Editing Knowledge (section)

=== Analysis of knowledge ===
{{See also|Belief#Justified true belief|Definitions of knowledge#Justified true belief}}
[[File:Justified true belief.png|thumb|alt=Venn diagram of justified true belief|The definition of knowledge as justified true belief is often discussed in the academic literature.]]
An often-discussed definition characterizes knowledge as justified true belief. This definition identifies three essential features: it is (1) a [[belief]] that is (2) [[Truth|true]] and (3) [[Justification (epistemology)|justified]].<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Klein|1998|loc=Lead Section, § 3. Warrant}} | {{harvnb|Zagzebski|1999|pp=99–100}} }}</ref>{{efn|A similar approach was already discussed in [[Ancient Greek philosophy]] in Plato's dialogue ''[[Theaetetus (dialogue)|Theaetetus]]'', where [[Socrates]] pondered the distinction between knowledge and true belief but rejected this definition.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Allen|2005|loc=Lead Section, § Gettierology}} | {{harvnb|Parikh|Renero|2017|pp=[https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-319-53280-6_4 93–102]}} | {{harvnb|Chappell|2019|loc=§ 8. Third Definition (D3): 'Knowledge Is True Judgement With an Account': 201d–210a}} }}</ref>}} Truth is a widely accepted feature of knowledge. It implies that, while it may be possible to believe something false, one cannot know something false.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Ichikawa|Steup|2018|loc=§ 1.1 The Truth Condition}} | {{harvnb|Hetherington|2022a|loc=§ 1b. Knowledge-That, § 5. Understanding Knowledge?}} | {{harvnb|Stroll|2023|loc=§ The Nature of Knowledge}} }}</ref>{{efn|Truth is usually associated with [[Subjectivity and objectivity (philosophy)|objectivity]]. This view is rejected by [[factual relativism|relativism about truth]], which argues that what is true depends on one's perspective.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Landau|2017|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=fDoqDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA119 119–120]}} | {{harvnb|O'Grady}} }}</ref>}} That knowledge is a form of belief implies that one cannot know something if one does not believe it. Some everyday expressions seem to violate this principle, like the claim that "I do not believe it, I know it!" But the point of such expressions is usually to emphasize one's confidence rather than denying that a belief is involved.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Ichikawa|Steup|2018|loc=§ 1.2 The Belief Condition}} | {{harvnb|Klein|1998|loc=§ 1. The Varieties of Knowledge}} | {{harvnb|Zagzebski|1999|p=93}} }}</ref>

The main controversy surrounding this definition concerns its third feature: justification.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Ichikawa|Steup|2018|loc=§ 1.3 The Justification Condition, § 6. Doing Without Justification?}} | {{harvnb|Klein|1998|loc=Lead Section, § 3. Warrant}} | {{harvnb|Zagzebski|1999|p=100}} }}</ref> This component is often included because of the impression that some true beliefs are not forms of knowledge, such as beliefs based on [[superstition]], [[luck]]y guesses, or erroneous [[reasoning]]. For example, a person who guesses that a coin flip will land heads usually does not know that even if their belief turns out to be true. This indicates that there is more to knowledge than just being right about something.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Klein|1998|loc=§ 2. Propositional Knowledge Is Not Mere True Belief, § 3. Warrant}} | {{harvnb|Hetherington|2022a|loc=§ 5a. The Justified-True-Belief Conception of Knowledge, § 6e. Mere True Belief}} | {{harvnb|Lehrer|2015|loc=[https://books.google.com/books?id=yKG9CgAAQBAJ&pg=PA1 1. The Analysis of Knowledge]}} | {{harvnb|Ichikawa|Steup|2018|loc=§ 1.3 The Justification Condition}} }}</ref> These cases are excluded by requiring that beliefs have justification for them to count as knowledge.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Ichikawa|Steup|2018|loc=§ 1.3 The Justification Condition}} | {{harvnb|Klein|1998|loc=§ 3. Warrant}} | {{harvnb|Hetherington|2022a|loc=§ 5a. The Justified-True-Belief Conception of Knowledge, § 6e. Mere True Belief}} }}</ref> Some [[Philosophy|philosophers]] hold that a belief is justified if it is [[Evidentialism|based on evidence]], which can take the form of [[mental states]] like experience, [[memory]], and other beliefs. Others state that beliefs are justified if they are produced by [[Reliabilism|reliable]] processes, like sensory perception or logical reasoning.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Ichikawa|Steup|2018|loc=§ 1.3 The Justification Condition, § 6.1 Reliabilist Theories of Knowledge}} | {{harvnb|Klein|1998|loc=§ 4. Foundationalism and Coherentism, § 6. Externalism}} | {{harvnb|Hetherington|2022a|loc=§ 5a. The Justified-True-Belief Conception of Knowledge, § 7. Knowing’s Point}} }}</ref>

