Editing Iran–Contra affair (section)

==Arms sales to Iran==
{{See also|Brokers of Death arms case|Israel in the Iran–Iraq War}}
As reported in ''[[The New York Times]]'' in 1991, "continuing allegations that Reagan campaign officials made a deal with the Iranian Government of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini in the fall of 1980" led to "limited investigations". However "limited", those investigations established that "Soon after taking office in 1981, the Reagan Administration secretly and abruptly changed United States policy." Secret Israeli arms sales and shipments to Iran began in that year, even as, in public, "the Reagan Administration" presented a different face, and "aggressively promoted a public campaign [...] to stop worldwide transfers of military goods to Iran". ''The New York Times'' explains: "Iran at that time was in dire need of arms and spare parts for its American-made arsenal to defend itself against Iraq, which had attacked it in September 1980", while "Israel [a US ally] was interested in keeping the war between Iran and Iraq going to ensure that these two potential enemies remained preoccupied with each other". Major General Avraham Tamir, a high-ranking Israeli Defense Ministry official in 1981, said there was an "oral agreement" to allow the sale of "spare parts" to Iran. This was based on an "understanding" with Secretary of State [[Alexander Haig]] (which a Haig adviser denied). This account was confirmed by a former senior US diplomat with a few modifications. The diplomat claimed that "[Ariel] Sharon violated it, and Haig backed away". A former "high-level" [[Central Intelligence Agency]] (CIA) official who saw reports of arms sales to Iran by Israel in the early 1980s estimated that the total was about $2 billion a year—but also said, "The degree to which it was sanctioned I don't know."<ref name="israel-iran">{{cite news |url=https://www.nytimes.com/1991/12/08/world/iran-pipeline-hidden-chapter-special-report-us-said-have-allowed-israel-sell.html |title=U.S. Said to Have Allowed Israel to Sell Arms to Iran |last=Hersh |first=Seymour M. |date=8 December 1991 |work=The New York Times |edition=National |at=sec. 1. p. 1 |access-date=15 November 2018 |archive-date=28 July 2018 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180728191307/https://www.nytimes.com/1991/12/08/world/iran-pipeline-hidden-chapter-special-report-us-said-have-allowed-israel-sell.html |url-status=live }}</ref>

On 17 June 1985, National Security Adviser [[Robert McFarlane (American government official)|Robert McFarlane]] wrote a National Security Decision Directive which called for the US to begin a rapprochement with the Islamic Republic of Iran.{{sfn|Kornbluh|Byrne|1993|p=213}} The paper read:

<blockquote>Dynamic political evolution is taking place inside Iran. Instability caused by the pressures of the Iraq-Iran war, economic deterioration and regime in-fighting create the potential for major changes inside Iran. The Soviet Union is better positioned than the U.S. to exploit and benefit from any power struggle that results in changes from the Iranian regime [...]. The U.S. should encourage Western allies and friends to help Iran meet its import requirements so as to reduce the attractiveness of Soviet assistance [...]. This includes provision of selected military equipment.{{sfn|Kornbluh|Byrne|1993|pp=213–214}}</blockquote>

Defense Secretary [[Caspar Weinberger]] was highly negative, writing on his copy of McFarlane's paper: "This is almost too absurd to comment on [...] like asking Qaddafi to Washington for a cozy chat."{{sfn|Kornbluh|Byrne|1993|p=214}} Secretary of State [[George Shultz]] was also opposed, stating that having designated Iran a [[State Sponsor of Terrorism]] in January 1984, how could the US possibly sell arms to Iran?{{sfn|Kornbluh|Byrne|1993|p=214}} Only the Director of the CIA [[William J. Casey]] supported McFarlane's plan to start selling arms to Iran.{{sfn|Kornbluh|Byrne|1993|p=214}}

