 10.1111/j.1756-8765.2008.01006.x
| title = Homo Heuristicus: Why Biased Minds Make Better Inferences
| journal = Topics in Cognitive Science
| volume = 1
| issue = 1
| pages = 107–143
| year = 2009
| pmid = 25164802
| url = https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1756-8765.2008.01006.x
| access-date = 6 May 2024
| quote = The gaze heuristic introduced earlier has three building blocks.{{nbsp}}... there is a class of such tracking heuristics{{nbsp}}... | hdl = 11858/00-001M-0000-0024-F678-0
| hdl-access = free
}}</ref>
* {{Annotated link|Gaze heuristic}}<ref name=gaze1/>
* {{Annotated link|Pointing and calling}}

===Trade-off===
*{{Annotated link|Trade-off}}<ref>{{cite journal
| last1 = Gigerenzer
| first1 = G.
| last2 = Gaissmaier
| first2 = W.
| date = 2011
| title = Heuristic Decision Making
| url = https://pure.mpg.de/rest/items/item_2099042_4/component/file_2099041/content
| journal = Annual Review of Psychology
| volume = 62
| issue = 
| pages = 451–482
| doi = 10.1146/annurev-psych-120709-145346
| pmid = 21126183
| access-date = 6 May 2024
| quote = Trade-offs: a class of heuristics that weights all cues or alternatives equally and thus makes trade-offs (e.g., tallying and 1/N)| hdl = 11858/00-001M-0000-0024-F16D-5
| hdl-access = free
}}</ref>
** ''Tallying heuristic''<ref>{{cite journal
	| last1 = Gigerenzer
	| first1 = Gerd
	| date = 2008
	| title = Why Heuristics Work
	| url = http://www.jstor.org/stable/40212224
	| journal = Perspectives on Psychological Science
	| volume = 3
	| issue = 1
	| pages = 20–29
	| doi = 10.1111/j.1745-6916.2008.00058.x
	| jstor = 40212224
	| pmid = 26158666
	| access-date = 5 May 2024
    | quote = Tallying (unit-weight linear model; Dawes, 1979). To estimate a criterion, do not estimate weights but simply count the number of favoring cues.| url-access = subscription
	}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal
	| last1 = Swire-Thompson
	| first1 = Briony
	| last2 = Ecker 
	| first2 = Ullrich
	| last3 = Lewandowsky
	| first3 = Stephan
	| last4 = Berinsky
	| first4 = Adam
	| date = 2020
	| title = They Might Be a Liar But They're My Liar: Source Evaluation and the Prevalence of Misinformation
	| url = http://www.jstor.org/stable/4529525
	| journal = Political Psychology
	| volume = 41
	| issue = 
	| pages = 21–34
	| doi = 10.1111/pops.12586
	| jstor = 4529525
	| access-date = 
    | quote = This also could be in accordance with the ''tallying heuristic'' where people count the number of arguments (for example, pros and cons) and disregard the relative importance of each argument (Bonnefon, Dubois, Fargier, & Leblois, 2008; Gigerenzer, 2004).| hdl = 1983/27f75033-2ac4-4249-b1cc-ae076b96f013
	| hdl-access = free
	}}</ref>
** ''Equality heuristic''<ref>{{cite journal
	| last1 = Gigerenzer
	| first1 = Gerd
	| date = 2008
	| title = Why Heuristics Work
	| url = http://www.jstor.org/stable/40212224
	| journal = Perspectives on Psychological Science
	| volume = 3
	| issue = 1
	| pages = 20–29
	| doi = 10.1111/j.1745-6916.2008.00058.x
	| jstor = 40212224
	| pmid = 26158666
	| access-date = 5 May 2024
    | quote = 1/N; equality heuristic (DeMiguel et al., 2006). Allocate resources equally to each of N alternatives.| url-access = subscription
	}}</ref>

===Social heuristics===
{{Annotated link|Social heuristics}}<ref>{{cite journal
| last1 = Gigerenzer
| first1 = G.
| last2 = Gaissmaier
| first2 = W.
