Editing Infiltration tactics (section)

===Germany===
[[File:Bundesarchiv Bild 146-1974-132-26A, Stoßtrupp.jpg|thumb|left|German [[Stormtroopers (Imperial Germany)|''Stoßtruppen'']] (stormtroopers) rising from trenches to attack, equipped with satchel-bags of grenades]]
As far back as the 18th century, [[Prussian Army|Prussian military]] doctrine stressed maneuver and force concentration to achieve a decisive battle (''[[Vernichtungsgedanke]]'').  The German military searched for ways to apply this in the face of [[trench warfare]].  Captain [[Willy Rohr]] fought in the long [[Battle of Hartmannswillerkopf]] (1914–1915), starting with two ''Pionier'' ([[combat engineer]]) companies. Such engineers were often employed in assaulting fortifications, using non-standard weapons and tactics compared to the regular infantry.  Rohr's initial efforts to use these as special advanced strike teams, to break French trench lines for following troops to exploit, achieved only limited success, with heavy losses.  Rohr, working with his superiors, saw equipment improved, including the new ''[[Stahlhelm]]e'' (steel helmets), ample supplies of [[hand grenade]]s, [[flamethrower]]s, light [[mortar (weapon)|mortars]] and [[light machine gun]]s.  Rohr's analysis was that much more training was needed to incorporate the new weapons and to coordinate separate attacks as needed to achieve the overall operational goals.  His analysis got the attention of the ''[[Oberste Heeresleitung]]'' (''OHL'', German army high command).  In December 1915, Rohr was given the task of training the army in "modern close combat", and soon promoted to major.<ref>Graf Eberhard von Schwerin: ''Königlich preußisches Sturm-Bataillon Nr 5 (Rohr)''; Sporn, Zeulenroda (Thuringia) 1939, 166 pages</ref>  During the next two years, special ''Stoßtruppen'' (stormtrooper) detachments were created in divisions throughout the army; select men were sent to Rohr for training, who became trainers when they returned to their units. These tactics were expanded and refined by many in the German military command, extending the Prussian military doctrine down to the smallest units – specially trained troops maneuvered and organised to strike selected positions, wherever opportunities were found.<ref>Hermann Cron: ''Geschichte des Deutschen Heeres im Weltkriege 1914–1918''. Berlin 1937, p. 23.</ref>

[[File:General von hutier.jpg |thumb |upright|left|General [[Oskar von Hutier]], whose name is often associated with German infiltration tactics]]
German infiltration tactics are sometimes called '''''Hutier tactics''''', after German General [[Oskar von Hutier]], even though his role in developing the tactics was limited.  Hutier, along with his artillery commander Colonel [[Georg Bruchmüller]], improved the use of artillery in ways that suited infiltration tactics.  Conventional [[Human wave attack|mass-wave]] tactics were typically preceded by days of constant [[bombardment]] of all defender positions, attempting to gain advantage by attrition.  Hutier favoured brief but intense [[#Hurricane bombardment|hurricane bombardments]] that allow the opponent little time to react and reinforce their line.  The bombardment targeted the opponents' rear areas to destroy or disrupt roads, artillery, and command centres.  This was done to [[suppressive fire|suppress]] and confuse the defenders and reduce their capability to [[counterattack]] from their rearward [[defence line]]s.  For maximum effect, the exact points of attack remained concealed until the last possible moment, and the infantry attacked immediately following the short bombardment.<ref name="Edmonds 1935" />{{rp|158–160}}

The German stormtrooper methods involve men rushing forward in small but mutually supporting groups, using whatever cover is available, and then laying down covering fire for the other groups as they moved.  The tactics aim to avoid attacking any strongpoints directly, by first breaching the weakest points of the defender's line, and using those to gain positional advantages on other points.  Additionally, they acknowledge the futility of managing a grand detailed plan of operations from afar, opting instead for junior officers on the spot to exercise initiative, expanding the earlier Prussian doctrine of ''[[Auftragstaktik]]'' (mission-based tactics).<ref>Hellmuth Gruss: ''Die deutschen Sturmbataillone im Weltkrieg. Aufbau und Verwendung''; Berlin, 1939</ref>

Due to the extensive training needed, stormtroopers remained small elite forces.  Regular infantry with heavy weapons would follow up, using more standard tactics, reducing isolated and weakened opposing strongpoints with flank attacks, as the stormtroopers continued the advance beyond them.  Reserve troops following these had to consolidate gains against counterattacks.<ref name="Edmonds 1935" />{{rp|157}}