In early July 1985, the historian [[Michael Ledeen]], a consultant of [[National Security Advisor (United States)|National Security Adviser]] Robert McFarlane, requested assistance from [[Prime Minister of Israel|Israeli Prime Minister]] [[Shimon Peres]] for help in the sale of arms to Iran.<ref name="JVL"/> Having talked to an Israeli diplomat [[David Kimche]] and Ledeen, McFarlane learned that the Iranians were prepared to have [[Hezbollah]] release US hostages in Lebanon in exchange for Israelis shipping Iran US weapons.{{sfn|Kornbluh|Byrne|1993|p=214}} Having been designated a State Sponsor of Terrorism since January 1984,<ref>{{cite web |url=https://2009-2017.state.gov/j/ct/list/c14151.htm |title=State Sponsors of Terrorism |publisher=State.gov |access-date=2014-08-18 |archive-date=1 August 2018 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180801200712/https://2009-2017.state.gov/j/ct/list/c14151.htm |url-status=live }}</ref> Iran was in the midst of the [[Iran–Iraq War]] and could find few Western nations willing to supply it with weapons.{{citation needed|date=February 2023}} The idea behind the plan was for Israel to ship weapons through an intermediary (identified as [[Manucher Ghorbanifar]]) to the Islamic Republic as a way of aiding a supposedly moderate, politically influential faction within the regime of [[Ruhollah Khomeini|Ayatollah Khomeini]] who was believed to be seeking a rapprochement with the US; after the transaction, the US would reimburse Israel with the same weapons, while receiving monetary benefits.{{sfn|Reagan|1990|p=504}} McFarlane in a memo to Shultz and Weinberger wrote:

<blockquote>The short term dimension concerns the seven hostages; the long term dimension involves the establishment of a private dialogue with Iranian officials on the broader relations [...]. They sought specifically the delivery from Israel of 100 TOW missiles [...].{{sfn|Kornbluh|Byrne|1993|p=214}}</blockquote>

The plan was discussed with President Reagan on 18 July 1985 and then again on 6 August 1985.{{sfn|Kornbluh|Byrne|1993|p=214}} Shultz at the latter meeting warned Reagan that "we were just falling into the arms-for-hostages business and we shouldn't do it".{{sfn|Kornbluh|Byrne|1993|p=214}}

The Americans believed that there was a moderate faction within the Islamic Republic headed by [[Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani]], the powerful speaker of the ''Majlis'' who was seen as a leading potential successor to Khomeini and who was alleged to want a rapprochement with the US.<ref name="Brogan, Patrick page 253">{{cite book |last=Brogan |first=Patrick |title=The Fighting Never Stopped: A Comprehensive Guide To World Conflicts Since 1945 |location=New York |publisher=Vintage Books |date=1989 |page=253}}</ref> The Americans believed that Rafsanjani had the power to order Hezbollah to free the US hostages and establishing a relationship with him by selling Iran arms would ultimately place Iran back within the US sphere of influence.<ref name="Brogan, Patrick page 253"/> It remains unclear if Rafsanjani really wanted a rapprochement with the US or was just deceiving Reagan administration officials who were willing to believe that he was a moderate who would effect a rapprochement.<ref name="Brogan, Patrick page 253"/> Rafsanjani, whose nickname is "the Shark", was described by the UK journalist Patrick Brogan as a man of great charm and formidable intelligence known for his subtlety and ruthlessness whose motives in the Iran–Contra affair remain completely mysterious.<ref name="Brogan, Patrick page 253"/> The Israeli government required that the sale of arms meet high-level approval from the US government, and, when McFarlane convinced them that the US government approved the sale, Israel obliged by agreeing to sell the arms.<ref name="JVL">{{cite web|title=The Iran-Contra Scandal|publisher=The American–Israeli Cooperative Enterprise|url=https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/US-Israel/Iran_Contra_Affair.html|access-date=7 June 2008|archive-date=15 May 2008|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080515195548/http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/US-Israel/Iran_Contra_Affair.html|url-status=live}}</ref>