| date = 2011
| title = Heuristic Decision Making
| url = https://pure.mpg.de/rest/items/item_2099042_4/component/file_2099041/content
| journal = Annual Review of Psychology
| volume = 62
| issue = 
| pages = 451–482
| doi = 10.1146/annurev-psych-120709-145346
| pmid = 21126183
| access-date = 6 May 2024
| quote = [Social heuristics] include imitation heuristics, tit-for-tat, the social-circle heuristic, and averaging the judgments of others to exploit the 'wisdom of crowds' (Hertwig & Herzog 2009). Imitate the-successful, for instance, speeds up learning of cue orders and can find orders that excel take-the-best’s validity order (Garcia-Retamero et al. 2009).| hdl = 11858/00-001M-0000-0024-F16D-5
| hdl-access = free
}}</ref>
* {{Annotated link|Imitation}}<ref>{{cite journal
	| last1 = Gigerenzer
	| first1 = Gerd
	| date = 2008
	| title = Why Heuristics Work
	| url = http://www.jstor.org/stable/40212224
	| journal = Perspectives on Psychological Science
	| volume = 3
	| issue = 1
	| pages = 20–29
	| doi = 10.1111/j.1745-6916.2008.00058.x
	| jstor = 40212224
	| pmid = 26158666
	| access-date = 5 May 2024
| quote =Imitate the majority (Boyd & Richerson, 2005). Look at a majority of people in your peer group, and imitate their behavior. Imitate the successful (Boyd &Richerson, 2005). Look for the most successful person and imitate his or her behavior.| url-access = subscription
	}}</ref>
*{{Annotated link|Tit for tat}}<ref>{{cite journal
	| last1 = Gigerenzer
	| first1 = Gerd
	| date = 2008
	| title = Why Heuristics Work
	| url = http://www.jstor.org/stable/40212224
	| journal = Perspectives on Psychological Science
	| volume = 3
	| issue = 1
	| pages = 20–29
	| doi = 10.1111/j.1745-6916.2008.00058.x
	| jstor = 40212224
	| pmid = 26158666
	| access-date = 5 May 2024
    | quote =Tit-for-tat (Axelrod, 1984). Cooperate first, keep a memory of Size 1, and then imitate your partner's last behavior.| url-access = subscription
	}}</ref>
*{{Annotated link|Wisdom of the crowd}}<ref>{{cite journal
	| last1 = Mondak
	| first1 = Jeffery
	| date = 1993
	| title = Public Opinion and Heuristic Processing of Source Cues
	| url = http://www.jstor.org/stable/586448
	| journal = Political Behavior
	| volume = 15
	| issue = 2
	| pages = 167–92
	| doi = 10.1007/BF00993852
	| jstor = 586448
	| access-date = 7 May 2024
    | quote = [I]f a person believes that audience consensus usually offers accurate guidance as to the merits of persuasive messages, then positive audience reaction to a specific message would prompt the individual to accept the speaker's claims. The cognitive heuristic is the holding that audience consensus in this case is representative of situations in which audience consensus provides a reliable guide (Axsom, Yates, and Chaiken, 1987).| url-access = subscription
	}}</ref>

===Epistemic heuristics===
{{Broader|Tacit assumption}}

* {{Annotated link|Propositional attitude}}<ref>{{cite journal
	| last1 = Charteris
	| first1 = Jennifer
	| date = 2014
	| title = Epistemological shudders as productive aporia: A heuristic for transformative teacher learning
	| journal = International Journal of Qualitative Methods
	| volume = 13
	| issue = 1
	| pages = 104–121
	| doi = 10.1177/160940691401300102
	| quote = Lozinski and Collinson (1999, as cited in Giugni, 2006) were the first to employ the concept of an 'epistemological shudder' to describe how one's preferred representations of one's known world can prove incapable of immediately making sense of the 'marvellous' (p. 101).| doi-access = free
	}}</ref>
* {{Annotated link|Essence}}<ref>{{cite journal
	| last1 = Krist
	| first1 = Christina
	| last2 = Schwarz
	| first2 = Christina
	| last3 = Reiser
	| first3 = Brian
	| date = 2018
