Editing Hull note (section)

==Final attempts at peace==
On November 5, 1941, Emperor [[Hirohito]] approved, in Imperial Conference, the plan for the attack on Pearl Harbor.<ref>Peter Wetzler, ''Hirohito and War'', 1998, p.39</ref> At the same time, his government made a last effort to arrive at a diplomatic solution of their differences with the United States. Ambassador [[Kichisaburō Nomura]] presented two proposals to the American government.

The first, Proposal A, was presented by him on November 6, 1941. It proposed making a final settlement of the Sino-Japanese War with a partial withdrawal of Japanese troops. United States military intelligence had deciphered some of Japan's diplomatic [[Code (cryptography)|codes]] so they knew that there was a second proposal in case it failed. The United States government stalled and then rejected it on November 14, 1941.

On November 20, 1941, Nomura presented Proposal B, which offered to withdraw Japanese forces from southern Indochina if the United States agreed to end aid to the Nationalist Chinese, freeze military deployments in Southeast Asia (except for Japan's reinforcement of northern Indochina), provide Japan with "a required quantity of oil", and assist Japan in acquiring materials from the Dutch East Indies.<ref>[http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/timeline/411120bpw.html "Draft Proposal Handed by the Japanese Ambassador (Nomura) to the Secretary of State"], November 20, 1941</ref> The United States was about to make a counteroffer to this plan, which included a monthly supply of fuel for civilian use. However, President [[Franklin D. Roosevelt]] received a leak of Japan's war plan and news that Japanese [[troopship]]s were on their way to [[Indochina]]. He then decided that the Japanese were not being sincere in their negotiations and instructed Secretary Hull to drop the counterproposal.<ref>Henry Stimson diary, November 26, 1941</ref>{{better source needed|reason=A private diary is not [[WP:V|verifiable]]. Cite a published version or a different source|date=November 2023}}

By November 26, top American officials at the White House, State, Navy and War departments believed that Japan was moving invasion forces toward Thailand. They also believed that the Japanese foreign ministry had put an absolute deadline on negotiations of November 29 because "after that things are automatically going to happen". The Americans were convinced that war would start in a matter of days, probably with a surprise Japanese attack.

The previous plan, to present Japan with a temporary ''[[modus vivendi]]'', was strongly opposed by China and Britain and dropped.<ref>Robert Dallek (1979). ''Franklin D. Roosevelt and American foreign policy, 1932–1945''. Oxford University Press. pp. 307–08.</ref>