In 1985, President Reagan entered [[Walter Reed National Military Medical Center]] for [[colon cancer]] surgery. Reagan's recovery was nothing short of miserable, as the 74-year-old President admitted having little sleep for days in addition to his immense physical discomfort. While doctors seemed to be confident that the surgery was successful, the discovery of his localized cancer was a daunting realization for Reagan. From seeing the recovery process of other patients, as well as medical “experts” on television predicting his death to be soon, Reagan's typical optimistic outlook was dampened. These factors were bound to contribute to psychological distress in the midst of an already distressing situation.<ref name=":0">{{Cite journal |last=Gilbert |first=Robert E. |date=2014 |title=The politics of presidential illness: Ronald Reagan and the Iran-Contra Scandal |journal=Politics and the Life Sciences |volume=33 |issue=2 |pages=58–76 |doi=10.2990/33_2_58 |pmid=25901884 |s2cid=41674696}}</ref> Additionally, Reagan's invocation of the [[Twenty-fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution|25th Amendment]] prior to the surgery was a risky and unprecedented decision that smoothly flew under the radar for the duration of the complex situation. While it only lasted slightly longer than the length of the procedure (approximately seven hours and 54 minutes), this temporary transfer of power was never formally recognized by the White House. It was later revealed that this decision was made on the grounds that "Mr. Reagan and his advisors did not want his actions to establish a definition of incapacitation that would bind future presidents." Reagan expressed this transfer of power in two identical letters that were sent to the speaker of the House of Representatives, Representative [[Tip O'Neill]], and the president pro tempore of the senate, Senator [[Strom Thurmond]].<ref>{{Cite news|last=Monteagudo|first=Merrie|date=Jan 8, 2021|title=From the Archives: Ronald Regan first invoked the 25th Amendment in 1985|work=The San Diego Union Tribune|url=https://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/news/local-history/story/2021-01-08/from-the-archives-ronald-regan-first-invoked-the-25th-amendment-in-1985|access-date=Mar 3, 2021|archive-date=26 January 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210126183734/https://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/news/local-history/story/2021-01-08/from-the-archives-ronald-regan-first-invoked-the-25th-amendment-in-1985|url-status=live}}</ref>

While the President was recovering in the hospital, McFarlane met with him and told him that representatives from Israel had contacted the [[National Security Agency]] to pass on confidential information from what Reagan later described as the "moderate" Iranian faction headed by Rafsanjani opposed to the Ayatollah's hardline anti-US policies.{{sfn|Reagan|1990|p=504}} The visit from McFarlane in Reagan's hospital room was the first visit from an administration official outside of Donald Regan<!-- Donald Regan not Ronald Reagan --> since the surgery. The meeting took place five days after the surgery and only three days after doctors gave the news that his polyp had been malignant. The three participants of this meeting had very different recollections of what was discussed during its 23-minute duration. Months later, Reagan even stated that he "had no recollection of a meeting in the hospital in July with McFarlane and that he had no notes which would show such a meeting". This does not come as a surprise considering the possible short and long-term effects of anesthesia on patients above the age of 60, in addition to his already weakened physical and mental state.<ref name=":0" />

According to Reagan, these Iranians sought to establish a quiet relationship with the US, before establishing formal relationships upon the death of the aging Ayatollah.{{sfn|Reagan|1990|p=504}} In Reagan's account, McFarlane told Reagan that the Iranians, to demonstrate their seriousness, offered to persuade the Hezbollah militants to release the seven US hostages.{{sfn|Reagan|1990|p=505}} McFarlane met with the Israeli intermediaries;{{sfn|Walsh|1993|loc=chpt. 24}} Reagan claimed that he allowed this because he believed that establishing relations with a strategically located country, and preventing the [[Soviet Union]] from doing the same, was a beneficial move.{{sfn|Reagan|1990|p=504}} Although Reagan claims that the arms sales were to a "moderate" faction of Iranians, the Walsh Iran–Contra Report states that the arms sales were "to Iran" itself,{{sfn|Walsh|1993|loc=Part I}} which was under the control of the Ayatollah.

Following the Israeli–US meeting, Israel requested permission from the US to sell a small number of [[BGM-71 TOW]] antitank missiles to Iran, claiming that this would aid the "moderate" Iranian faction,{{sfn|Reagan|1990|p=505}} by demonstrating that the group actually had high-level connections to the US government.{{sfn|Reagan|1990|p=505}} Reagan initially rejected the plan, until Israel sent information to the US showing that the "moderate" Iranians were opposed to terrorism and had fought against it.{{sfn|Reagan|1990|p=506}} Now having a reason to trust the "moderates", Reagan approved the transaction, which was meant to be between Israel and the "moderates" in Iran, with the US reimbursing Israel.{{sfn|Reagan|1990|p=505}} In his 1990 autobiography ''[[An American Life]]'', Reagan claimed that he was deeply committed to securing the release of the hostages; it was this compassion that supposedly motivated his support for the arms initiatives. The president requested that the "moderate" Iranians do everything in their capability to free the hostages held by Hezbollah.<ref name="plain-and-simple">{{cite news |url=https://www.nytimes.com/1988/11/27/books/arms-for-hostages-plain-and-simple.html |title=Arms for Hostages – Plain and Simple |date=27 November 1988 |work=The New York Times |edition=National |at=sec. 7. p. 10 |last=Butterfield |first=Fox |access-date=29 December 2018}}</ref> Reagan always publicly insisted after the scandal broke in late 1986 that the purpose behind the arms-for-hostages trade was to establish a working relationship with the "moderate" faction associated with Rafsanjani to facilitate the reestablishment of the US–Iranian alliance after the soon to be expected death of Khomeini, to end the Iran–Iraq War and end Iranian support for Islamic terrorism while downplaying the importance of freeing the hostages in Lebanon as a secondary issue.{{sfn|Kornbluh|Byrne|1993|pp=214–215}} By contrast, when testifying before the Tower Commission, Reagan declared that hostage issue was the main reason for selling arms to Iran.{{sfn|Kornbluh|Byrne|1993|p=215}}

