Editing Khartoum Resolution (section)

==Interpretations==
Commentators have frequently presented the resolution as an example of Arab rejectionism. 
Abd al Azim Ramadan stated that the Khartoum decisions left only one option—war.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Meital |first1=Yoram |title=The Khartoum Conference and Egyptian Policy after the 1967 War: A Reexamination |journal=Middle East Journal |date=2000 |volume=54 |issue=1 |pages=64–82 |jstor=4329432 |url=http://www.jstor.org/stable/4329432}}</ref>  [[Efraim Halevy]], Guy Ben-Porat, [[Steven R. David]], [[Julius Stone]], and [[Ian Bremmer]] all agree the Khartoum Resolution amounted to a rejection of [[Israel's right to exist]].<ref>{{cite web|last=Halevy |first=Efraim |title=Israel's Hamas Portfolio |url=http://israelcfr.com/documents/issue6_hamas.pdf |publisher=[[Israel Council on Foreign Relations]] |access-date=8 June 2012 |author-link=Efraim Halevy |quote=Indeed, twenty years later, after two successive wars, the Arab world rejected Israel's right to exist at the infamous Khartoum Conference of 196[7] – 'the three NOs': no to recognition, no to negotiation, and no to peace were uttered in response to Israel's appeal to negotiate without any preconditions. |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120225221835/http://israelcfr.com/documents/issue6_hamas.pdf |archive-date=25 February 2012}}</ref><ref>{{cite book|last= Ben-Porat|first=Guy|title= Global Liberalism, Local Populism: Peace and Conflict in Israel/Palestine and Northern Ireland|year=2006|publisher= [[Syracuse University Press]]|location=[[Syracuse, New York]]|isbn= 0-8156-3069-7|chapter-url= https://books.google.com/books?id=o0EVZoyteO8C&pg=PA145|access-date=8 June 2012|page=145|chapter= Chapter 7: Israel, Globalization, and Peace|quote= Convening in Khartoum shortly after the war, Arab states declared their refusal to negotiate with Israel or to recognize its right to exist.}}</ref><ref>{{cite book|last=David|first=Steven R.|title=Contemporary Israel: Domestic Politics, Foreign Policy, and Security Challenges|year=2009|publisher=[[Westview Press|WestView Press]]|location=[[Boulder, Colorado]]|isbn=978-0-8133-4385-3|chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=aOywsZizLi0C&pg=PA559|author-link=Steven R. David|editor=Freedman, Robert O.|editor-link=Robert Freedman (political scientist)|access-date=8 June 2012|page=559|chapter=Chapter 13: Existential Threats to Israel|quote=Following Israel's success, in what became known as the Six Day War, the Arab states reinforced their refusal to accept Israel's existence when, in a conference in Khartoum, Sudan, they declared they would not negotiate with Israel, make peace with Israel, or recognize its right to exist.}}</ref><ref>{{cite book|last=Stone|first=Julius|title=The Arab-Israeli Conflict|year=1975|publisher=[[Princeton University Press]]|location=[[Princeton, New Jersey]]|isbn=0691010668|chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=-xxWAAAAYAAJ&pg=PA336|author-link=Julius Stone|editor=Moore, John Norton|access-date=8 June 2012|page=336|chapter=Chapter 39: Between Ceasefires in the Middle East|quote= The Arab states, denying Israel's 'right to exist', continued after Khartoum to insist on 'no recognition, no negotiation, no peace', demanding complete Israeli withdrawal from}}</ref><ref>{{cite book|last=Bremmer|first=Ian|title=The J Curve: A New Way to Understand Why Nations Rise and Fall|year=2006|publisher=[[Simon & Schuster]]|location=[[New York, NY]]|isbn=0-7432-9371-1|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=MIU14x1yEZkC|author-link=Ian Bremmer|access-date= 8 June 2012|page=209|chapter=Chapter Five: The Right Side of the J Curve|quote=Immediately after the Six-Day War, Arab leaders—including those of the Palestine Liberation Organization—agreed in Khartoum they would not make peace with Israel, would not negotiate with Israel, would not even recognize Israel's right to exist.}}</ref> The [[Palestine Liberation Organization]] (PLO) itself enlisted the Khartoum Resolution to advocate against acceptance of Israel's right to exist as articulated in [[United Nations Security Council Resolution 242]].<ref>{{cite book|title=The Encyclopedia of the Arab-Israeli Conflict, Vol. 1|year=2008|publisher=[[ABC-CLIO]]|location=[[Santa Barbara, California]]|isbn=978-1-85109-841-5|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=YAd8efHdVzIC&pg=PA1289|editor=Tucker, Spencer C.|editor-link=Spencer C. Tucker|access-date= 8 June 2012|page=1289|quote=The PLO disagreed entirely with the provisions whereby Arab nations were expected to recognize Israel's right to exist, claiming that these not only ran counter to the Arab states' earlier Khartoum Summit Conference declaration but were also 'fundamentally and gravely inconsistent with the Arab character of Palestine, the essence of the Palestinian cause and the right of the Palestinian people to their homeland.'}}
</ref> [[Benny Morris]] wrote that the Arab leaders "hammered out a defiant, rejectionist platform that was to bedevil all peace moves in the region for a decade" despite an Israeli offer on 19 June 1967 "to give up Sinai and the Golan in exchange for peace."<ref>{{Cite book|url=https://archive.org/details/righteousvictims00morr_0/page/346|title=Righteous victims : a history of the Zionist-Arab conflict, 1881–1999|last=Morris|first=Benny|publisher=Vintage Books|year=2001|isbn=9780679744757|pages=[https://archive.org/details/righteousvictims00morr_0/page/346 346]|oclc=234104996|url-access=registration}}</ref> [[Odd Bull]] of the [[UNTSO]] opined in much the same manner in 1976.<ref>{{Cite book|title=War and peace in the Middle East the experiences a views of a U.N. observer|last=Bull|first=Odd|publisher=Leo Cooper|year=1976|isbn=9780850522266|pages=126|oclc=490839078}}</ref>

[[Avi Shlaim]] has argued that Arab spokesmen interpreted the Khartoum declarations to mean "no formal peace ''treaty'', but not a rejection of peace; no ''direct'' negotiations, but not a refusal to talk through third parties; and no ''de jure'' recognition of Israel, but acceptance of its existence as a state" (emphasis in original). Shlaim states that the conference marked a turning point in Arab–Israeli relations by noting that [[Gamal Abdel Nasser]] urged [[Hussein of Jordan]] to seek a "comprehensive settlement" with Israel. Shlaim acknowledges that none of that was known in Israel at the time, whose leaders took the "Three Nos" at face value.<ref>{{Cite book|title=The iron wall: Israel and the Arab world|last=Shlaim|first=Avi|publisher=Penguin|year=2001|isbn=9780140288704|pages=258–259|oclc=59510046}}</ref> Fred Khouri argued that "the Khartoum conference cleared the way for the Arab moderates to seek a political solution and to offer, in exchange for their conquered lands, important concessions short of actually recognizing Israel and negotiating formal peace treaties with her."<ref>{{Cite book|title=The Arab-Israeli dilemma|last=Khouri|first=Fred|publisher=Syracuse University Press|year=1987|pages=312–314|oclc=634263471}}</ref>

In the event, indirect negotiations between Israel, Jordan and Egypt eventually opened through the auspices of the [[Jarring Mission]] (1967–1973), and secret direct talks also took place between Israel and Jordan, but neither avenue succeeded in achieving a meaningful settlement, which set the stage for a new round of conflict.{{citation needed|date=August 2020}}