Editing Intentionality (section)

==The problem of intentional inexistence==
A central issue for theories of intentionality has been ''the problem of intentional inexistence'': to determine the ontological status of the entities which are the objects of intentional states. This is particularly relevant for cases involving objects that have no existence outside the mind, as in the case of mere fantasies or hallucinations.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Brentano |first1=Franz |title=Psychology From an Empirical Standpoint |date=1874 |publisher=Routledge |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/BREPFA |access-date=2020-11-10 |archive-date=2020-11-20 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201120033436/https://philpapers.org/rec/BREPFA |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{cite book |last1=Crane |first1=Tim |title=The Objects of Thought |publisher=Oxford: Oxford University Press |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/CRATOO-2 |chapter=1. The Problem of Non-Existence |year=2013 |access-date=2020-11-11 |archive-date=2020-10-22 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201022235813/https://philpapers.org/rec/CRATOO-2 |url-status=live }}</ref>

For example, assume that Mary is thinking about Superman. On the one hand, it seems that this thought is intentional: Mary is ''thinking about something''. On the other hand, Superman ''does not exist''. This suggests that Mary either is ''not thinking about something'' or is ''thinking about something that does not exist'' (that Superman fiction exists is beside the point). Various theories have been proposed in order to reconcile these conflicting intuitions. These theories can roughly be divided into ''eliminativism'', ''relationalism'', and ''adverbialism''. Eliminativists deny that this kind of problematic mental state is possible. Relationalists try to solve the problem by interpreting intentional states as [[Relations (philosophy)|relations]] while Adverbialists interpret them as [[Property (philosophy)|properties]].<ref name="Kriegel">{{cite journal |last1=Kriegel |first1=Uriah |title=Intentional Inexistence and Phenomenal Intentionality |journal=Philosophical Perspectives |date=2007 |volume=21 |issue=1 |pages=307–340 |doi=10.1111/j.1520-8583.2007.00129.x |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/KRIIIA |access-date=2020-11-11 |archive-date=2020-11-16 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201116051104/https://philpapers.org/rec/KRIIIA |url-status=live }}</ref><ref name="Bourget">{{cite book |last1=Bourget |first1=David |title=Sensations, Thoughts, Language: Essays in honor of Brian Loar |date=2019 |publisher=Routledge |pages=137–166 |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/BOURVA |chapter=Relational Vs Adverbial Conceptions of Phenomenal Intentionality |access-date=2020-11-11 |archive-date=2021-08-30 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210830120040/https://philpapers.org/rec/BOURVA |url-status=live }}</ref>

===Eliminativism===
''Eliminativists'' deny that the example above is possible. It might seem to us and to Mary that she is thinking about something but she is not really thinking at all. Such a position could be motivated by a form of [[semantic externalism]], the view that the meaning of a term, or in this example the content of a thought, is determined by factors external to the subject.<ref name="Kriegel" /> If meaning depends on successful [[reference]] then failing to refer would result in a lack of meaning. The difficulty for such a position is to explain why it seems to Mary that she is thinking about something and how seeming to think is different from actual thinking.<ref name="Kriegel" />

===Relationalism===
''Relationalists'' hold that having an intentional state involves standing in a relation to the intentional object. This is the most natural position for non-problematic cases. So if Mary perceives a tree, we might say that a perceptual relation holds between Mary, the subject of this relation, and the tree, the object of this relation. Relations are usually assumed to be existence-entailing: the instance of a relation entails the existence of its relata.<ref name="Bourget"/> This principle rules out that we can bear relations to non-existing entities. One way to solve the problem is to deny this principle and argue for a kind of ''intentionality exceptionalism'': that intentionality is different from all other relations in the sense that this principle does not apply to it.<ref name="Kriegel"/><ref>{{cite book |last1=Priest |first1=Graham |title=Towards Non-Being: The Logic and Metaphysics of Intentionality |date=2016 |publisher=Oxford University Press |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/PRITNT |chapter=3. Objects of Thought |access-date=2020-11-11 |archive-date=2021-08-28 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210828101919/https://philpapers.org/rec/PRITNT |url-status=live }}</ref>