[[File:Justified True Belief model of knowledge.svg|thumb|upright=1.3|alt=Venn diagram of justified true belief that does not amount to knowledge|The Gettier problem is grounded in the idea that some justified true beliefs do not amount to knowledge.]]
The definition of knowledge as justified true belief came under severe criticism in the 20th century, when epistemologist [[Edmund Gettier]] formulated a series of counterexamples.<ref>{{harvnb|Hetherington|2022|loc=Lead Section, § Introduction}}</ref> They purport to present concrete cases of justified true beliefs that fail to constitute knowledge. The reason for their failure is usually a form of epistemic luck: the beliefs are justified but their justification is not relevant to the truth.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Klein|1998|loc=§ 5. Defeasibility Theories}} | {{harvnb|Hetherington|2022a|loc=§ 5. Understanding Knowledge?}} | {{harvnb|Zagzebski|1999|p=100}} }}</ref> In a well-known example, someone drives along a country road with many [[Potemkin village|barn facades]] and only one real barn. The person is not aware of this, stops in front of the real barn by a lucky coincidence, and forms the justified true belief that they are in front of a barn. This example aims to establish that the person does not know that they are in front of a real barn, since they would not have been able to tell the difference.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Rodríguez|2018|pp=29–32}} | {{harvnb|Goldman|1976|pp=771–773}} | {{harvnb|Sudduth|2022}} | {{harvnb|Ichikawa|Steup|2018|loc=§ 10.2 Fake Barn Cases}} }}</ref> This means that it is a lucky coincidence that this justified belief is also true.<ref>{{harvnb|Ichikawa|Steup|2018|loc=§ 3. The Gettier Problem, § 10.2 Fake Barn Cases}}</ref>

According to some philosophers, these counterexamples show that justification is not required for knowledge<ref>{{harvnb|Ichikawa|Steup|2018|loc=§ 3. The Gettier Problem, § 4. No False Lemmas, § 5. Modal Conditions, § 6. Doing Without Justification?}}</ref> and that knowledge should instead be characterized in terms of reliability or the manifestation of [[Intellectual virtue|cognitive virtue]]s. Another approach defines knowledge in regard to the function it plays in cognitive processes as that which provides reasons for thinking or doing something.<ref>{{harvnb|Steup|Neta|2020|loc=§ 2.3 Knowing Facts}}</ref> A different response accepts justification as an aspect of knowledge and include additional criteria.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Ichikawa|Steup|2018|loc=§ 3. The Gettier Problem, § 7. Is Knowledge Analyzable?}} | {{harvnb|Durán|Formanek|2018|pp=648–650}} }}</ref> Many candidates have been suggested, like the requirements that the justified true belief does not depend on any false beliefs, that no [[defeater]]s{{efn|A defeater of a belief is evidence that this belief is false.<ref>{{harvnb|McCain|Stapleford|Steup|2021|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=IeNBEAAAQBAJ&pg=PT111 111]}}</ref>}} are present, or that the person would not have the belief if it was false.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Lehrer|2015|loc=[https://books.google.com/books?id=yKG9CgAAQBAJ&pg=PA1 1. The Analysis of Knowledge]}} | {{harvnb|Sudduth|2022}} }}</ref> Another view states that beliefs have to be infallible to amount to knowledge.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Hetherington|2022a|loc=§ 5c. Questioning the Gettier Problem, § 6. Standards for Knowing}} | {{harvnb|Kraft|2012|pp=[https://philpapers.org/rec/KRASIF 49–50]}} }}</ref> A further approach, associated with [[pragmatism]], focuses on the aspect of inquiry and characterizes knowledge in terms of what works as a practice that aims to produce habits of action.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Ames|Yajun|Hershock|2021|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=MDcWEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA86 86–87]}} | {{harvnb|Legg|Hookway|2021|loc=§ 4.2 Inquiry}} | {{harvnb|Baggini|Southwell|2016|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=k60YDAAAQBAJ&pg=PA48 48]}}}}</ref> There is still very little consensus in the academic discourse as to which of the proposed modifications or reconceptualizations is correct, and there are various [[Definitions of knowledge#Other definitions|alternative definitions of knowledge]].<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Ichikawa|Steup|2018|loc=§ 3. The Gettier Problem, § 7. Is Knowledge Analyzable?}} | {{harvnb|Zagzebski|1999|pp=93–94, 104–105}} | {{harvnb|Steup|Neta|2020|loc=§ 2.3 Knowing Facts}} }}</ref>