[[File:Tow atm.jpg|thumb|A BGM-71 TOW antitank guided missile]]
The following arms were supplied to Iran:{{sfn|Walsh|1993|loc=Part I}}<ref>{{cite news |author=<!--Staff writer(s); no by-line.--> |title=Arms, Hostages and Contras: How a Secret Foreign Policy Unraveled |url=https://www.nytimes.com/1987/11/19/world/iran-contra-report-arms-hostages-contras-secret-foreign-policy-unraveled.html |work=The New York Times |edition=National |date=19 November 1987 |at=sec. A. p. 12 |access-date=7 June 2008 |archive-date=26 April 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200426004710/http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9B0DE3DB173EF93AA25752C1A961948260 |url-status=live }}</ref>
* First arms sales in 1981 (see above)
* 20 August 1985 – 96 [[BGM-71 TOW|TOW]] antitank missiles
* 14 September 1985 – 408 more TOWs
* 24 November 1985 – 18 [[MIM-23 Hawk|Hawk]] antiaircraft missiles
* 17 February 1986 – 500 TOWs
* 27 February 1986 – 500 TOWs
* 24 May 1986 – 508 TOWs, 240 Hawk spare parts
* 4 August 1986 – More Hawk spares
* 28 October 1986 – 500 TOWs

===First few arms sales===
The first arms sales to Iran began in 1981, though the official paper trail has them beginning in 1985 (see above). On 20 August 1985, Israel sent 96 US-made TOW missiles to Iran through an arms dealer [[Manucher Ghorbanifar]].{{sfn|Hamilton|Inouye|1987}} Subsequently, on 14 September 1985, 408 more TOW missiles were delivered. On 15 September 1985, following the second delivery, Reverend [[Benjamin Weir]] was released by his captors, the [[Islamic Jihad Organization]]. On 24 November 1985, 18 Hawk antiaircraft missiles were delivered.

===Modifications in plans===
Robert McFarlane resigned on 4 December 1985,<ref>{{cite web|title=Letter Accepting the Resignation of Robert C. McFarlane as Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs|url=http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1985/120485d.htm|access-date=4 December 2012|archive-date=20 March 2014|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140320212108/http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1985/120485d.htm|url-status=dead}}</ref>{{sfn|Walsh|1993|loc=chpt. 1}} stating that he wanted to spend more time with his family,{{sfn|Reagan|1990|p=509}} and was replaced by Admiral [[John Poindexter]].<ref name="JP">{{Cite web|url=https://www.brown.edu/Research/Understanding_the_Iran_Contra_Affair/profile-poindexter.php|title=Understanding the Iran-Contra Affairs - The Legal Aftermath|website=www.brown.edu|access-date=5 July 2020|archive-date=17 May 2022|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220517095623/https://www.brown.edu/Research/Understanding_the_Iran_Contra_Affair/profile-poindexter.php|url-status=live}}</ref> Two days later, Reagan met with his advisors at the White House, where a new plan was introduced. This called for a slight change in the arms transactions: instead of the weapons going to the "moderate" Iranian group, they would go to "moderate" Iranian army leaders.{{sfn|Reagan|1990|p=510}} As each weapons delivery was made from Israel by air, hostages held by Hezbollah would be released.{{sfn|Reagan|1990|p=510}} Israel would continue to be reimbursed by the US for the weapons. Though staunchly opposed by [[United States Secretary of State|Secretary of State]] [[George Shultz]] and [[United States Secretary of Defense|Secretary of Defense]] [[Caspar Weinberger]], the plan was authorized by Reagan, who stated that, "We were {{em|not}} trading arms for hostages, nor were we negotiating with terrorists".{{sfn|Reagan|1990|p=512}} In his notes of a meeting held in the White House on 7 December 1985, Weinberger wrote he told Reagan that this plan was illegal, writing: <blockquote>I argued strongly that we have an embargo that makes arms sales to Iran illegal and President couldn't violate it and that 'washing' transactions through Israel wouldn't make it legal. Shultz, Don Regan agreed.{{sfn|Kornbluh|Byrne|1993|p=216}}</blockquote> Weinberger's notes have Reagan saying he "could {{not a typo|answer charges}} of illegality but he couldn't {{sic|answer charge}} that 'big strong President Reagan passed up a chance to {{not a typo|free hostages}}'."{{sfn|Kornbluh|Byrne|1993|p=216}} Now retired National Security Advisor McFarlane flew to London to meet with Israelis and Ghorbanifar in an attempt to persuade the Iranian to use his influence to release the hostages before any arms transactions occurred; this plan was rejected by Ghorbanifar.{{sfn|Reagan|1990|p=510}}