	| title = Identifying Essential Epistemic Heuristics for Guiding Mechanistic Reasoning in Science Learning
	| url = https://doi.org/10.1080/10508406.2018.1510404
	| journal = Journal of the Learning Sciences
	| volume = 28
	| issue = 2
	| pages = 160–205 
	| doi = 10.1080/10508406.2018.1510404
	| access-date = 11 May 2024
    | quote = The first epistemic heuristic essential to mechanistic reasoning is that students think across scalar levels. Most definitions of mechanistic reasoning (e.g., Grotzer & Perkins, 2000; Machamer et al., 2000) use the term ''underlying'' to describe the kinds of things that must be identified and characterized in order to explain a target phenomenon.| url-access = subscription
	}}</ref>
* {{Annotated link|Analysis}}<ref>{{cite journal
	| last1 = Krist
	| first1 = Christina
	| last2 = Schwarz
	| first2 = Christina
	| last3 = Reiser
	| first3 = Brian
	| date = 2018
	| title = Identifying Essential Epistemic Heuristics for Guiding Mechanistic Reasoning in Science Learning
	| url = https://doi.org/10.1080/10508406.2018.1510404
	| journal = Journal of the Learning Sciences
	| volume = 28
	| issue = 2
	| pages = 160–205 
	| doi = 10.1080/10508406.2018.1510404
	| access-date = 11 May 2024
    | quote = second epistemic heuristic: identifying and characterizing relevant elements at a scalar level below that of the target phenomenon.{{nbsp}}... we use the term ''factor'' to refer generally to the relevant elements at the scalar level below that of the aggregate phenomenon. Similarly, we refer generally to the intellectual work involved in characterizing the relevant properties, rules, and behaviors of factors as ''unpacking'' those factors.| url-access = subscription
	}}</ref>
* {{Annotated link|Falsifiability}}<ref>{{cite journal
	| last1 = Krist
	| first1 = Christina
	| last2 = Schwarz
	| first2 = Christina
	| last3 = Reiser
	| first3 = Brian
	| date = 2018
	| title = Identifying Essential Epistemic Heuristics for Guiding Mechanistic Reasoning in Science Learning
	| url = https://doi.org/10.1080/10508406.2018.1510404
	| journal = Journal of the Learning Sciences
	| volume = 28
	| issue = 2
	| pages = 160–205 
	| doi = 10.1080/10508406.2018.1510404
	| access-date = 11 May 2024
    | quote =Finally, the third heuristic essential to mechanistic reasoning involves checking how well the underlying mechanisms fit the observed phenomenon.| url-access = subscription
	}}</ref>
* {{Annotated link|Hierarchy of evidence}}

===Behavioral economics===
{{Main|Behavioral economics}}
* {{Annotated link|Affect heuristic}}<ref>{{cite journal
	| last1 = Nouri
	| first1 = Pouria
	| last2 = Imanipour
	| first2 = Narges
	| last3 = Talebi
	| first3 = Kambiz
	| last4 = Zali
	| first4 = Mohammadreza
	| date = 2018
	| title = Most common heuristics and biases in nascent entrepreneurs' marketing behavior
	| url = https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/08276331.2018.1427406
	| journal = Journal of Small Business & Entrepreneurship
	| volume = 30
	| issue = 6
	| pages = 451–472
	| doi = 10.1080/08276331.2018.1427406
	| access-date = 11 May 2024
    | quote = The affect heuristic is one of the most common heuristics in individuals, and has been a popular topic in the study of behavioral finance (Finucane et al. 2000).| url-access = subscription
	}}</ref>
* {{Annotated link|Feedback}}<ref name=Sergiu>{{cite journal
	| last1 = Hart
	| first1 = Sergiu
	| date = 2005
	| title = Adaptive Heuristics
	| url = http://www.jstor.org/stable/3598879
	| journal = Econometrica
	| volume = 73
	| issue = 5
	| pages = 1401–30
	| doi = 10.1111/j.1468-0262.2005.00625.x
	| jstor = 3598879
	| access-date = 6 May 2024
    | quote = Adaptive heuristics commonly appear in behavioral models, such as reinforcement, feedback, and stimulus-response.| url-access = subscription