[[File:Operation Michael 1918.jpg|thumb|Initial success of [[Operation Michael]] within the [[German spring offensive]], 21&nbsp;March – 5&nbsp;April 1918]]
The Germans employed and improved infiltration tactics with increasing success, at first defensively in counterattacks as part of Germany's [[defence in depth]] and then offensively, leading up to the [[Battle of Caporetto]] against the Italians in 1917 and finally the massive [[German spring offensive]] in 1918 against the British and French.<ref name="Edmonds 1935" />{{rp|489}}  Initial German successes were stunning; of these, Hutier's [[18th Army (German Empire)|18th Army]] gained more than {{cvt|50|km|mi|-1}} in less than a week – the farthest advance in the [[Western Front (World War I)|Western Front]] since the [[Race to the Sea]] had ended the war of movement in 1914.  This advance would hereafter associate Hutier's name with infiltration tactics in Western Europe.  The German armies began to stall after outrunning their supply, artillery and reinforcements, which could not catch up over the shell-torn ground left ruined by Allied attacks in the [[Battle of the Somme]] in 1916; the offensives failed to achieve a war-winning [[breakthrough (military)|breakthrough]] dividing the French and British armies.<ref name="Edmonds 1935">{{cite book |last1=Edmonds |first1=J. E. |last2=Davies |first2=C. B. |last3=Maxwell-Hyslop |first3=R. G. B. |series=History of the Great War Based on Official Documents, by Direction of the Historical Section of the Committee of Imperial Defence |title=Military Operations France and Belgium, 1918: The German March Offensive and its Preliminaries |year=1995 |orig-year=1935 |publisher=HMSO |location=London |isbn=978-0-89839-219-7 |edition=repr. Imperial War Museum & Battery Press}}</ref>{{rp|137}}  The exhausted German forces lost the initiative and were soon pushed back in the Allied [[Hundred Days Offensive]], ending in the German surrender.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Langley |first1=Andrew |title=The hundred days offensive : the Allies' push to win World War I |date=2009 |publisher=Compass Point Books |location=Minneapolis, Minnesota |isbn=978-0756538583 |page=[https://archive.org/details/hundreddaysoffen0000lang/page/33 33] |url=https://archive.org/details/hundreddaysoffen0000lang/page/33 }}</ref>

Though far more successful tactically than traditional attacks, infiltration tactics did not address supporting any resulting advances [[operational level of war|operationally]], so they tended to bog-down over time and allow the defender time to regroup.  German artillery, critical during the initial assault, lagged far behind afterwards.  The elite stormtroopers took notable casualties on the initial attacks, which could not be readily replaced.  German forces lacked mobile forces such as cavalry to exploit and secure deep advances.  Most importantly, German logistical capabilities, designed for a static front, failed to sustain troops advancing far into devastated enemy territory.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Gray |first1=Randal |title=Kaiserschlacht, 1918: The Final German Offensive |date=26 September 1991 |publisher=Osprey |location=London |isbn=978-1855321571 |pages=212–214}}</ref><ref>{{cite book |last1=Zabecki |first1=David T. |title=The German 1918 Offensives: A Case Study of the Operational Level of War |date=June 26, 2009 |publisher=Taylor & Francis |location=London |isbn=978-0415558792 |page=56}}</ref>

The German military did not use the term ''infiltration tactics'' as a distinct new manner of warfare but more as a continuous improvement to their wide array of military tactics. When the "new" German tactics made headlines in [[Allies of World War I|Allied]] nations in 1918, the French published articles on the "Hutier tactics" as they saw it; this focused more on the operational surprise of the start of the attack and the effective hurricane bombardment, rather than the low-level tactics. In post-war years, although information on "Hutier tactics" was widely distributed in France, the US and Britain, most generals were skeptical about these new tactics, given the German defeat.<ref>{{cite book|last1=Samuels|first1=Martin |title=Doctrine and Dogma German and British Infantry Tactics in the First World War|year=1992|publisher=Greenwood|isbn=978-0-313-27959-1 |page=149}}</ref> In Germany, infiltration tactics were integrated into the ''[[Reichswehr]]'' and the ''[[Wehrmacht]]''. [[Felix Steiner]], former officer of the ''Reichswehr'', introduced the principle of stormtroopers into the formation of the ''[[Waffen-SS]]'', in order to shape it into a new type of army using this tactic. When combined with [[armoured fighting vehicle]]s and [[Close air support#Luftwaffe|aircraft]] to extend the tactics' operational capabilities, this contributed to what would be called ''[[Blitzkrieg]]'' in the [[Second World War]].<ref>{{cite book|last1=Corum|first1=James S.|title=The Roots of Blitzkrieg: Hans von Seeckt and German Military Reform|date=1992|publisher=University Press of Kansas|isbn=978-0-7006-0541-5|location=Lawrence, Kansas|page=30}}</ref><ref>{{cite book|last1=Citino|first1=Robert M.|title=The Path to Blitzkrieg: Doctrine and Training in the German Army, 1920-39|date=26 December 2007|publisher=[[Stackpole Books]]|isbn=978-0-8117-3457-8|page=16}}</ref>