On the day of McFarlane's resignation, [[Oliver North]], a military aide to the [[US National Security Council]] (NSC), proposed a new plan for selling arms to Iran, which included two major adjustments: instead of selling arms through Israel, the sale was to be direct at a markup; and a portion of the proceeds would go to the [[Contras]], Nicaraguan paramilitary fighters waging [[guerrilla warfare]] against the [[Sandinista National Liberation Front#1984 election|Sandinista government]], claiming power after an election full of irregularities.<ref>See ''Washington Post'' at the time.</ref>{{nonspecific|date=July 2022}} The dealings with the Iranians were conducted via the NSC with Admiral Poindexter and his deputy Colonel North, with the US historians Malcolm Byrne and Peter Kornbluh writing that Poindexter granted much power to North "who made the most of the situation, often deciding important matters on his own, striking outlandish deals with the Iranians, and acting in the name of the president on issues that were far beyond his competence. All of these activities continued to take place within the framework of the president's broad authorization. Until the press reported on the existence of the operation, nobody in the administration questioned the authority of Poindexter's and North's team to implement the president's decisions".{{sfn|Kornbluh|Byrne|1993|p=217}} North proposed a $15 million markup, while contracted arms broker Ghorbanifar added a 41-percent markup of his own.{{sfn|Walsh|1993|loc=vol. I}} Other members of the NSC were in favor of North's plan; with large support, Poindexter authorized it without notifying President Reagan, and it went into effect.<ref name="Avery">{{cite web|last=Avery|first=Steve|title=Irangate: Iran-Contra affair, 1985–1992|publisher=U-S-History.com|year=2005|url=http://www.u-s-history.com/pages/h1889.html|access-date=7 June 2008|archive-date=12 May 2011|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110512030446/http://www.u-s-history.com/pages/h1889.html|url-status=live}}</ref> At first, the Iranians refused to buy the arms at the inflated price because of the excessive markup imposed by North and Ghorbanifar. They eventually relented, and, in February 1986, 1,000 TOW missiles were shipped to the country.<ref name="Avery"/> From May to November 1986, there were additional shipments of miscellaneous weapons and parts.<ref name="Avery"/>

Both the sale of weapons to Iran and the funding of the Contras attempted to circumvent not only stated administration policy, but also the [[Boland Amendment]]. Administration officials argued that, regardless of Congress restricting funds for the Contras, or any affair, the President (or in this case the administration) could carry on by seeking alternative means of funding such as private entities and foreign governments.<ref name="Fisher">{{cite journal |last=Fisher |first=Louis |title=How Tightly Can Congress Draw the Purse Strings? |journal=American Journal of International Law |volume=83 |issue=4 |pages=758–766 |year=1989 |doi=10.2307/2203364 |jstor=2203364|s2cid=147213452 }}</ref> Funding from one foreign country, [[Brunei]], was botched when North's secretary, [[Fawn Hall]], transposed the numbers of North's [[Swiss bank]] account number. A Swiss businessperson, suddenly $10 million richer, alerted the authorities of the mistake. The money was eventually returned to the [[Sultan of Brunei]], with interest.<ref>{{cite news |author=<!--Staff writer(s); no by-line.--> |title=Brunei Regains $10 Million |work=The New York Times |edition=National |at=sec. A. p. 9 |agency=Associated Press |date=22 July 1987 |access-date=28 March 2008 |url=https://www.nytimes.com/1987/07/22/world/iran-contra-hearings-brunei-regains-10-million.html |archive-date=30 June 2009 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090630090545/http://www.nytimes.com/1987/07/22/world/iran-contra-hearings-brunei-regains-10-million.html |url-status=live }}</ref>

