Editing Life support (section)

== Case studies ==

=== Sawatzky vs. Riverview Health Center Inc., November 1998 ===
Mr. Sawatsky had Parkinson's disease and had been a patient at the [[Riverview Health Centre]], [[Manitoba]], [[Canada]] since May 28, 1998. When he was admitted to the hospital, the attending physician decided that if he went into cardiac arrest, he should not be resuscitated. Mrs. Sawatsky opposed the decision and the doctor complied. Later, the doctor decided that the patient needed a cuffed [[tracheotomy]] tube, which Mrs. Sawatsky opposed. In response, the hospital applied to have a Public Trustee become the patient's legal guardian and the Trustee consented to the operation. In late October, without consulting another physician or the patient's wife, the physician again made a "do not resuscitate" order after the patient developed pneumonia. Mrs. Sawatzky went to court for an [[interim order]] to remove the DNR. The "do not resuscitate" order was withdrawn.<ref>{{cite web |title=Sawatzky v. Riverview Health Centre Inc., (1998) 132 Man.R.(2d) 222 (QB) |url=https://ca.vlex.com/vid/sawatzky-v-riverview-health-680752037 |website=vLex |access-date=4 January 2023 |language=en}}</ref>

In the case law to date in 1988, the courts decided that a decision to withhold or withdraw treatment was only for the physician to make, not the courts. However, the Manitoba court decided that given the scarcity of related cases and how none of them considered the [[Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms]], it would try the case. Previous courts had held that physicians should not be bound by law to provide treatment that they did not believe the patient would want. Otherwise, the physician would be acting against his conscience and his duty as a physician. However, if the patient disagreed, they can sue the physician for negligence. To avoid this, Justice Beard ruled in favor of the patient. Resuscitation is not controversial and only requires CPR, which would be performed by the first qualified person on the scene. Even if resuscitation was an ethical dilemma, it was minor given that the doctor had allowed resuscitation for several months already. In contrast with related cases in which patients were comatose, Mrs. Sawatzky provided evidence that her husband was able to communicate and believed that he could recover, but the doctor disagreed. The uncertainty of recovery pushed the Court to order the physician to allow resuscitation. Where rulings discuss end of life issues, the question is more, "Is continued life a benefit to this person" instead of, "Is it possible to treat this person". These questions are beyond the scope of the medical profession and can be answered philosophically or religiously, which is also what builds our sense of justice. Both philosophy and religion value life as a basic right for humans, rather than as the ability to contribute to society, and purposely encompasses all people. Mr. Sawatzky fell under the umbrella, so the judge ruled in his favor.<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://www.cardus.ca/lexview/article/2306/|title=LexView 23.0 - Court Gives Course in Medical Ethics to the Public Trustee {{!}} Lexview|newspaper=Cardus.ca|access-date=2016-12-04|archive-date=2016-12-20|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20161220054835/https://www.cardus.ca/lexview/article/2306/|url-status=dead}}</ref>

=== Airedale NHS Trust v. Bland (1993) ===
The ''Airedale NHS Trust v. Bland'' case was an English [[House of Lords]] decision for a 17-year-old comatose survivor of the [[Hillsborough disaster]]. He had been artificially fed and hydrated via life support for about three years, but he had not shown any improvement while in his persistent vegetative state. His parents challenged the therapeutic life support at the [[High Court of Justice|High Court]] and wanted permission to end life support for their son. The Court decided that his "existence in a persistent vegetative state is not a benefit to the patient," but the statement did not cover the innate value of human life. The court interpreted the sanctity of life as only applicable when life could continue in the way that the patient would have wanted to live their life. If the quality of life did not fall within what the patient valued as a meaningful life, then sanctity of life did not apply. The accuracy of a proxy's decision about how to treat a patient is influenced by what the patient would have wanted for themselves. However, just because the patient wanted to die did not mean the courts would allow physicians to assist and medically kill a patient. This part of the decision was influenced by the case ''[[Rodriguez v British Columbia (AG)|Rodriguez (1993)]]'' in which a British Columbian woman with [[amyotrophic lateral sclerosis]] could not secure permission for assisted suicide.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Godlovitch|first=Glenys|last2=Mitchell|first2=Ian|last3=Doig|first3=Christopher James|date=2005-04-26|title=Discontinuing life support in comatose patients: an example from Canadian case law|journal=CMAJ: Canadian Medical Association Journal|volume=172|issue=9|pages=1172–1173|doi=10.1503/cmaj.050376|issn=0820-3946|pmc=557062|pmid=15851705}}</ref>