	}}</ref>
* {{Annotated link|Reinforcement}}<ref name=Sergiu/>
* {{Annotated link|Stimulus–response model}}<ref name=Sergiu/>

===Others===
* {{Annotated link|Satisficing}}<ref>{{cite journal
| last1 = Chow
| first1 = Sheldon
| date = 2015
| title = Many Meanings of 'Heuristic'
| url = http://www.jstor.org/stable/24562967
| journal = The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
| volume = 66
| issue = 4
| pages = 977–1016
| doi = 10.1093/bjps/axu028
| jstor = 24562967
| access-date = 5 May 2024
|quote=However, a different meaning of 'heuristic' was invoked in psychology with the Gestalt theorists, and later with Simon's notion of 'satisficing'.| url-access = subscription
}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal
	| last1 = Gigerenzer
	| first1 = Gerd
	| date = 2008
	| title = Why Heuristics Work
	| url = http://www.jstor.org/stable/40212224
	| journal = Perspectives on Psychological Science
	| volume = 3
	| issue = 1
	| pages = 20–29
	| doi = 10.1111/j.1745-6916.2008.00058.x
	| jstor = 40212224
	| pmid = 26158666
	| access-date = 5 May 2024
    | quote =Satisficing (Simon, 1955; Todd & Miller, 1999). Search through alternatives, and choose the first one that exceeds your aspiration level.| url-access = subscription
	}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal
| last1 = Gigerenzer
| first1 = G.
| last2 = Gaissmaier
| first2 = W.
| date = 2011
| title = Heuristic Decision Making
| url = https://pure.mpg.de/rest/items/item_2099042_4/component/file_2099041/content
| journal = Annual Review of Psychology
| volume = 62
| issue = 
| pages = 451–482
| doi = 10.1146/annurev-psych-120709-145346
| pmid = 21126183
| access-date = 6 May 2024
| quote = Simon's (1955) satisficing heuristic searches through options in any order, stops as soon the first option exceeds an aspiration level, and chooses this option.| hdl = 11858/00-001M-0000-0024-F16D-5
| hdl-access = free
}}</ref>
* {{Annotated link|Representativeness heuristic}}<ref>{{cite journal
| last1 = Chow
| first1 = Sheldon
| date = 2015
| title = Many Meanings of 'Heuristic'
| url = http://www.jstor.org/stable/24562967
| journal = The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
| volume = 66
| issue = 4
| pages = 977–1016
| doi = 10.1093/bjps/axu028
| jstor = 24562967
| access-date = 5 May 2024
|quote=[T]he representativeness heuristic[:]Probabilities are evaluated by the degree to which one thing or event is representative of (resembles) another; the higher the representativeness (resemblance) the higher the probability estimation[.]| url-access = subscription
}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal
	| last1 = Lu
	| first1 = Yun
	| last2 = Vasko
	| first2 = Francis
	| last3 = Drummond
	| first3 = Trevor
	| last4 = Vasko
	| first4 = Lisa
	| date = 2014
	| title = Probability & Perception: The Representativeness Heuristic in Action
	| url = https://doi.org/10.5951/mathteacher.108.2.0126
	| journal = The Mathematics Teacher
	| volume = 108
	| issue = 2
	| pages = 126–31
	| doi = 10.5951/mathteacher.108.2.0126
	| access-date = 5 May 2024
    | quote = The belief that a sequence such as 11111111111111111111 is less probable than a sequence such as 66234441536125563152 is often referred to as the ''representativeness heuristic'' (Kahneman and Tversky 1972; Shaughnessy 1977, 1992).| url-access = subscription
	}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Kahneman |first1=Daniel |last2=Tversky |first2=Amos |date=July 1973 |title=On the psychology of prediction. |url=http://doi.apa.org/getdoi.cfm?doi=10.1037/h0034747 |journal=Psychological Review |language=en |volume=80 |issue=4 |pages=237–251 |doi=10.1037/h0034747 |issn=1939-1471 |access-date=2023-05-09 |archive-date=2023-10-28 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20231028141521/https://psycnet.apa.org/doiLanding?doi=10.1037/h0034747 |url-status=live |url-access=subscription }}</ref>