On 7 January 1986, John Poindexter proposed to Reagan a modification of the approved plan: instead of negotiating with the "moderate" Iranian political group, the US would negotiate with "moderate" members of the Iranian government.{{sfn|Reagan|1990|p=516}} Poindexter told Reagan that Ghorbanifar had important connections within the Iranian government, so, with the hope of the release of the hostages, Reagan approved this plan as well.{{sfn|Reagan|1990|p=516}} Throughout February 1986, weapons were shipped directly to Iran by the US (as part of Oliver North's plan), but none of the hostages were released. Retired National Security Advisor McFarlane conducted another international voyage, this one to [[Tehran]]—bringing with him a gift of a [[Bible]] with a handwritten inscription by Ronald Reagan<ref name="Gwertzman">{{cite news |url=https://www.nytimes.com/1987/01/11/us/mcfarlane-took-cake-and-bible-to-teheran-ex-cia-man-says.html |work=The New York Times |first=Bernard |last=Gwertzman |title=McFarlane Took Cake and Bible to Teheran, Ex-C.I.A. Man Says |date=11 January 1987 |access-date=9 February 2017 |archive-date=28 September 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190928033814/https://www.nytimes.com/1987/01/11/us/mcfarlane-took-cake-and-bible-to-teheran-ex-cia-man-says.html |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{cite news |url=https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1987-01-28-mn-1439-story.html |work=Los Angeles Times |title=Calls President Courageous but Weak : Iranian Exhibits Bible Signed by Reagan |date=28 January 1987 |access-date=15 May 2012 |archive-date=20 November 2011 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20111120052254/http://articles.latimes.com/1987-01-28/news/mn-1439_1_rafsanjani |url-status=live }}</ref> and, according to [[George W. Cave]], a cake baked in the shape of a key.<ref name="Gwertzman"/> [[Howard Teicher]] described the cake as a joke between North and Ghorbanifar.{{sfn|Tower|Muskie|Scowcroft|1987|p=B-100}} McFarlane met directly with Iranian officials associated with Rafsanjani, who sought to establish US–Iranian relations in an attempt to free the four remaining hostages.{{sfn|Reagan|1990|pp=520–521}}

The US delegation comprised McFarlane, North, Cave (a retired CIA officer who served as the group's translator), Teicher, Israeli diplomat [[Amiram Nir]], and a CIA communicator.<ref>{{cite book |author=President's Special Review Board |author-link=Tower Commission |title=Report of the President's Special Review Board |url=http://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=pur1.32754062647601;view=2up;seq=1 |date=February 26, 1987 |publisher=United States Government Printing Office |location=Washington, D.C. |page=237 |id= |oclc=15243889 |ref={{harvid|Report of the President's Special Review Board|1987}} |access-date=8 June 2015 |archive-date=5 February 2016 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160205142211/http://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=pur1.32754062647601;view=2up;seq=1 |url-status=live }}</ref> They arrived in Tehran in an Israeli plane carrying forged Irish passports on 25 May 1986.{{sfn|Kornbluh|Byrne|1993|p=249}} This meeting also failed. Much to McFarlane's disgust, he did not meet ministers, and instead met in his words "third and fourth level officials".{{sfn|Kornbluh|Byrne|1993|p=249}} At one point, an angry McFarlane shouted: "As I am a Minister, I expect to meet with decision-makers. Otherwise, you can work with my staff."{{sfn|Kornbluh|Byrne|1993|p=249}} The Iranians requested concessions such as Israel's withdrawal from the [[Golan Heights]], which the US rejected.{{sfn|Reagan|1990|pp=520–521}} More importantly, McFarlane refused to ship spare parts for the Hawk missiles until the Iranians had Hezbollah release the US hostages, whereas the Iranians wanted to reverse that sequence with the spare parts being shipped first before the hostages were freed.{{sfn|Kornbluh|Byrne|1993|p=249}} The differing negotiating positions led to McFarlane's mission going home after four days.{{sfn|Kornbluh|Byrne|1993|p=250}} After the failure of the secret visit to Tehran, McFarlane advised Reagan not to talk to the Iranians anymore, advice that was disregarded.{{sfn|Kornbluh|Byrne|1993|p=250}}

