Editing Line of Actual Control (section)

== Evolution of the LAC ==

=== Predecessors ===
{{See also|China–Myanmar border#History}}

=== 1956 and 1960 claim lines ===
[[File:Chinese claim lines in Ladakh - map by CIA.png|thumb|right|280px|The 1956 and 1960 claim lines of China in the western sector, map by the [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]]]]

{{expand section|date=September 2020}}

=== LAC of 7 November 1959 ===
[[File:Aksai Chin Sino-Indian border map.png|thumb|280px|Map 2: This Indian map shows various lines, including the red line, representing India's view of the position in 1959, and the blue line, representing the position prior to the 1962 war.]]

The date of 7 November 1959, on which the Chinese premier [[Zhou Enlai]] alluded to the concept of "line of actual control",<ref name="Hoffmann" /> achieved a certain sanctity in Chinese nomenclature. But there was no line defined in 1959. Scholars state that Chinese maps had shown a steadily advancing line in the western sector of the Sino-Indian boundary, each of which was identified as "the line of actual control as of 7 November 1959".<ref>
{{harvp|Fisher, India in 1963|1964|p=738}}: 'For India, the determination of the line from which the Chinese were to withdraw was of crucial importance since in this sector Chinese maps over the years had shown steadily advancing claims, with quite different lines each identified as "the line of actual control as of 7 November 1959".'
</ref><ref>
{{harvp|Fisher, Rose & Huttenback, Himalayan Battleground|1963|pp=137-138}}: 'In fact, the Chinese claim that their 1956 and 1960 maps were "equally valid" was soon used to define the 1959 "line of actual control" as essentially the border shown on the 1960 map—thus incorporating several thousand additional square miles, some of which had not been seized until after the hostilities had broken out in October, 1962.'
</ref><ref>
{{harvp|Hoffmann, India and the China Crisis|1990|p=225}}: 'Furthermore, the Chinese claim line differed greatly from any line held by them on 7 November 1959 and reflected their efforts to establish claims to Indian territory by force, both before and after their massive attack on Indian outposts and forces on 20 October 1962. In some places the line still went beyond the territory that the invading Chinese army had reached.'
</ref>

On 24 October 1962, after the initial thrust of the Chinese forces in the [[Sino-Indian War]], the Chinese premier Zhou Enlai wrote to the heads of ten African and Asian nations outlining his proposals for peace, a fundamental tenet of which was that both sides should undertake not to cross the "line of actual control".{{sfnp|Whiting, Chinese calculus of deterrence|1975|pp=123–124}} This letter was accompanied by certain maps which again identified the "line of actual control as of 7 November 1959". Margaret Fisher calls it the "line of actual control as of 7 November 1959" ''as published in November 1962''.<ref name="Fisher">{{harvp|Fisher, India in 1963|1964|pp=738–739}}</ref><ref>
{{cite journal |last1=Karackattu |first1=Joe Thomas |title=The Corrosive Compromise of the Sino-Indian Border Management Framework: From Doklam to Galwan |journal=Asian Affairs |volume=51 |issue=3 |year=2020 |pages=590–604 |issn=0306-8374 |doi=10.1080/03068374.2020.1804726|s2cid=222093756 }} See Fig.&nbsp;1, p.&nbsp;592
</ref> Scholar Stephen Hoffmann states that the line represented not any position held by the Chinese on 7 November 1959, but rather incorporated the gains made by the Chinese army before and after the massive attack on 20 October 1962. In some cases, it went beyond the territory the Chinese army had reached.{{sfnp|Hoffmann, India and the China Crisis|1990|p=225}}

India's understanding of the 1959 line passed through Haji Langar, Shamal Lungpa and Kongka La (the red line shown on Map 2).<ref>[https://www.claudearpi.net/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/1963-Chinese-Agression-in-Maps.pdf Chinese Aggression in Maps: Ten maps, with an introduction and explanatory notes] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200927055404/http://www.claudearpi.net/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/1963-Chinese-Agression-in-Maps.pdf |date=27 September 2020 }}, Publications Division, Government of India, 1963. Map 2.</ref>

Even though the Chinese-claimed line was not acceptable to India as the depiction of an actual position,<ref name=indermalhotra>
Inder Malhotra, [http://archive.indianexpress.com/news/the-colombo--compromise-/860792/ The Colombo ‘compromise’], The Indian Express, 17 October 2011. "Nehru also rejected emphatically China's definition of the LAC as it existed on November 7, 1959."
</ref> it was apparently acceptable as the line from which the Chinese would undertake to withdraw 20 kilometres.<ref name=Fisher/> Despite the non-acceptance by India of the Chinese proposals, the Chinese did withdraw 20 kilometres from this line, and henceforth continued to depict it as the "line of actual control of 1959".{{sfnp|Hoffmann, India and the China Crisis|1990|loc=Map 6: "India's forward policy, a Chinese view", p.&nbsp;105}}<ref>{{Cite web |url=https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/175959.pdf |title=Premier Zhou Letter to Prime Minister Nehru dated November 07, 1959 |access-date=9 September 2022 |archive-date=9 September 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220909193824/https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/175959.pdf |url-status=live }}</ref>

