Editing Internalism and externalism (section)

=== Motivation ===

In contemporary moral philosophy, '''motivational internalism'''<!--boldface per WP:R#PLA--> (or '''moral internalism'''<!--boldface per WP:R#PLA-->) is the view that moral convictions (which are not necessarily beliefs, e.g. feelings of moral approval or disapproval) are intrinsically motivating. That is, the motivational internalist believes that there is an internal, necessary connection between one's conviction that X ought to be done and one's motivation to do X. Conversely, the '''motivational externalist'''<!--boldface per WP:R#PLA--> (or '''moral externalist'''<!--boldface per WP:R#PLA-->) claims that there is no necessary internal connection between moral convictions and moral motives.<ref name="Williams" >Williams, Bernard (1981) "Internal and External Reasons", in Williams's ''Moral Luck'', Cambridge: Cambridge University  Press, pp.&nbsp;101–13.</ref> That is, there is no necessary connection between the conviction that X is wrong and the motivational drive not to do X. (The use of these terms has roots in W.D. Falk's (1947) paper "'Ought' and Motivation".<ref>Falk, W. D. (1947) "'Ought' and Motivation", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 48: 492–510</ref>)

These views in [[moral psychology]] have various implications. In particular, if motivational internalism is true, then [[amorality]] is unintelligible (and metaphysically impossible). An amoralist is not simply someone who is immoral, rather it is someone who knows what the moral things to do are, yet is not motivated to do them. Such an agent is unintelligible to the motivational internalist, because moral judgments about the right thing to do have built into them corresponding motivations to do those things that are judged by the agent to be the moral things to do. On the other hand, an amoralist is entirely intelligible to the motivational ''externalist'', because the motivational externalist thinks that moral judgments about what is right do not necessitate some motivation to do those things that are judged to be the right thing to do; rather, an independent desire—such as the desire to do the right thing—is required (Brink, 2003<ref>Brink, David (1989) "Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics", New York: Cambridge University Press, Ch. 3, pp. 37–80.</ref>), (Rosati, 2006<ref>Rosati, Connie S. (2006). "Moral Motivation", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Edward N. Zalta (ed.).</ref>).