===Subsequent dealings===
On 26 July 1986, [[Hezbollah]] freed the US hostage Father [[Lawrence Jenco]], former head of [[Catholic Relief Services]] in Lebanon.{{sfn|Kornbluh|Byrne|1993|p=250}} Following this, [[William J. Casey]], head of the CIA, requested that the US authorize sending a shipment of small missile parts to Iranian military forces as a way of expressing gratitude.{{sfn|Reagan|1990|p=523}} Casey also justified this request by stating that the contact in the Iranian government might otherwise lose face or be executed, and hostages might be killed. Reagan authorized the shipment to ensure that those potential events would not occur.{{sfn|Reagan|1990|p=523}} North used this release to persuade Reagan to switch over to a "sequential" policy of freeing the hostages one by one, instead of the "all or nothing" policy that the Americans had pursued until then.{{sfn|Kornbluh|Byrne|1993|p=250}} By this point, the Americans had grown tired of Ghorbanifar who had proven himself a dishonest intermediary who played off both sides to his own commercial advantage.{{sfn|Kornbluh|Byrne|1993|p=250}} In August 1986, the Americans had established a new contact in the Iranian government, Ali Hashemi Bahramani, the nephew of Rafsanjani and an officer in the Revolutionary Guard.{{sfn|Kornbluh|Byrne|1993|p=250}} The fact that the Revolutionary Guard was deeply involved in international terrorism seemed only to attract the Americans more to Bahramani, who was seen as someone with the influence to change Iran's policies.{{sfn|Kornbluh|Byrne|1993|p=250}} [[Richard Secord]], a US arms dealer, who was being used as a contact with Iran, wrote to North: "My judgment is that we have opened up a new and probably better channel into Iran".{{sfn|Kornbluh|Byrne|1993|p=250}} North was so impressed with Bahramani that he arranged for him to secretly visit [[Washington DC]] and gave him a guided tour at midnight of the White House.{{sfn|Kornbluh|Byrne|1993|p=250}}

North frequently met with Bahramani in the summer and autumn of 1986 in West Germany, discussing arms sales to Iran, the freeing of hostages held by Hezbollah and how best to overthrow President [[Saddam Hussein]] of Iraq and the establishment of "a non-hostile regime in Baghdad".{{sfn|Kornbluh|Byrne|1993|p=250}} In September and October 1986, three more Americans—Frank Reed, Joseph Cicippio, and Edward Tracy—were abducted in Lebanon by a separate terrorist group, who referred to them simply as "G.I. Joe", after the popular US toy. The reasons for their abduction are unknown, although it is speculated that they were kidnapped to replace the freed Americans.{{sfn|Ranstorp|1997|pp=98–99}} One more original hostage, David Jacobsen, was later released. The captors promised to release the remaining two, but the release never happened.{{sfn|Reagan|1990|pp=526–527}}

During a secret meeting in Frankfurt in October 1986, North told Bahramani that: "Saddam Hussein must go".{{sfn|Kornbluh|Byrne|1993|p=250}} North also claimed that Reagan had told him to tell Bahramani that: "Saddam Hussein is an asshole."{{sfn|Kornbluh|Byrne|1993|p=250}} Behramani during a secret meeting in Mainz informed North that Rafsanjani "for his own politics [...] decided to get all the groups involved and give them a role to play".{{sfn|Kornbluh|Byrne|1993|p=251}} Thus, all the factions in the Iranian government would be jointly responsible for the talks with the Americans and "there would not be an internal war".{{sfn|Kornbluh|Byrne|1993|p=251}} This demand of Behramani caused much dismay on the US side as it made clear to them that they would not be dealing solely with a "moderate" faction in the Islamic Republic but rather with all the factions in the Iranian government—including those who were very much involved in terrorism.{{sfn|Kornbluh|Byrne|1993|p=251}} Despite this, the talks were not broken off.{{sfn|Kornbluh|Byrne|1993|p=251}}