* {{Annotated link|Availability heuristic}}<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Tversky |first1=Amos |last2=Kahneman |first2=Daniel |date=1973-09-01 |title=Availability: A heuristic for judging frequency and probability |url=https://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0010-0285%2873%2990033-9 |journal=Cognitive Psychology |language=en |volume=5 |issue=2 |pages=207–232 |doi=10.1016/0010-0285(73)90033-9 |issn=0010-0285 |access-date=2023-08-24 |archive-date=2023-10-28 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20231028141521/https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/0010028573900339?via%3Dihub |url-status=live |url-access=subscription }}</ref><ref>{{cite journal
| last1 = Chow
| first1 = Sheldon
| date = 2015
| title = Many Meanings of 'Heuristic'
| url = http://www.jstor.org/stable/24562967
| journal = The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
| volume = 66
| issue = 4
| pages = 977–1016
| doi = 10.1093/bjps/axu028
| jstor = 24562967
| access-date = 5 May 2024
|quote=[T]he availability heuristic[:]The frequency of a class or the probability of an event is assessed according to the ease with which instances or associations can be brought to mind (Tversky and Kahneman [1974])| url-access = subscription
}}</ref>
* {{Annotated link|Awareness}}<ref>{{cite journal
| last1 = Gigerenzer
| first1 = G.
| last2 = Gaissmaier
| first2 = W.
| date = 2011
| title = Heuristic Decision Making
| url= https://pure.mpg.de/rest/items/item_2099042_4/component/file_2099041/content
| journal = Annual Review of Psychology
| volume = 62
| issue = 
| pages = 451–482
| doi = 10.1146/annurev-psych-120709-145346
| pmid = 21126183
| access-date = 6 May 2024
| quote = Max Wertheimer, who was a close friend of Einstein, and his fellow Gestalt psychologists spoke of heuristic methods such as ‘looking around’ to guide search for information.| hdl = 11858/00-001M-0000-0024-F16D-5
| hdl-access = free
}}</ref>
* {{Annotated link|Base and superstructure}}<ref name=Loic>{{cite journal
	| last1 = Wacquant
	| first1 = Loic
	| date = 1985
	| title = Heuristic Models in Marxian Theory
	| url = https://doi.org/10.2307/2578970
	| journal = Social Forces
	| volume = 64
	| issue = 1
	| pages = 17–45
	| doi = 10.2307/2578970
	| jstor = 2578970
	| access-date = 6 May 2024
    | quote = In building social theory, Marx used not one (as generally regarded) but three heuristic models: base-superstructure, organic totality, and dialectical development.| url-access = subscription
	}}</ref>
* {{Annotated link|Social organism}}<ref name=Loic/>
* {{Annotated link|Dialectic}}<ref name=Loic/>
* {{Annotated link|Continuum limit}}<ref>{{cite journal
	| last1 = Hey
	| first1 = Spencer
	| date = 2016
	| title = Heuristics and Meta-Heuristics in Scientific Judgement
	| url = http://www.jstor.org/stable/43946078
	| journal = The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
	| volume = 67
	| issue = 2
	| pages = 471–95
	| doi = 10.1093/bjps/axu045
	| jstor = 43946078
	| access-date = 5 May 2024
    | quote = The continuum limit heuristic is one member of a more general class of heuristics for variable reduction (Wilson [2007], pp. 184–92).| url-access = subscription
	}}</ref>
* {{Annotated link|Johari window}}
* {{Annotated link|Social rationality}}
* {{Annotated link|Desert (philosophy)}}<ref>{{cite journal
	| last1 = Petersen
	| first1 = Michael
	| date = 2015
	| title = Evolutionary Political Psychology: On the Origin and Structure of Heuristics and Biases in Politics