A more common relationalist solution is to look for existing objects that can play the role that the non-existing object was supposed to play. Such objects are sometimes called "proxies",<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Emery |first1=Nina |title=Actualism, Presentism and the Grounding Objection |journal=Erkenntnis |date=2020 |volume=85 |issue=1 |pages=23–43 |doi=10.1007/s10670-018-0016-6 |s2cid=125607032 |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/EMEAPA |access-date=2020-11-11 |archive-date=2021-08-30 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210830120035/https://philpapers.org/rec/EMEAPA |url-status=live |url-access=subscription }}</ref> "traces",<ref>{{cite encyclopedia |last1=Menzel |first1=Christopher |title=Actualism |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/actualism/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |date=2018}}</ref> or "ersatz objects".<ref>{{cite web |last1=Parent |first1=Ted |title=Modal Metaphysics |url=https://iep.utm.edu/mod-meta/ |website=Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy |access-date=12 November 2020 |archive-date=11 November 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201111212729/https://iep.utm.edu/mod-meta/ |url-status=live }}</ref> It has been suggested that [[abstract objects]] or [[Platonic forms]] can play this role. Abstract objects have actual existence but they exist outside space and time. So when Mary thinks about Superman, she is standing in a thinking relation to the abstract object or the Platonic form that corresponds to Superman. A similar solution replaces abstract objects with concrete mental objects. In this case, there exists a mental object corresponding to Superman in Mary's mind. As Mary starts to think about Superman, she enters into a relationship with this mental object. One problem for both of these theories is that they seem to mischaracterize the experience of thinking. As Mary is thinking about Superman, she is neither thinking about a Platonic form outside space-time nor about a mental object. Instead, she ''is'' thinking about a concrete physical being.<ref name="Kriegel" /><ref name="Bourget" /> A related solution sees possible objects as intentional objects. This involves a commitment to [[modal realism]], for example in the form of the [[David Lewis (philosopher)|Lewisian]] model or as envisioned by [[Extended modal realism|Takashi Yagisawa]].<ref>{{cite book |last1=Yagisawa |first1=Takashi |title=Worlds and Individuals, Possible and Otherwise |date=2009 |publisher=Oxford University Press |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/YAGWAI |access-date=2020-11-11 |archive-date=2021-08-24 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210824042128/https://philpapers.org/rec/YAGWAI |url-status=live }}</ref><ref name="Thomas">{{cite journal |last1=Thomas |first1=Andrew D. |title=Extended Modal Realism — a New Solution to the Problem of Intentional Inexistence |journal=Philosophia |date=2020 |volume=48 |issue=3 |pages=1197–1208 |doi=10.1007/s11406-019-00126-z |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/THOEMR-3 |doi-access=free |access-date=2020-11-11 |archive-date=2020-11-14 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201114050326/https://philpapers.org/rec/THOEMR-3 |url-status=live }}</ref>

===Adverbialism===
''Adverbialists'' hold that intentional states are properties of subjects. So no independent objects are needed besides the subject, which is how adverbialists avoid the problem of non-existence.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Koons |first1=Robert C. |last2=Pickavance |first2=Timothy |title=The Atlas of Reality: A Comprehensive Guide to Metaphysics |publisher=John Wiley & Sons |isbn=978-1-119-11611-0 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=dewmDgAAQBAJ |language=en |chapter=12 The Non-Existent and the Vaguely Existent|date=9 February 2017 }}</ref> This approach has been termed "adverbialism" since the object of the intentional state is seen as a modification of this state, which can be linguistically expressed through adverbs. Instead of saying that ''Mary is thinking about Superman'', it would be more precise, according to adverbialists, to say that ''Mary is thinking in a superman-ly manner'' or that ''Mary is thinking superman-ly''. Adverbialism has been challenged on the grounds that it puts a strain on natural language and the metaphysical insights encoded in it.<ref name="Bourget" /> Another objection is that, by treating intentional objects as mere modifications of intentional states, adverbialism loses the power to distinguish between different complex intentional contents, the so-called many-property-problem.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Jackson |first1=Frank |title=Symposium: The Adverbial Theory of Perception |journal=Metaphilosophy |date=1975 |volume=6 |issue=2 |pages=127–135 |doi=10.1111/j.1467-9973.1975.tb00242.x |url=https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1467-9973.1975.tb00242.x |language=en |issn=1467-9973 |access-date=2020-11-11 |archive-date=2021-08-30 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210830120035/https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1467-9973.1975.tb00242.x |url-status=live |url-access=subscription }}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |last1=Woodling |first1=Casey |title=The Limits of Adverbialism About Intentionality |journal=Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy |date=2016 |volume=59 |issue=5 |pages=488–512 |doi=10.1080/0020174X.2016.1140071 |s2cid=171200406 |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/WOOTLO-13 |access-date=2020-11-11 |archive-date=2021-08-16 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210816172602/https://philpapers.org/rec/WOOTLO-13 |url-status=live |url-access=subscription }}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |last1=D'Ambrosio |first1=Justin |title=A New Perceptual Adverbialism |journal=Journal of Philosophy |date=2019 |volume=116 |issue=8 |pages=413–446 |doi=10.5840/jphil2019116826 |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/DAMANP |hdl=1885/214157 |s2cid=204526763 |hdl-access=free |access-date=2020-11-11 |archive-date=2021-06-23 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210623033715/https://philpapers.org/rec/DAMANP |url-status=live }}</ref>