In December 1962, representatives of six African and Asian nations met in [[Colombo]] to develop peace proposals for India and China. Their proposals formalised the Chinese pledge of 20-kilometre withdrawal and the same line was used, labelled as "the line from which the Chinese forces will withdraw 20 km."{{sfnp|Hoffmann, India and the China Crisis|1990|p=226}}<ref>[http://www.claudearpi.net/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/Aksai-Chin.jpg ''ILLUSTRATION DES PROPOSITIONS DE LA CONFERENCE DE COLOMBO - SECTEUR OCCIDENTAL''] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201012093110/http://www.claudearpi.net/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/Aksai-Chin.jpg |date=12 October 2020 }}, claudearpi.net, retrieved 1 October 2020. "''Ligne au dela de la quelle les forces Chinoises se retirent de 20 km. selon les propositions de la Conférence de Colombo'' (Line beyond which the Chinese forces will withdraw 20 km. according to the proposals of the Colombo Conference)"</ref>

This line was essentially forgotten by both sides till 2013, when the Chinese PLA revived it during its [[2013 Depsang incursion|Depsang incursion]] as a new border claim.<ref>
{{harvp|Gupta, The Himalayan Face-off|2014|loc=Introduction}}: "While the Indian Army asked the PLA to withdraw to its original positions as per the 1976 border patrolling agreement, the PLA produced a map, which was part of the annexure to a letter written by Zhou to Nehru and the Conference of African-Asian leaders in November 1959 [''sic''; the correct date is November 1962], to buttress its case that the new position was well within the Chinese side of the LAC."
</ref>{{efn|The claimed line in this location is "new" in that it is well beyond the 1956 and 1960 claim lines of China, the latter having been called the "traditional customary boundary". It is said to be 19 km beyond it, in Indian estimation.}}

=== Line separating the forces before 8 September 1962 ===
At the end of the 1962 war, India demanded that the Chinese withdraw to their positions on 8 September 1962 (the blue line in Map 2).<ref name=indermalhotra />

=== 1993 agreement ===
{{Main|Border Peace and Tranquility Agreement, 1993}}

<!--This first paragraph backgrounder is needed and is important. Please do not remove fully. Shorten if needed.-->
Political relations following the 1962 war only saw signs of improvement towards the later 1970s and 80s. Ties had remained strained until then also because of Chinese attraction to Pakistan during India Pakistan wars in 1965 and 1971.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Li |first=Zhang |date=September 2010 |title=China-India Relations: Strategic Engagement and Challenges |url=https://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/asievisions34zhangli.pdf |via=www.ifri.org |publisher=[[Institut français des relations internationales]]: Center for Asian Studies |isbn=9782865927746}}</ref> Restored ambassadorial relations in 1976, a visit of the Indian Prime Minister to China in 1988, a visit of the Chinese Premier to India in 1992 and then a visit of Indian President to China in 1992 preceded the 1993 agreement.<ref name="PRC">{{Cite web |last= |first= |date=2 February 2002 |title=The Relations between China and India |url=http://in.china-embassy.org/eng/sgxw/zygx/t61475.htm |access-date=2021-02-16 |website=Embassy of the People's Republic Of China in India}}</ref> Prior to the 1993 agreement, a trade agreement was signed in 1984, followed by a cultural cooperation agreement in 1988.<ref name="PRC" /><ref>{{Cite web |last= |first= |date=23 December 1988 |title=Sino-Indian Joint Press Communique |url=https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/2649_665393/t15800.shtml |website=Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the People's Republic of China}}</ref>

The 1993 agreement, signed on 7 September, was the first bilateral agreement between China and India to contain the phrase Line of Actual Control. The agreement covered force level, consultations as a way forward and the role of a Joint Working Group. The agreement made it clear that there was an "ultimate solution to the boundary question between the two countries" which remained pending. It was also agreed that "the two sides agree that references to the line of actual control in this Agreement do not [[Prejudice (legal term)|prejudice]] their respective positions on the boundary question".<ref>{{Cite web |last= |first= |date=1993 |title=PA-X: Agreement on the Maintenance of Peace and Tranquility along the Line of Actual Control in the India-China Border Areas |url=https://www.peaceagreements.org/view/286 |website=Peace Agreements Database |via=The University of Edinburgh}}</ref>