	| url = http://www.jstor.org/stable/43783844
	| journal = Political Psychology
	| volume = 36
	| issue = 1
	| pages = 45–78
	| doi = 10.1111/pops.12237
	| jstor = 43783844
	| access-date = 5 May 2024
    | quote = One of the political heuristics that has been most studied from an evolutionary perspective is the deservingness heuristic.{{nbsp}}... the deservingness heuristic is the psychological tendency of people to base their opinions about welfare programs on the efforts of the recipients. Specifically, the heuristic motivates people to support welfare benefits to recipients who are represented as victims of bad luck and reject benefits to recipients who are represented as lazy.}}</ref>
* {{annotated link|Less-is-better effect}}
* [[Simple random sample|Minimalist heuristic]]<ref>{{cite journal
	| last1 = Todd
	| first1 = P
	| last2 = Dieckmann
	| first2 = A
	| date = 2004
	| title = Heuristics for Ordering Cue Search in Decision Making
	| url = https://www.researchgate.net/publication/221620559
	| journal = Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems
	| volume = 
	| issue = 
	| pages = 13–18
	| doi = 
	| access-date = 6 May 2024
    | quote = The even simpler Minimalist heuristic, which searches through available cues in a random order[.]}}</ref>
* {{Annotated link|Unification of theories in physics}}<ref>{{cite journal
	| last1 = Kao
	| first1 = Molly
	| date = 2019
	| title = Unification beyond Justification: A Strategy for Theory Development
	| url = http://www.jstor.org/stable/45215151
	| journal = Synthese
	| volume = 196
	| issue = 8
	| pages = 3263–78
	| doi = 10.1007/s11229-017-1515-8
	| jstor = 45215151
	| access-date = 
| quote = The focus on unification as a heuristic strategy parallels certain elements of a related type of reasoning, namely that found in robustness analysis.}}</ref>
* {{Annotated link|Backward induction}}

===Meta-heuristic===
{{Main|Metaheuristic}}
{{Broader|List of metaphor-based metaheuristics}}

* ''Optimality''<ref name=opt01>{{cite journal
| last1 = Schoemaker
| first1 = Paul
| date = 1991
| title = The quest for optimality: A positive heuristic of science?
| url = https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/behavioral-and-brain-sciences/article/abs/the-quest-for-optimality-a-positive-heuristic-of-science/0A56CEFA30BC66B72B121C80487A5F3F
| journal = Behavioral and Brain Sciences
| volume = 14
| issue = 2
| pages = 205–245
| doi = 10.1017/S0140525X00066140
| access-date = 27 July 2024
|quote=As with any heuristic (Tversky & Kahneman 1974), however, the optimality approach is prone to systematic biases{{nbsp}}[...] {{ubl|1. ''Posing a why question''{{nbsp}}... |2. ''Bounding the domain of inquiry''{{nbsp}}... |3. ''Selection of salient features''{{nbsp}}... |4. ''Teleological description of the system''{{nbsp}}... |5. ''Search for the optimal solution''{{nbsp}}... |6. ''Empirical comparisons''{{nbsp}}... |7. ''Further refinement of the model''{{nbsp}}... |8. ''Generation of new hypotheses''{{nbsp}}[...] Survival of the fittest, which is perhaps the grandest of all optimality principles, was formulated as a qualitative, conceptual cornerstone in Darwin's (1859) theory of evolution. Entropy and least action principles are other broad optimality laws{{nbsp}}[...] Equilibrium notions and homeostatic behavior can also be interpreted as general optimality principles, covering wide domains of application.}} | url-access = subscription
}}</ref>
** {{Annotated link|Survival of the fittest}}<ref name=opt01/>
** {{Annotated link|Mechanical equilibrium}}<ref name=opt01/>
** {{Annotated link|Chemical equilibrium}}<ref name=opt01/>
** {{Annotated link|Homeostasis}}<ref name=opt01/>
** {{Annotated link|Entropy}}<ref name=opt01/>